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From the Editor
The Summer issue of Parameters opens with an essay by Sir Lawrence
Freedman entitled “Beyond Surprise Attack.” Surprise, argues Freedman,
can come in any number of forms, and sometimes those that come in the
middle or end of a campaign prove the most decisive.
Our first forum, Reevaluating Diplomatic & Military Power, offers two
articles. The first, “What Are America’s Alliances Good For?” by Hal
Brands and Peter Feaver, contends the costs and risks associated with
America’s military alliances are frequently overstated, while at the same
time the benefits are downplayed. Brands and Feaver, thus, provide a
more accurate net assessment of America’s alliances in hopes of better
informing current policy debates. In the second article, “Employing
Military Force in the 21st Century,” Michael Matheny petitions US
policymakers look to past uses of force for ways of employing force
while managing the global and national violence threshold.
The second forum, Innovations in Warfare & Strateg y, contains four
articles on new or emerging forms of warfare. David Katz’s “Waging
Financial Warfare: Why and How” introduces financial warfare as a
valuable and innovative tool for deterring the sponsors of the “little
green” and “little blue men” of proxy warfare. Emilio Iasiello’s “Russia’s
Improved Information Operations: From Georgia to Crimea” discusses
Russia’s enhancements in information warfare since 2008, which
he insists put it somewhat ahead of the United States. In “Achieving
Organizational Flexibility through Ambidexterity,” Patricia Shields and
Donald Travis, introduce the concept of organizational ambidexterity
and explain its value to military planning and problem-solving. In the
last article, “The Strategic Logic of Sieges in Counterinsurgencies,”
Lionel Beehner, Benedetta Berti, and Michael Jackson question the
perception that siege warfare is an effective and relatively low-cost form
of counterinsurgency. Instead, they see it as ineffective without major
outside military support or the willingness to use overwhelming force.
Our final forum, Army Expansibility, presents three articles touching
on important aspects of the US Army’s ability to expand rapidly. In
“Mobilizing for a Major War,” Olen Chad Bridges and Andrée Navarro
expose some of the more glaring deficiencies the Army must correct
to be prepared for a large-scale mobilization. In “Mobilization: The
State of the Field,” Ken Gilliam and Barrett Parker describe research
the Army is conducting to improve its ability to execute a large-scale
mobilization. Last, Robert Owen’s “US Air Force Airlift and the Army’s
Relevance” urges Army leaders to advocate for an expanded air mobility
capability. ~AJE

Special Commentary

Beyond Surprise Attack
Lawrence Freedman
©2017 Lawrence Freedman

ABSTRACT: This article explores the use and value of surprise
attacks in modern warfare.

A

surprise attack, conceived with cunning, prepared with duplicity,
and executed with ruthlessness, provides international history
with its most melodramatic moments. A state believes itself to
be at peace then suddenly finds itself at war, in agony and embarrassed that
it failed to pick up the enemy plot and will now suffer the consequences
of blows from which recovery will be hard. Melodramas along these
lines play out not only in the worst-case scenarios of military planners
and alarmist commentators but also in movies and novels. They offer a
compelling narrative: the most powerful states are humiliated and the
course of history altered as one power sees possibilities for action that its
victim misses completely. It is also a credible narrative as surprise attacks
have been regular occurrences throughout history. They make military
sense as defeating a strong opponent is always going to be difficult unless
the first blows really count. Maximizing operational secrecy is essential to
maximizing operational success.
Surprise makes the most sense when battles are decisive. Otherwise,
the effect will be to start a war—with all the pain, risk, and uncertainty—
without ensuring victory. A decisive victory forces the enemy hand. An
important legacy of the Napoleonic Wars was the conviction that such
a victory depended on the effective elimination of the enemy army.
At some point surprise could make the critical difference when two
essentially symmetrical armies, relying on superior tactics, organization
and armaments, faced each other. Catching an unprepared enemy with
an early blow from which it could never really recover, even if it tried to
fight on, should allow the whole business of war to be concluded quickly.
The Franco-Prussian War underscored the importance of early
battlefield success. The Prussians were astonished when the French,
having declared war, were slow to mobilize. They did not make the same
mistake. The efficiency of their mobilization, along with the innovative
tactics of Helmuth von Moltke, caught France unaware, leading to its
defeat at the Battle of Sedan at the start of September 1870. Germany
executed the ideal campaign, quick and truly decisive, spoiled only by
the refusal of the French population to accept the verdict of battle until
their unexpected resistance was crushed. Moltke showed how to surprise
the enemy, and his successors in the German general staff took note: To
win a war, mobilize early and strike hard and fast.
The German victory also led to speculation about how other
powers might be caught out by a ruthless and resourceful enemy,
including books imagining how other great powers might also suffer

Sir Lawrence Freedman
is Emeritus Professor
of War Studies at
King’s College London.
This article draws on
The Future of War: A
History (New York:
PublicAffairs, 2017).
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sudden and catastrophic defeats. An early example of this genre was The
Battle of Dorking, written by a British Army officer. Appearing in 1871
just after von Moltke’s victory, Dorking described a German invasion
from across the channel in which telegraph cables were cut to prevent
advance warning. The Royal Navy, which had allowed itself to become
overextended because of colonial commitments, lost its warships to “fatal
engines which sent our ships, one after the other, to the bottom.” The
drama concluded with a last stand on a ridge near Dorking in southern
England, where a brave combination of regulars and reserves were let
down by the army’s miserable organization. And so, the accumulated
prosperity and strength of centuries was lost in days. A once-proud
nation was stripped of its colonies, “its trade gone, its factories silent, its
harbours empty, a prey to pauperism and decay.”1
As with so much writing about the future of war, this example
essentially made a point about the present, in this case the need for
army reform, a statement about what might happen if sensible measures
were not taken urgently. Other books followed with similar themes
about the dangers of spies or readying young men for the demands
and sacrifices of war, or sometimes in counternarratives to the gloom,
demonstrating how a brave nation could cope with all challenges. By
the start of the twentieth century, writers were exploring the military
possibilities opening up with new technologies such as heavier-than-air
flying machines.2 The imagination of the British novelist H. G. Wells
even stretched to atom bombs.3 A regular theme in all this literature
was the importance of surprise and the first blow. The key to victory
was seizing the initiative.
There were those, such as the Polish banker Ivan Bloch, who
understood that even the cleverest plans might fail, that defenses
might cope better than expected with dashing attacks, and that a
defiant population might resist foreign occupation.4 Still, the Germans
opened the First World War with an ambitious offensive designed, once
again, to defeat France quickly. But this time they failed. Instead of a
decisive victory, they got caught up in a long attritional slog, in which
they struggled to cope with the superior economic and demographic
strengths of their enemies.
After 1918, alternative routes to a quick victory were sought. One
possibility was to use tanks to wage a rapid offensive. But there was
another alternative that dispensed with forcing an enemy land invasion.
Instead of pressuring the enemy government to capitulate as a result of
the annihilation of its army, it would have to surrender because of the
demands of a desperate population unable to cope with a succession
of massive air raids and being hit by high explosives, incendiaries, and
poison gas. A new dystopian literature quickly developed, telling of
the trials of ordinary people as they fled their burning cities or of the
hopelessness of governments in the face of weapons they were unable
1      George Chesney, “The Battle of Dorking: Reminiscences of a Volunteer,” Blackwood’s Magazine
(May 1871), http:// gutenberg.net.au/ebooks06/0602091h.html.
2      See the two novels about Robur, with his heavier-than-air flying machine, by Jules Verne, The
Clipper of the Clouds (London: Sampson Low, 1887); and Jules Verne, Master of the World (London:
Sampson Low, 1904).
3      H. G. Wells, The World Set Free, a Story of Mankind (London: Macmillan, 1914).
4      Ivan Stanislavovich Bloch, Is War Now Impossible? Being an Abridgment of the War of the Future in
Its Technical Economic and Political Relations (London: Grant Richard, 1899).
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to counter. The theme comes through in some of the titles: The Poison
War, The Black Death, Menace, Empty Victory, Invasion from the Air, War upon
Women, Chaos, and Air Reprisal.5
Air raids did not provide the opening shots of the Second World
War, but they soon came. becoming regular and progressively more
destructive. Although their effects were certainly terrible, they were not
decisive.6 The resilience of ordinary people and of modern societies had
been underestimated. Only with the war’s finale and the atom bombs
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the deadly promise of air
power realized. Previous air raids had killed as many people, but this
time the devastation required only single weapons and the impact was
emphasized by the surrender of an already beleaguered Japan.
The prospect that the next war could soon “go nuclear” inevitably
dominated strategic debates after 1945. But, the trauma of the two surprise
attacks that brought the Soviet Union and then the United States into
the Second World War shaped considerations of what that might mean.
Pushing the logic of seizing the initiative to the extreme, Hitler launched
Operation Barbarossa against Russia in June 1941 while the British were
still fighting; the Japanese attacked the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor,
despite failing to pacify China. Both efforts were enormous gambles,
bold in their execution and complete in their surprise. Both offensives
were characterized by arrogance, for their leaders were convinced their
nations were superior in spirit and in discipline, but also in recklessness,
taking on much larger powers before defeating the existing enemies.
Both gambles failed. The Soviet Union was rocked; at one point it
looked like it would succumb, but it held on. Gradually, the size of the
country, its harsh climate, reserves of strength, and Nazi mistakes turned
the tide of war.7 There was never much chance that Japan would conquer
the United States—the objective was to get in the best position for what
was assumed to be an inevitable war. The result was a terrible conflict
with great suffering, ending with Japan under American occupation.8
The most important lesson was that getting in the first blow,
however well designed and executed, did not guarantee victory. Yet for
the victims of 1941, the basic lesson was that great power did not provide
immunity from surprise attack. The United States and the Soviet Union
won in the end, but their fights were long and painful, and the results
were not preordained. The shock effect was substantial, and it left a
legacy in the way both thought about war thereafter. In 1958, when
experts from both superpowers met briefly to discuss their fears of
surprise attacks, the Soviets were fixated on yet another large offensive
set in motion by Germany, this time backed by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), while the Americans were focused on another
Pearl Harbor-type “bolt from the blue” this time with nuclear missiles.9
5      I. F. Clarke, Voices Prophesying War: Future Wars, 1763–3749 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992), 169–70.
6      Richard J. Overy, The Bombing War: Europe 1939–1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2013).
7      Christian Hartmann, Operation Barbarossa: Nazi Germany’s War in the East, 1941–1945 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013).
8      Jeffrey Record, A War It Was Always Going to Lose: Why Japan Attacked America in 1941
(Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2011).
9      Jeremi Suri, “America’s Search for a Technological Solution to the Arms Race: The Surprise
Attack Conference of 1958 and a Challenge for ‘Eisenhower Revisionists’,” Diplomatic History 21,
no. 3 (Summer 1997).
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The impact of these shocks could be seen during the Cold War,
especially in regard to nuclear strategy. In Washington the dominant
fear was that Soviet leadership might become convinced that a wellcrafted first strike would put it in a position where it need not fear
retaliation. Starting numbers were irrelevant if the United States could
be disarmed by a surprise Soviet attack directed against its bombers,
intercontinental ballistic missiles, and missile-carrying submarines.10
In the 1960s, the Pentagon set a test for the US nuclear arsenal: could
it “assure destruction” of the Soviet Union? In other words, could
America maintain “at all times a clear and unmistakable ability to inflict
an unacceptable degree of damage upon any aggressor, or combination
of aggressors—even after absorbing a surprise first strike.” This damage
was quantified at 33–20 percent of the Soviet population and 75–50
percent of the Soviet industrial capacity. These criteria assumed a pain
threshold well above the losses experienced in World War II, which
were hardly willingly accepted. Then, the highest possible intelligence
assessments about future Soviet capabilities were considered to see
whether any extra capabilities were required to ensure that the assured
destruction criteria could be met. The answer was not a lot was needed
beyond existing plans.
This effort was not a prediction of the course of a future war, or of
the American government’s reaction to a complete failure of deterrence.
The aim was to leave no doubt in the minds of Soviet leadership that
aggression carried an unavoidable risk of nuclear devastation. An
American response could not be guaranteed because the Soviet Union
could also, even after absorbing a first strike, ensure similar levels of
destruction of the United States. Hence “mutual assured destruction,”
naturally known as MAD, came to describe the standoff between the
nuclear powers during the Cold War. How much the capability contributed
to preventing a hot war remains a matter for conjecture. There were
many reasons why political leaders would have been desperate to avoid
a Third World War, but the possibility of mutual destruction was hardly
irrelevant. It was not necessary to gaze for long into a crystal ball to
see the awful devastation with which a future war might end.11 Would
the Germans and Japanese in 1941 have really been so ready to launch
their wars if their crystal balls had shown them how bad things might
turn out? The point of deterrence was to persuade a potential adversary
not to bank on the first move being decisive, and to think through the
consequences of an enemy still capable of fighting back.
Establishing there was no sure way to win a nuclear war did not end
all fears. The Soviet Union kept building up its own arsenal, suggesting
it had a different view of how deterrence might work, which might even
include some plan for a nuclear victory. Even if MAD meant the nuclear
arsenals neutralized each other, the Soviet strength in conventional
capabilities provided them with other options for mischief. This capacity
left plenty of scope for inventiveness when it came to imagining how
Moscow might take an initiative that would catch Washington unaware
and so allow stealing some geopolitical advantage. One scenario actively
debated in the 1970s was the possibility of a sudden and vast Warsaw
10      Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 37, no. 2 (January 1959).
11      Albert Carnesale et al., Living with Nuclear Weapons (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1983).
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Pact offensive into West Germany that required little prior mobilization,
and so, no practical warning to NATO about the attack.12 This worstcase scenario assumed everything worked perfectly for the enemy while
NATO was left flat-footed, overwhelmed before it could even consider
escalation to nuclear force.
Yet, even when contemporary wars have opened with surprise
attacks, the results have not been encouraging. Israel’s demolition of
Egypt’s air force on the first day of the Six-Day War (1967) is one example
where the enemy was left helpless by a well-executed attack. Although,
this war also demonstrates how conquering and occupying another’s
territory might also lead to persistent terrorism and insurgency. Two
prime examples of surprise attacks that failed to deliver early victories
are North Korea’s move against South Korea in 1950 and Iraq’s contest
with Iran three decades later. The North might have succeeded if an
international coalition had not managed to aid South Korea before it
was completely overrun. Iraq found itself struggling to cope with Iran’s
counterinvasion in 1980 and became caught in a war lasting until 1988.
Its resultant indebtedness to those who helped it fund its defense, was
one reason for its next surprise attack—Kuwait in August 1990. The
occupation was easily accomplished, but it barely lasted six months.
Kuwait was liberated under an American-led coalition in early 1991.
The most striking feature of modern wars is not how quickly they
can be concluded but how long they last.13 The United States achieved
quick victories in Iraq and Afghanistan against regular forces but then
got bogged down dealing with insurgencies. Russian aggression against
Ukraine has left it bogged down in an inconclusive struggle. Syria
has become an arena in which a whole series of regional conflicts are
playinged out without an identified route to anything resembling peace
being identified. With civil wars, the typical conflict now lasts years,
long after the economy, society, and political system have been broken,
with the violence sustained by criminals as well as zealots, warlords, and
neighboring states.
Major powers now often appear tentative and unsure. Even when,
as with Russia, they seem to be taking bold steps, their objectives turn
out to be limited. Grand victories are no longer in mind. Instead of
audacious moves geared to a quick victory, a probing, patient alternative
approach is even seen in China’s disputes in the South China Sea.
Yet, none of this has erased concerns about surprise attacks. One
reason is the recollection of al-Qaeda’s attacks on New York and
Washington on September 11, 2001, after which commentary soon
turned again to Pearl Harbor. The lesson lay not in the revenge taken
against al-Qaeda and its Taliban sponsors in Afghanistan but the shock
of discovering the vulnerability of modern, open societies too malicious
attack. The aim seemed simply to cause maximum pain, and that goal
soon led to speculation about the many ways that pain might be inflicted.
12      A “standing start” attack was a theme in an influential report by Senators Sam Nunn and
Dewey F. Bartlett, NATO and the New Soviet Threat, US Senate, Armed Services Committee, 95th
Congress, First Session (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977). See also Robert
Close, Europe without Defence? 48 Hours that Could Change the Face of the World (Brussels: Editions Arts
and Voyages, 1976).
13      Ann Hironaka, Neverending Wars: The International Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation
of Civil War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).
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Scenarios in which small terrorist cells or even “lone wolves” could
cause harm using basic weapons such as guns, knives, highly explosive
materials, aircraft or motor vehicles turned into lethal weapons were
constructed. Attacks of this sort could not bring a modern western state
to “its knees.”14 The surprise they achieved was essentially tactical in its
effects. At most, strategically they were part of an ongoing and largely
uncoordinated global insurgency. Despite the obvious differences in
scale and impact, the outcome of a Taliban ambush in Kabul or of a
shooting in Paris were part of a campaign that began before 9/11 and
appears to be of indefinite duration.
All of this needs to be kept in mind when addressing claims that
future surprise attacks will come out of cyberspace and have effects
tantamount to defeat in war. As early as the 1990s, the growing
dependence of vital services on digital networks led to warnings of an
“electronic Pearl Harbor” directed against the critical infrastructure
supporting energy, transport, banking, and so on.15 Instead of trying to
get quick victories by taking out enemy forces, why not instead take out
the enemy society? While the technical issues are quite different from
more classical forms of military attack, and the practice would be far
less violent, there are similarities to the post-1918 claims about strategic
air bombardment providing a more satisfactory route to victory than
attritional fights between armies.16 As with a nuclear first strike, the
best case for the perpetrator requires confidence that preparations for
an attack are not detected, that the appropriate networks are properly
identified and could be attacked, and that the cyberattacks will work as
planned. And then, as with Operation Barbarossa and Pearl Harbor,
there is the question of what happens after the first blow. How would
this turn into a lasting political gain? A cyberattack does not lead to
territory being occupied. The victims would be expected to respond,
even as they struggled to get the lights back on and systems working.
An attack that produced drastic effects could be considered a casus belli,
and classical military responses might be considered legitimate.17
The issue is not whether critical infrastructure can be vulnerable and
lead to major upset if taken down. Hostile activity in the cyberdomain,
represented by a continuing offense-defense duel, is now constant and
ubiquitous. It involves activists, terrorist and criminal organizations and
poses constant trouble for those trying to preserve the integrity and the
effectiveness of vital networks. The danger, however, is not so much of
some one-off catastrophic surprise attack but a series of events in line
with modern conflict, reflecting the blurring of the military and civilian
spheres, efforts to weaken and subvert opponents without attacking
them head on. These are wars with occasional military strikes and
battles, often vicious but still short of being truly decisive. Cyberattacks

14      The most alarming prospect was a terrorist nuclear weapon. Graham Allison, Nuclear
Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Times Books / Henry Holt, 2004).
15      The first to refer to the possibility of an “electronic Pearl Harbor” was Winn Schwartau,
Terminal Compromise (Old Hickory, TN: Interpact Press, 1991), http://www.gutenberg.org
/files/79/79.txt.
16      See John Arquilla, “The Computer Mouse that Roared: Cyberwar in the Twenty-First
Century,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 18, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2011): 39–48.
17      George Lucas, Ethics and Cyber Warfare: The Quest for Responsible Security in the Age of Digital
Warfare (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
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represent another way to cause injury and irritation short of obvious
acts of war, as well as serving as natural accompaniments to acts of war.
There is, therefore, a disconnect between the continuing search
for a route to a decisive victory and the contemporary experience of
warfare, which once started, is hard to stop. Even if enemy regulars are
overwhelmed, the result is as likely to be insurgency, especially directed
against foreign forces. This tends to be reflected in more recent future
war fiction, such as Ghost Fleet by Peter Singer and August Cole. This
story opens with a surprise attack of impressive complexity, cunning and
duplicity, which almost succeeds but fails in the end.18
There will always be arguments for testing the resilience of systems
against the worst case. If they can cope with the most severe threats
then lesser cases should be manageable. The worst case may depend
on the aggressor being foolish and futile, but stupidity is one of the
hardest things for any intelligence agency to predict. At the same time,
when planning an offensive, every effort must be made to make the first
blows count. The key point, however, is that even with surprise and
maximum effort, these first blows are unlikely to be decisive on their
own, especially against an opponent with any reserves of strength. This
depth is why states must look beyond surprise attacks to what follows,
to the second and third blows, and also to those much further down the
line, perhaps delivered by irregulars who have taken over the struggle
after the defeat of the regulars. The surprises of war do not just come
at the start.

18      P. W. Singer and August Cole, Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 2015).

Reevaluating Diplomatic & Military Power

What Are America’s Alliances Good For?
Hal Brands and Peter D. Feaver
©2017 Hal Brands and Peter D. Feaver

ABSTRACT: The costs and risks associated with America’s military
alliances have always been more visible and easily understood than
the benefits. In reality, however, those costs and risks are frequently
overstated, whereas the benefits are more numerous and significant
than often appreciated. This article offers a more accurate net
assessment of America’s alliances in hopes of better informing
current policy debates.

P

resident Donald Trump has shaken up the foreign policy debate
in the United States, and nowhere more so than in relations
with America’s longstanding treaty allies. Since Trump emerged
as a presidential candidate in mid-2015, he has often put US alliances
squarely in his crosshairs. Trump labeled the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) “obsolete” and suggested leaving its easternmost
members to defend themselves. He floated the idea of encouraging
nuclear proliferation by Japan and South Korea to enable US geopolitical
retrenchment. As president, Trump pointedly refused to explicitly affirm
America’s Article 5 commitment at his first NATO summit, and he
publicly dressed down the European allies for failing to spend more
on defense.1
In a subsequent trip to Europe, Trump offered a more robust
statement of US commitment to NATO, but nonetheless vented
his frustration with allies for not, in his view, shouldering sufficient
burdens.2 Underlying these critiques has been the idea that US alliances
are fundamentally sucker bets—one-sided relationships in which a
guileless America bears all the costs and parasitic allies derive all the
benefits. “We’re taken advantage by every nation in the world virtually,”
Trump commented in February 2017.3
Not surprisingly, the bipartisan US foreign policy elite has generally
reacted with alarm at the administration’s rhetoric and policies. Leading
commentators have warned that Trump is threatening to harm the
alliances Washington spent decades building, institutions generally
considered to be among America’s most precious geopolitical assets.4
Likewise, international observers have worried that the United States
1      See, variously, Aaron Eglitis, Toluse Olorunnipa, and Andy Sharp, “Trump’s NATO
Skepticism Raises Alarm for Allies Near Russia,” Bloomberg, July 21, 2016; Stephanie Condon,
“Donald Trump: Japan, South Korea Might Need Nuclear Weapons,” CBS News, March 29, 2016;
and Jeremy Diamond, “Trump Scolds NATO Allies over Defense Spending,” CNN, May 25, 2017.
2      Abby Phillip and John Wagner, “In Poland, Trump Reaffirms Commitment to NATO, Chides
Russia,” Daily Herald (Chicago), July 6, 2017.
3      Lauren Gambino and Sabrina Siddiqui, “Trump Defends Chaotic Foreign Policy: ‘We’re
Going to Straighten It Out, OK?’,” Guardian, February 2, 2017.
4      See, for instance, Dov Zakheim, “Trump’s Position on Treaty Commitments Has Already
Hurt America,” Foreign Policy, July 22, 2016.
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seems to be turning away from its most important friends.5 Yet despite
the reaction they have provoked, Trump’s critiques have nonetheless
revealed a fundamental asymmetry in the cost-benefit assessment
of US alliances.
The fact of the matter is that the costs and risks associated with
America’s alliances have always been more visible and easily understood
than the benefits. Moreover, because US foreign policy elites have
long become accustomed to military alliances as facts of geopolitical
life, even proalliance observers often struggle to specify, in concrete
terms, why those institutions are so valuable. Supporters are thus at a
rhetorical disadvantage in these arguments. They often defend alliances
by pointing to vague and ill-defined benefits, or simply by invoking
tradition, whereas critics can point to specific dangers and burdens,
including those more easily reduced to a campaign trail slogan or a pithy
tweet. And Trump is not alone in his attacks on US alliances—many
leading “realist” academics have long offered similar critiques, which
the president has now effectively appropriated as his own. “The U.S.
net gain from its alliance relationships is . . . not commensurate with the
cost,” Barry Posen writes: “the bargain has become unprofitable to the
United States.”6
In this essay, we offer a more accurate net assessment of America’s
alliances by detailing the purported costs and considerable—if less
widely understood—benefits. We first summarize the most common
critiques of US alliances and explain why many of those critiques are less
persuasive than they initially seem. We then provide a detailed typology
of the myriad benefits—military and otherwise—of US alliances. As this
analysis shows, the net assessment of US alliances is strongly positive,
and the balance is not even particularly close. Today as always, there
remain significant challenges associated with alliance management and
reasonable debates to be had about addressing them. But those debates
need to be informed by a better understanding of what US alliances are
good for in the first place.

Costs, Real and Perceived

Trump is not the first prominent observer to critique US alliances.
Ever since the country’s founding, permanent military alliances have
been a source of controversy. The alliance structure built from the ashes
of World War II, and gradually expanded in the decades thereafter, has
itself been the subject of heated debate. Leading political figures such
as Senator Robert Taft initially opposed an American commitment to
NATO; Senator Michael Mansfield sought to force withdrawal of half
the US troops deployed to Europe in the early 1970s. The post-Cold
War expansion of NATO touched off perhaps the most intense foreign
policy debate of the 1990s. And in recent decades, there has been a lively
cottage industry among academics who deem US alliances expensive,
unrewarding, and dangerous, and who argue for attenuating or simply
abandoning those commitments. The standard academic critique—much
5      Krishnadev Calamur, “Germany’s Merkel Urges ‘Europe to Take Our Fate into Our Own
Hands,’ ” Atlantic, May 30, 2017.
6      Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2014), 34.
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of which Trump has adopted or adapted as his own—adduces several
key costs and dangers associated with US alliances.
First, America’s military alliances require Washington to defend
countries whose security is not vital to the United States. Second, US
alliances compel military expenditures far higher than would be necessary
simply to defend America itself. Third, maintaining the credibility of US
alliances forces America to adopt aggressive, forward-leaning defense
strategies. Fourth, having allies raises the risk of the United States
being entrapped in unwanted conflicts. Fifth, America’s allies habitually
free ride on America’s own exertions. Sixth, alliances limit America’s
freedom of action and cause unending diplomatic headaches.7
So how accurate are these critiques? We consider each in its turn.
In sum, America’s alliance system is hardly costless, and all of these
critiques contain at least a kernel of truth. In many cases, however, the
costs are significantly exaggerated—or critics simply ignore that the
United States would have to pay similar costs even if it had no alliances.
Alliances require defending countries whose security is not vital to the United
States. The United States has formal security commitments to over thirty
treaty allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific and informal or ambiguous
security commitments to over thirty additional countries.8 These
commitments, particularly the formal treaty commitments, represent
something approaching a solemn vow to shed blood to defend nonAmerican lands. And some of the countries protected by US guarantees
are not, in and of themselves, critical to the global balance of power or
the physical security of the United States.9 The United States could be
called upon to resist a Russian seizure of Estonia, and yet the American
people could survive and thrive in a world in which Estonia was occupied
by Russian forces.
Yet if this critique is not baseless, it is often overstated, because the
United States does have a vital interest in defending many of its current
allies. The basic geopolitical lesson of World Wars I and II—a lesson
many critics of US alliances endorse—is that Washington should not
allow any hostile power to dominate a crucial geopolitical region such as
Europe, East Asia, or the Middle East.10 Accordingly, the United States
could still find itself compelled to fight to defend those regions—and
7      For examples of these critiques, see Posen, Restraint; Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions:
American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); Stephen
M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: Norton, 2006);
Christopher A. Preble, The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less
Prosperous, and Less Free (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009); Eric A. Nordlinger, Isolationism
Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995);
and Ted Galen Carpenter, A Search for Enemies: America’s Alliances after the Cold War (Washington,
DC: Cato Institute, 1992). Some of these works build on earlier (and often less critical) studies of
alliance dynamics, including Mancur Olson Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of
Alliances,” Review of Economics and Statistics 48, 3 (August 1996): 266–79, doi:10.2307/1927082; and
Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).
8      See Adam Taylor, “Map: The U.S. Is Bound by Treaties to Defend a Quarter of Humanity,”
Washington Post, May 30, 2015. A precise count of US allies is difficult to achieve because the actual meaning and implications of certain US defense agreements—the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance, for instance—are ambiguous.
9      It is important to note that all of America’s defense commitments provide an “out” through
clauses allowing Washington to act in accordance with its own constitutional processes. In essence,
treaties—although they are ratified by the Senate and carry the force of law—represent more of a
moral obligation than a tightly binding legal obligation to other states.
10      See John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior
U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 95, 4 (July/August 2016): 70–83.
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many key countries therein—even if formal alliance relationships did
not exist. This was, after all, precisely what happened during both world
wars and the Persian Gulf War, when American officials concluded
that US security required defending or liberating key countries in these
regions, even though Washington had not previously had military
alliances there. Alliances do not cause US entanglements overseas;
entanglements cause alliances.
US alliances compel military expenditures far higher than would be necessary
to defend America itself. To defend allies in the western Pacific or Europe,
the United States requires global power-projection capabilities and a
military that can win not just in its own backyard but in the backyards of
its great-power rivals. America thus needs a larger, more technologically
advanced, more sophisticated force than would be necessary strictly for
continental defense, along with an accompanying global-basing network.
For these reasons, the US military is indeed more expensive than it
would be absent US alliances. Yet this critique is also overblown. After
all, if the United States has an interest in preventing any hostile power
from dominating a key region of Eurasia, then alliances or no alliances,
Washington would still require a military capable of projecting decisive
power into these regions in an emergency.11 Likewise, because America
has geopolitical objectives beyond the protection of allies—such as
counterterrorism and securing the global commons—the need for
advanced power projection capabilities and overseas bases would remain
even in a world without alliances.
Such a force might still be smaller than today’s military. If the
United States pursued a strategy in which it rolled back or attenuated
key alliances, one critic suggests, it could reduce defense spending to
2.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), as opposed to 3.5 or 4
percent.12 Yet America would still have the world’s largest defense budget
by a considerable margin under this approach, and such a force—which
would consist, for instance, of only four carrier strike groups instead of
10 to 11 today—might not actually be sufficient to command the global
commons and fight its way back into key regions in a crisis.13
In fact, if the United States pulled back from its alliance commitments
and waited for a crisis to develop before surging back into key regions,
it might find such a mission more difficult—and more expensive—
than simply protecting its allies in the first place. It was precisely this
fact—that the United States ended up deploying millions of troops to
liberate Western Europe and East Asia during World War II, at financial
and human costs that would be almost unimaginable today, that led
American policymakers to adopt a different approach featuring formal
alliances and forward deployments thereafter.14 Nor would eliminating
parts of the US basing network associated with protecting American
11      Evan Braden Montgomery, “Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific: China’s Rise and
the Future of U.S. Power Projection,” International Security 38, no. 4 (Spring 2014): 121, doi:10.1162
/ISEC_a_00160.
12      Posen, Restraint.
13      Hal Brands, The Limits of Offshore Balancing (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
2015), 23–28.
14      See Robert J. Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003),
205; and James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “An Ocean Too Far: Offshore Balancing in the
Indian Ocean,” Asian Security 8, 1 (March 2012): 11, doi:10.1080/14799855.2011.652025.
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allies save much money absent corresponding force reductions, because
host-nation support arrangements often make it roughly as cheap, if not
cheaper, to station American forces overseas than to station them in the
United States.15 American defense expenditures could slightly decrease
in a world without US military alliances, at least in the short-term, but
the savings would be less dramatic—and perhaps more ephemeral—
than one might expect.
Maintaining the credibility of American alliances requires adopting forwardleaning defense strategies. This critique comes closer to the mark. Prior to
the Cold War, the US strategic posture was essentially one of allowing
aggressors to conquer friendly states in Europe and East Asia, and then
mobilizing to liberate those areas. Since the late 1940s, however, US
policymakers have worried that American allies will be unlikely to risk
aligning with Washington—and thereby antagonizing hostile neighbors
such as the Soviet Union—if they believe the United States will simply
allow them to be overrun in a conflict. If being liberated first requires
being conquered, who wants to be liberated?16
Accordingly, since the early Cold War, the United States has focused
on defending rather than liberating allies. This strategy required
Washington to pledge to defend West Germany at the Rhine despite
the enormous difficulty of doing so, to forward-station forces in
Europe and East Asia, and even to pledge rapid nuclear escalation to
defend vulnerable European allies.17 Since the end of the Cold War, the
dilemmas associated with forward defense have been far less dangerous
and agonizing because the United States has not confronted a rival
superpower. But the return of great-power competition in recent years
has begun to raise these issues anew, albeit in less dramatic fashion. Part
of the rationale for the Pentagon’s much-hyped Air-Sea Battle concept
appears to be to cripple China’s power-projection capabilities before it
can subdue US allies in the Western Pacific.18 The recent stationing of
US and NATO battalions in the Baltic states—in some cases, less than
200 miles from major Russian cities such as St. Petersburg—reflects
similar imperatives.
Having allies raises the risk of entrapment. Critics of US alliances point to
the danger of “reckless driving” and “chain-ganging.” Reckless driving
occurs when an ally, protected by a US security guarantee, behaves more
provocatively than would otherwise be prudent. Reckless driving, in
turn, can trigger chain-ganging. If an ally intentionally or unintentionally
triggers conflict with an adversary, a formal security commitment may
force the guarantor to enter the conflict whether it desires to or not.
There is some irreducible danger of reckless driving and chain-ganging
in any credible alliance, of course. Yet historical evidence suggests that
this problem is actually less severe in US alliances than one might expect.
15      See Patrick Mills et al, The Costs of Commitment: Cost Analysis of Overseas Air Force Basing (working paper, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, April 2012).
16      On this dynamic, see Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, The Truman
Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992).
17      Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
18      On AirSea Battle (now called the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global
Commons), see Andrew F. Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle? (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments, 2010).
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As Michael Beckley and Victor Cha have shown, US policymakers
have long been sensitive to this dilemma, and have thus inserted
loopholes or escape hatches into security agreements with potentially
problematic partners, such as Syngman Rhee’s South Korea or Chiang
Kai-Shek’s Taiwan.19 Today, for instance, the US security commitment
to Taiwan is ambiguous for this very purpose: to prevent Taipei from
assuming Washington will automatically rescue Taiwan if its leaders
provoke China. NATO forbids new members from having outstanding
territorial disputes for the same reason.
In recent decades, moreover, the United States has repeatedly
pressured allies and security partners to behave with restraint and
warned those allies against provoking stronger neighbors. American
officials underscored this point in dealings with Taiwan during the
George W. Bush administration, and reportedly, with the Philippines
and other allies in their more recent maritime disputes with China.20
As a result, scholars have found few, if any, unambiguous cases over
the past 70 years in which the United States was dragged into shooting
wars solely because of alliance commitments.21 Reckless driving and
chain-ganging are risks, but US officials have so far proven fairly adept
at managing them.
Allies habitually free ride. The opposite of reckless driving and chain
ganging is free-riding. Logically, because America is committed to
defend its allies, those states can spend less than they would otherwise
on their own defense. In 2011, for instance, the United States spent
around 4.5 percent of its GDP on defense, compared to 1.6 percent of
GDP for European NATO allies and roughly 1 percent for Japan.22
To be fair, these statistics exaggerate the free-riding problem because
America’s defense budget includes higher-than-average personnel costs
as a way of recruiting and retaining an all-volunteer force in contrast to
many allies and partners whose labor markets enable them to recruit
personnel at lower wages or who rely primarily on conscription.23
Moreover, this gap was subsequently narrowed as US military spending,
which had been inflated by the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, fell after
2010. Yet free-riding is nonetheless real enough, as US officials have
frankly recognized. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told NATO
in 2011, “The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and
patience in the U.S. Congress—and in the American body politic writ
large—to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that
are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make
the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own
defense.”24Indeed, this problem has troubling implications, for it renders
19      Michael Beckley, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of
U.S. Defense Pacts,” International Security 39, 4 (Spring 2015): 7–48, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00197; and
Victor Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2016).
20      Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power (New York:
W. W. Norton, 2015), chapter 7. See also Ja Ian Chong and Todd R. Hall, “The Lessons of 1914 for
East Asia Today: Missing the Trees for the Forest,” International Security 39, 1 (Summer 2014): 23–24,
doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00165.
21      Beckley, “Myth of Entangling Alliances.”
22      Posen, Restraint, 35–36.
23      Lindsay P. Cohn, “How Much is Enough?,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 9, no. 3 (Fall 2015): 47–61.
24      Thom Shanker and Steven Erlanger, “Blunt U.S. Warning Reveals Deep Strains in NATO,”
New York Times, June 10, 2011.
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the allies less capable of contributing to either out-of-area interventions
or collective defense operations.
If free-riding is indeed a dilemma, however, it is also an implicit
goal of US alliances, and it probably costs less—when “cost” is defined
holistically—than the likely alternatives. As extensive scholarship
demonstrates, a primary reason Washington created its postwar military
alliances was to break the cycle of unrestrained geopolitical competition
in Europe and East Asia, for fear such competition would give rise
to arms races and wars. Moreover, another prominent goal of US
alliances has been to restrain nuclear proliferation, for fear the spread
of nuclear weapons would make nuclear war more likely and dilute
American influence.25
In other words, some degree of free-riding is a feature of America’s
alliances, not a glitch. The United States has traditionally preferred
for allies to spend less on defense than they otherwise might, because
this restraint creates a world in which America itself is safer and more
influential. To put it another way, does Washington really want a world in
which Germany and Japan both spend 5 percent of GDP on defense and
engage in nuclear arms-racing with adversaries? The answer is surely no,
even if US officials might still urge these countries to spend moderately
more than they do today.
Alliances limit America’s freedom of action and cause unending diplomatic
headaches. This is true enough. In international politics, it can be harder
to do things multilaterally than unilaterally. In many cases, relying on
allies means relying on less capable military forces to perform functions
the US military could better perform on its own, as Washington
discovered during the intervention in Kosovo in the late 1990s. Allies
bring their own idiosyncrasies into the relationship, often with messy
and frustrating results. A vivid example of this dynamic was the set
of caveats each NATO ally brought to the mission in Afghanistan—
restrictions on when, where, and how its forces could fight—ensuring
that, in terms of combat punch, the whole was somewhat less than the
sum of the parts.26
Making alliances work also requires continual “gardening,” in the
phrase of George Shultz—continually massaging difficult relationships
and suffering insufferable allies such as Charles de Gaulle. As Jimmy
Carter once remarked, a meeting with allies represented “one of the
worst days of my diplomatic life.”27 Yet there are obvious counterpoints
here: frustrations are inherent in any diplomatic relationship, the United
States undoubtedly finds it easier to address those frustrations within the
context of deeply institutionalized alliances, and any constraints on US
freedom of action have to be weighed against the myriad other ways in
which alliances enhance US flexibility and power.

25      See Francis Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and
Nonproliferation” International Security 40, no. 1 (Summer 2015): 9–46, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00205;
and Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, America Abroad: The United States’ Global Role in the
21st Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 88–121.
26      Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (New York: W. W. Norton,
2009), 238–55.
27      Hal Brands, Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), 24.
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Overall, the costs and frustrations of US alliances are not illusory,
but many of those costs are actually less severe or salient than they
appear. The benefits of US alliances, by contrast, are both more diverse
and more significant than often appreciated.

Benefits, Direct and Indirect

Just as critics overstate the costs of alliances, so they dramatically
understate the benefits. The most direct and obvious advantages involve
the way allies allow the United States to punch above its own weight
by augmenting US military strengths across a range of issues and
contingencies. Yet alliances also offer additional geostrategic, politicaldiplomatic, and economic advantages that enhance American power
and support a number of critical US national objectives. In other words,
America’s alliances are less entangling than empowering. By binding
itself to the defense of like-minded nations, the world’s sole superpower
makes itself all the more effective and influential.

Military Punching Power

First and foremost, having allies significantly increases the military
power the United States can bring to bear on a given battlefield. During
the Cold War, European forces were vital to maintaining something
approximating a balance of power vis-à-vis Warsaw Pact forces.28 NATO
countries and other treaty allies also contributed to nearly every major
US combat operation of the postwar era, even though nearly all of those
operations occurred “out of area.” The United States may have waged
the Korean War in part to prove its willingness to defend its treaty allies
in Europe, but the NATO allies contributed over 20,000 troops—in
addition to other capabilities—to the fight.29 Even during the Vietnam
War, treaty allies South Korea and Australia contributed substantial
fighting elements (and bore substantial casualties); South Korea sent
over 300,000 soldiers to Vietnam over the course of the conflict and lost
over 4,500 in combat.30 Virtually everywhere the United States fought
during the Cold War, it did so in the company of allies.
In the post-Cold War era, this benefit has sometimes seemed less
important, because of the vast margin of US dominance vis-à-vis its rivals,
and because the gap between what Washington could do militarily and
what even its most capable allies could do militarily widened markedly.
Yet even so, the United States has relied heavily on allied participation
in nearly all of its major interventions.
During the Persian Gulf War, key NATO allies such as France and
the United Kingdom made large contributions to the coalition effort,
with the British providing 43,000 troops along with significant air
and naval contingents. The NATO allies provided roughly half of the
60,000 troops who policed Bosnia as part of the Implementation Force
mission in that country from 1995 through 1996, and a majority of the
31,000 troops who made up the subsequent Stabilization Force. NATO
28      See Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace; and Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 385–90.
29      The number may well have been higher; 20,000 seems like a rough and conservative estimate.
For general information, see Paul M. Edwards, United Nations Participants in the Korean War: The
Contributions of 45 Member Countries (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2013).
30      James Sterngold, “South Korea’s Vietnam Veterans Begin to Be Heard,” New York Times,
May 10, 1992.
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contributions to the US-led war in Afghanistan peaked at around 40,000
troops; this contingent helped sustain the mission at a time of heavy
US focus on Iraq and made it possible for Washington to surge 30,000
additional troops into Iraq when its forces were strained to the limit.31
Other US wars—in Iraq, Libya, and against the Islamic State—have
also featured noteworthy contributions from treaty allies in Europe and
the Asia-Pacific region. Both critics and defenders of US alliances often
speak of the frustrations of unequal burden sharing. But America’s
military burdens would be much higher if it did not have allies willing
to share them.
Having formal allies as opposed to relying on ad hoc partnerships
also yields a second and related military benefit: it eases the process of
mobilizing cobelligerents for action in a crisis. It is possible to assemble
military coalitions on the fly, of course, and every coalition military
venture in which the United States participated prior to 1945 was in
some sense improvised. Moreover, even in the post-World War II era,
the United States has solicited ad hoc contributions from nonallied
partner states. It is even possible, as the United States has repeatedly
demonstrated, to make a purely transactional alliance of convenience
with a “devil”—a country that otherwise shares very few interests
with America, such as the Soviet Union in World War II or Syria in the
Persian Gulf War.
The possibility of improvising military cooperation when needed
has led some critics to argue the United States can do away with formal,
institutionalized alliances altogether.32 But turning every military
operation into the equivalent of pickup basketball greatly increases the
difficulty of building an effective combined force. Pushing the analogy
further, pickup basketball is very hard to arrange in the absence of longstanding arrangements and customs that increase the predictability of the
other actors. Economists refer to these difficulties as transaction costs;
the routines and institutionalization of formal alliances make it much
easier to bring military power to bear at much lower transaction costs.
In formal alliances, the partners practice together in peacetime,
develop interoperability, and may even develop common equipment, thus
easing logistics challenges. They also establish diplomatic forums and
longstanding, fairly predictable relationships, thereby making it easier to
coordinate interests and achieve the political consensus necessary to use
force in the first place.33 To be sure, everything could be negotiated on
the fly, but the price America would pay for this flexibility would be the
31      See Hal Brands, Dealing with Allies in Decline: Alliance Management and U.S. Strategy in an Era of
Global Power Shifts (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2017), 9–10;
Spencer C. Tucker and Priscilla Mary Roberts, eds., The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United
States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2010), 214;
“Peace Support Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” NATO, September 7, 2015, www.nato.int
/cps/en/natolive/topics_52122.htm; and Jones, Graveyard of Empires, 243–45.
32      Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne, “A New Grand Strategy,” Atlantic, January 2002,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2002/01/a-new-grand-strategy/376471/.
33      Both the advantages and limits of these practices are discussed in David P. Auerswald and
Stephen M. Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2014). Seth Johnston argues that institutionalization also facilitates NATO’s adaption and innovation, keeping NATO relevant and useful long after its original purpose had been
eclipsed. Seth A. Johnston, How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance since
1950 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017).
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significantly greater difficulty—and, most likely, the significantly longer
timelines—of piecing together a coalition in a crisis.
A third major military contribution of allies is the specialized
capability they can bring to the table. Sometimes this is material
capability: British, French, and Australian special operations forces have
all made vital contributions to the Global War on Terror. The Japanese
have some of the finest antisubmarine warfare capabilities in the world,
which would be essential in a US conflict with China.34 More often US
allies contribute geographical capability in the form of proximity to the
theater of interest. This proximity allows forward staging of the strike
and intelligence assets, particularly air assets, on which the American
way of war depends. It also allows for specialized technical intelligence
collection that would be nearly impossible to conduct without local
partners. The counter-ISIS campaign, for instance, would have been
vastly more difficult had the United States not had access to key facilities
controlled by either treaty allies (Turkey) or long-standing military
partners (Qatar or Bahrain).35 Similarly, the United States would face
a nearly impossible task in any North Korean contingency without the
extensive US basing network in Japan.
And, of course, the United States has also traditionally relied on
another allied contribution: intellectual capability. By virtue of their
history, US allies have unique networks of relationships, along with the
distinctive insights those relationships afford, in many regions of interest.
This translates into intelligence—particularly human intelligence—that
would be almost impossible for America to generate on its own; consider,
for instance, the intelligence advantages possessed by the French in
northwest Africa or the Italians in Libya.36
The existence of formal, deeply institutionalized alliances, in
turn, facilitates the sharing of such intelligence. Three out of the four
countries that make up the Five Eyes intelligence partnership with the
United States are longstanding treaty allies; Washington also cooperates
extensively with its NATO allies on intelligence matters.37 In this as in
other respects, America’s alliances make it far stronger and more capable
militarily than it would otherwise be.

Geostrategic Influence and Global Stability

If alliances are thus helpful in terms of the conflicts America wages,
they are more helpful still in terms of the conflicts they prevent and
the broader geostrategic influence they confer. Indeed, although the
ultimate test of America’s alliances lies in their efficacy as warfighting
34      See, for instance, “The Japanese Military’s Focus on Anti-Submarine Capabilities,” Stratfor
Worldview, June 24, 2013, https://worldview.stratfor.com/analysis/japanese-militarys-focus-anti
-submarine-abilities.
35      American officials described access to Incirlik, Turkey, as a “game changer” in the counterISIS campaign. Ceylan Yeginsu and Helene Cooper “U.S. Jets to Use Turkish Bases in War on ISIS,”
New York Times, July 23, 2015.
36      On local and regional advantages, see, for instance, Christopher S. Chivvis, The French War on
Al Qa’ida in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
37      See Sir Stephen Lander, “International Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective,”
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17, 3 (October 2004): 481–93, doi:10.1080/0955757042000
296964; and Richard J. Aldrich, “U.S.-European Intelligence Co-Operation on Counter-Terrorism:
Low Politics and Compulsion,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 11, 1 (February
2009): 122–39, doi:10.1111/j.1467-856x.2008.00353.x.
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coalitions, the most powerful benefits they provide come in the normal
course of peacetime geostrategic management and competition.
First, US alliances bind many of the richest and most militarily capable
countries in the world to Washington through enduring relationships of
deep cooperation. Alliances reflect shared interests rather than creating
them, of course, and the United States would presumably have close ties
to countries such as the United Kingdom even without formal alliances.
But alliances nonetheless serve as “hoops of steel.” They help create
a sense of permanence and shared purpose in key relationships; they
provide forums for regular interaction and cooperation; they conduce to
deeply institutionalized exchanges (of intelligence, personnel, and other
assets) that insulate and perpetuate friendly associations even when
political leaders clash.38 And insofar as US alliances serve these purposes
with respect to immensely influential countries in Europe and the
Asia-Pacific, they help Washington preserve a significant overbalance of
power vis-à-vis any competitor.
Second, alliances have a strong deterrent effect on would-be
aggressors. American alliances lay down “redlines” regarding areas
in which territorial aggression is impermissible; they complicate the
calculus of any potential aggressor by raising the strong possibility that
an attack on a US ally will mean a fight with the world’s most formidable
military. The proposition that “defensive alliances deter the initiation of
disputes” is, in fact, supported by empirical evidence, and the forward
deployment of troops strengthens this deterrence further still.39
NATO clearly had an important deterrent effect on Soviet
calculations during the Cold War, for instance; more recently, Russia
has behaved most aggressively toward countries lacking US alliance
guarantees (Georgia and Ukraine), rather than toward those countries
possessing them (the Baltic states or Poland). In other words, alliances
make the geostrategic status quo—which is enormously favorable to the
United States—far “stickier” than it might otherwise be.
Third, and related to this second benefit, alliances tamp down
international instability more broadly. American security guarantees
allow US allies to underbuild their own militaries; while always annoying
and problematic when taken to extremes, this phenomenon also helps
avert the arms races and febrile security competitions that plagued
Europe and East Asia in earlier eras. In fact, US alliances are as useful
in managing tensions among America’s allies as they are in constraining
America’s adversaries.
NATO was always intended to keep the “Americans in” and the
“Germans down” as well as the “Russians out”; US presence, along
with the creation of a framework in which France and Germany were
38      On deep institutionalization, see Celeste A. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability:
NATO after the Cold War,” International Organization 54, 5 (Autumn 2000): 705–35; and Aldrich,
“U.S.-European Intelligence Co-Operation.”
39      Jesse C. Johnson and Brett Ashley Leeds, “Defense Pacts: A Prescription for Peace?,” Foreign
Policy Analysis 7, 1 (January 2011): 45–65, esp. 45, doi:10.1111/j.1743-8594.2010.00122.x; Brett
Ashley Leeds, “Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation
of Militarized Interstate Disputes,” American Journal of Political Science 47, 3 (July 2003): 427–39,
doi:10.2307/3186107; Paul K. Huth, “Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War,” American
Political Science Review 82, 2 (June 1988): 423–43, doi:10.2307/1957394; and Vesna Danilovic, “The
Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, 3 (2001):
341–69, doi:10.1177/0022002701045003005.

26

Parameters 47(2) Summer 2017

incentivized to cooperate rather than compete with one another, would
help stifle any resurgence of tensions between these historical rivals.40
Similarly, US alliance guarantees in the Asia-Pacific were designed, in
part, to create a climate of security in which Japan could be revived
economically without threatening its neighbors, just as the expansion
of NATO after the Cold War helped prevent incipient rivalries and
territorial irredentism among former members of the Warsaw Pact.41
US alliances keep things quiet in regions Washington cannot ignore,
thereby fostering a climate of peace in which America and its partners
can flourish.
Fourth, US alliances impede dangerous geostrategic phenomena
such as nuclear proliferation. As scholars such as Francis Gavin have
emphasized, US security guarantees and forward deployments have
played a critical role in convincing historically insecure, technologically
advanced countries—Germany, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, among
others—to forego possession of the world’s absolute weapon. In several
of these cases, moreover, the United States has used the security leverage
provided by alliance guarantees to dissuade allies from pursuing the
bomb after they had given indications of their intent to start down that
path.42 If, as seems likely, a world with more nuclear powers is likely to
be a more dangerous world in which crises more frequently take on a
nuclear dimension and the risk of nuclear conflict is higher, then the
value of American alliances looms large indeed.
In sum, as the framers of the post-World War II order understood,
phenomena such as massive instability, arms racing, and violence in key
regions would eventually imperil the United States itself.43 Whatever
modest reduction in short-term costs might come from pursuing a “free
hand” or isolationist strategy was thus more than lost by the expense
of fighting and winning a major war to restore order. Accordingly,
America’s peacetime alliance system represents a cheaper, more prudent
alternative for maximizing US influence while also preventing raging
instability by deterring aggression and managing rivalries among friends.
The fact that so many observers seem to have forgotten why, precisely,
America has alliances in the first place is an ironic testament to just how
well the system has succeeded.

Political Legitimacy and Consultation

Beyond their military and geostrategic virtues, alliances provide
important political benefits that facilitate the use of American power
both internationally and with respect to the domestic audience. The chief
political advantage of alliances is enhanced international legitimacy.
40      See Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace; also Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance:
The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981).
41      The role of NATO’s persistence and expansion in stifling security competition in Europe is,
ironically, acknowledged by one of the alliance’s foremost academic critics. See John J. Mearsheimer,
“Why Is Europe Peaceful Today?,” European Consortium for Political Research Keynote Lecture,
European Political Science 9, 3 (September 2010): 388, doi:10.1057/eps.2010.24.
42      See Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition”; Gene Gerzhoy, “Alliance Coercion and Nuclear
Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany’s Nuclear Ambitions,” International Security
39, no. 4 (Spring 2015): 91–129, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00198; and Mark Kramer, “Neorealism,
Nuclear Proliferation, and East-Central European Strategies,” in Unipolar Politics: Realism and State
Strategies after the Cold War, ed. Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1999), 385–463.
43      Leffler, Preponderance of Power.
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Formal alliances and the partnership of allies—particularly democratic
allies—in cooperative ventures confer the perceived legitimacy of
multilateral action. This perception is especially important when
an administration is unable to secure the formal legitimacy of a UN
Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force. In the case
of the Kosovo conflict, for example, being able to conduct the mission
under NATO auspices somewhat mitigated charges of “American
unilateralism.”44 Similarly, the ability of the United States to muster a
coalition of the willing involving both NATO and Asia-Pacific allies
in the Iraq War provided some rebuttal to critics who declaimed the
invasion as a “unilateral” endeavor.
Allied support also enhances the perceived legitimacy of the actions
for domestic audiences, thus strengthening the political foundations for
military ventures.45 The willingness of other states to participate in a
military intervention can signal that the resort to force is a wise and
necessary move, has reasonable prospects for success, and will enjoy
some minimal moral legitimacy. All of these factors can shore up public
support and give the intervention greater political resilience should it
prove more difficult than expected, and this international cooperation
is easier to achieve in the framework of longstanding military alliances.
Finally, allies provide useful input on use of force decisions.
Particularly when the deliberations involve long-standing treaty allies,
US officials can have more honest discussions about difficult policy
choices because the participants are “all in the family.” Put another
way, every US president reserves the right to use force unilaterally when
American interests demand. Yet as presidents have generally understood,
the failure to persuade other partners to approve and to join America
in the effort is itself a powerful cautionary warning.46 The need to make
persuasive arguments to allies and partners is a useful disciplining device
to prevent policy from running off the rails.

Diplomatic Leverage and Cooperation

Beyond their military, geostrategic, and political impact, having
formal military alliances greatly increases the diplomatic leverage US
leaders can bring to bear on thorny international challenges. Formal
alliances and long-standing partnerships give US leaders myriad fora
in which to raise concerns and advocate favored courses of action.
Europeans are obliged to listen to the United States on European issues
because Washington’s leading role in NATO makes it the central player
in European defense; the same dynamic prevails vis-à-vis US allies in
the Asia-Pacific. To give just one concrete example, the United States has
repeatedly prevented the European Union from lifting its arms embargo
on China because of the security leverage it has through NATO.47
44      For an argument stressing the reliance on alternative sources of legitimacy during the
Kosovo crisis, see Robert Kagan, “America’s Crisis of Legitimacy,” Foreign Affairs 83, 2 (March/
April 2004): 74–77.
45      Joseph M. Grieco et al., “Let’s Get a Second Opinion: International Institutions and
American Public Support for War,” International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 2 (June 2011): 563–83,
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00660.x.
46      For instance, the Bush Administration was stymied on the Sudan by the reluctance of the
rest of the international community to intervene. Condoleeza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of
My Years in Washington (New York: Crown Publishers, 2011), 582–85.
47      See Glenn Kessler, “Rice Warns Europe Not to Sell Advanced Weaponry to China,”
Washington Post, March 21, 2005.
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Having allies also increases US diplomatic options vis-à-vis
adversaries. Here, the danger of entrapment (getting drawn into conflicts
America might otherwise have avoided) must be weighed against
the benefits of having more options in dealing with the adversaries
Washington cannot ignore. One such benefit is the increased range
of signaling options available to strategists during an unfolding crisis.
Consider US efforts to constrain the North Korean nuclear program.
Without military alliances with South Korea and Japan, the United States
would have only two baskets of military options short of actual resort to
force in order to signal resolve and to shape North Korean calculations:
either taking relatively meaningless actions, such as changing the alert
levels in the homeland or in other theaters, or taking relatively dramatic
escalations, such as moving an aircraft carrier battle group within range
of the Korean peninsula or flying sorties close to the North Korean
border. With South Korea and Japan as allies, however, Washington
has a wider variety of midrange actions—increasing missile defense
capability or readiness in theater, raising local alert levels, and so on.48
These steps give leaders ways of responding, and thereby influencing
diplomatic negotiations, while also better positioning America to
respond if diplomacy fails.
Finally, alliances enhance US diplomatic efforts on security issues
beyond those directly related to collective defense. The United States
has used its alliances as vehicles for cooperation on counterterrorism
(both prior to and since September 11, 2001), as well as for countering
cybercrime, proliferation, and piracy; addressing climate change; and
responding to other challenges. All of these efforts involve substantial
intelligence sharing, information pooling, and coordination across law
enforcement and other lines of action. And all of this coordination
is greatly facilitated when conducted through deeply institutionalized
alliances and long-standing cooperative relationships.49
The United States has, of course, also been able to achieve tactical
cooperation even from long-standing adversaries on issues such as
counterterrorism, but such cooperation is frequently less significant,
harder to obtain, and comes at a higher price in terms of the reciprocal
American “gives” required in transactional relationships. It is thus with
good reason that, when an international crisis breaks or a new global
challenge emerges, the first phone calls made by US leaders are usually
to America’s closest allies.

Economic Benefits

As noted, the economic costs of US alliance commitments are lower
than conventionally assumed because the alliances allow Washington to
project military power much more cheaply than otherwise would be the
case. Alliances also generate numerous indirect economic benefits—so
many that they may constitute a net profit center for the United States.
As a recent analysis of the deployment of US troops abroad and of US
treaty obligations shows, both of these forms of security commitments
48      See, for example, the US-South Korean incremental tit-for-tat response to recent North
Korean military provocations, Dan Lamothe, “U.S. Army and South Korean Military Respond to
North Korea’s Launch with Missile Exercise,” Washington Post, July 4, 2017.
49      Art, Grand Strategy, 201–2.
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are correlated with several key economic indicators, including US
bilateral trade and global bilateral trade.50 The more US troops are
deployed to a given country, the greater US bilateral trade is with the
country in question. Furthermore, the effect extends to non-US global
bilateral trade: “Countries with U.S. security commitments conduct
more trade with one another than they would otherwise.” Adding all
the economic costs and benefits of these treaty commitments together
produces the estimate that the alliances offer more than three times as
much gain as they cost.
American alliance commitments advance US economic interests in
other ways, as well. For decades, US diplomats and trade negotiators
have used the security leverage provided by alliance commitments
to extract more favorable terms in bilateral financial and commercial
arrangements. During the Cold War, West Germany made “offset”
payments to the United States—transfers to shore up the sagging US
balance of payments—as a means of preserving the American troop
presence in Europe.51
More recently, American negotiators obtained more favorable
terms in the South Korea-United States trade agreement than the
European Union did in a parallel agreement with Seoul. “Failure would
look like a setback to the political and security relationship,” one US
official noted; this dynamic gave Washington additional negotiating
leverage.”52Additionally, as other scholars have shown, the US willingness
to defend other states and police the global commons reinforces the
willingness of other countries to accept a global order which includes
favorable economic privileges for the United States, such as the dollar
as the primary global reserve currency.53 And, of course, by sustaining a
climate of overall geopolitical stability in which trade and free enterprise
can flourish, alliances bolster American and global prosperity in broader
ways, as well.

Conclusion

The balance sheet on America’s alliances, then, is really not much
of a balance at all. There are costs and dangers associated with US
alliances, and some of these are real enough. But many of those costs
and dangers are exaggerated, blown out of proportion, or rest on a
simple misunderstanding of what the United States would have to do in
the world even if it terminated every one of its alliances. The benefits of
US alliances, conversely, are far more diverse and substantial than critics
tend to acknowledge. In sum, any grand strategy premised on putting
America first should recognize that by creating and sustaining its global
alliance network, America has indeed put itself first for generations.

50      Daniel Egel and Howard Shatz, “Economic Benefits of U.S. Overseas Security Commitments
Appear to Outweigh Costs,” The RAND Blog, September 23, 2016, http://www.rand.org
/blog/2016/09/economic-benefits-of-us-overseas-security-commitments.html.
51      Francis J. Gavin, Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958–
1971 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).
52      Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home,
America: The Case against Retrenchment,” International Security 37, 3 (Winter 2012/13): 44.
53      G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World
Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).
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If this is the case, then why have alliances proven to be such
lightning rods for both academic and presidential criticism of late?
Part of the answer lies in the dynamic noted at the outset of this piece.
The dangers and risks inherent in US alliances are mostly obvious and
intuitive, whereas the benefits are often subtler, more indirect, or require
digging deeper into the underlying logic of American internationalism
to understand. Those benefits, moreover, often reside in things that do
not happen—and are thus harder to observe, let alone measure. Yet part
of the answer also undoubtedly lies in the fact that American alliances,
like so much of American foreign policy today, appear to be in danger of
becoming a victim of their own success. The fact that US alliances have
been so effective, for so long, in maximizing US influence and creating
an advantageous international environment has made it all too easy to
take their benefits for granted. It would be a sad irony if the United
States turned away from its alliances, only then to realize just how much
it had squandered.
American alliances do not function perfectly, of course, and today
as at virtually every point since the late 1940s, there are challenges on
the horizon: the relative decline of many key US allies vis-à-vis US
adversaries, the difficulties of prodding partners in Europe and Asia
to do more on defense, the threat posed by coercion and intimidation
meant to change the geopolitical status quo without triggering alliance
redlines. Likewise, reasonable observers can debate what military strategy
the United States should pursue for upholding its alliance commitments
in the Baltic or the western Pacific. But the vexations of addressing
these challenges within the framework of America’s existing alliances
are undoubtedly less than the costs and perils to which the United States
would be exposed without its alliances. Winston Churchill had it right
when he said, “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies,
and that is fighting without them.” The US policy community would do
well to heed this admonition today.
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ABSTRACT: As various states assert power more aggressively,
US policymakers should apply lessons from past uses of force
while developing strategic plans to manage the global and national
tolerance for violence.

I

n the smoking wreckage of Hitler’s Berlin and in the burned out
ruins of Tokyo, the old world order disappeared. The geostrategic
context of international relations and power radically changed,
bringing new challenges, trends, and patterns. Globalism, the survival
and triumph of market capitalism, the end of colonialism, and the threat
of communism, all under the haunting shadow of nuclear weapons,
confronted the survivors of World War II and those who followed. In the
emerging new world order, the United States stood as the most powerful
nation on earth, if not in history. The end of World War II brought a
strategic inflection point not only for the world but for the United States
specifically—what would America do with its power? In retrospect, the
United States managed the emerging challenges fairly well—the world
survived.
Since 1945, the United States has found it necessary to exercise its
power, to use force in the pursuit of its national interests and those
of its allies, but has realized mixed results. After successfully defeating
the Axis powers during World War II and winning the Cold War, why
has the United States had trouble applying its overwhelming military
advantage? In the ledger of US military force applied in Korea, Europe,
Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, is there something beyond the role
of policymakers or the unique strategic context of each conflict that
explains success or failure? The answers lie in understanding the actual
utility of force—the amount and scale of force necessary to achieve
desired political control—and in understanding the lingering problems
of America’s use of force in an era dominated by limited war.
This era continued beyond the end of the Cold War, and many
suggest, progressed to a period of limited wars characterized by nonstate
actors, networked insurgencies, and new or resurgent state actors, all of
which contribute to persistent conflict and challenge regional stability.1
The nature of this period may not necessarily alter the utility of force
since force has been used successfully to assure, deter, coerce, and
compel. Such reasoning, however, depends on a close assessment of our
interests and objectives as well as those of our adversaries. Policymakers
must understand what military force can accomplish, and once the
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decision to apply military power is made, remain cognizant of its
inherent constraints.
America’s application of military force in an age of limited war is
invariably shaped by the asymmetry of interests between the United
States and its potential adversaries, the fluctuation of political will during
the conflict, and the challenges of building partner capacity. A better
understanding of the nature of the utility of force and its relationship
to several key limiting factors can help us develop and execute more
appropriate strategies.2

The Utility of Force: Assure, Deter, Coerce, and Compel

For allies, force may be used to influence behavior by providing
assurance—the visible result of security. Sir Michael Howard, a
preeminent British historian, claimed the West’s use of force assured
the global economy of safe passage to win the Cold War.3 Howard’s
view of the Cold War as a largely economic struggle testing the viability
of communism versus capitalism meant American force was deployed
globally to secure trade—it takes force to assure the global commons.
Assurance through forward presence and stationing has been the essence
of regional stability in much of the world. Achieved through forward
presence and global military capabilities, assurance also provides political
leverage, giving substance to diplomacy, credibility, and international
agreements. Generally positive, assurance descends on a scale of the
potential use of force in which it becomes deterrence.
The advent of nuclear arms and the onset of the Cold War generated
a great deal of literature on deterrence. Most evident among state
actors, deterrence is predicated on controlling an adversaries’ political
or military behavior by denying their ability to achieve their objectives
or by threatening sure and prohibitive punishment via nuclear or
conventional means. Deterrence depends on convincing an enemy of
the futility of a potential action or the excessive cost of such action.4
Edward Luttwak argued deterrence is by far the most efficient use of
force as it does not result in the actual expenditure of military resources.
Additionally, the perception of power need not be restricted by time
or space.5 Positioning the US Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait, for
example, is not necessary to convince China that the United States will,
in fact, oppose any attempt to conquer the island by force.
As efficient as deterrence may be, there are three problems with its
use. For deterrence to work, the potential adversary must be convinced
the deterring power has the capability to use force successfully. The
adversary must be convinced one has the will to use force. And, the
nation being deterred must have assets or interests that can be held at
risk. In the first two cases, the burden of deterrence is the occasional
2      Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 7.
3      Sir Michael Howard, “Lessons of the Cold War,” Survival 36, no. 4 (Winter 1994–95): 161–66.
4      There is a long and extensive literature on deterrence and coercion. Perhaps the best short
summary can be found in Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1996), 155.
5      Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the
Third (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 2. “In the imperial period at least,
military force was clearly recognized for what it is, an essentially limited instrument of power, costly
and brittle. Much better to conserve force and use military power indirectly, as an instrument of
political coercion.”
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demonstration of capability and will. In the latter case, not every adversary
has fixed assets that can be easily threatened or attacked. Within a state’s
borders are fixed assets that can be threatened; beyond those borders are
sustaining international political, economic, and financial connections,
which can also be threatened.
The Cold War is perhaps the most successful example of the utility
of conventional and nuclear deterrence to international stability. The US
nuclear arsenal threatened Soviet cities and industry while conventional
Western forces defended and denied an easy conquest of Western Europe.
In fact, mutually assured destruction was mutually assured deterrence.
Even so, does deterrence have utility at the lower range of
conflict? Can nonstate actors—terrorists or insurgents, networked or
distributed—be deterred? History suggests deterrence has little, if any,
utility in dealing with such threats, which often require coercion instead.
Like deterrence, coercion is based on punishment or denial.
Coercion by denial uses force to deny the enemy’s ability to achieve its
objectives, demonstrating the futility of resorting to force. Coercion by
punishment seeks to affect the enemy’s cost-benefit calculation such that
the behavior is prohibitively expensive. Coercion results in the actual
consumption of resources—blood and treasure. Coercion is about
forcing your opponent to choose and often ends in negotiation.
In the Korean War, the United States coerced North Korea and
China to abandon their designs for South Korea by physically denying
its conquest. By the same token, the United States was coerced into
abandoning South Vietnam due to the high military, economic, and
political cost of continued support; however, since coercion involves
the use of force—the employment of violence—it unleashes the dogs
of war with all the attendant potential for escalation and unforeseen
contingency. So far, the utility of force consisting of assurance,
deterrence, and coercion are most frequently successful in statist warfare
where the rational and objective calculation of interest and effort are
more evident and the intensity of national interest varies. Moreover,
there is little evidence to suggest coercion is any more effective than
deterrence at the lower range of conflict with nonstate actors who have
vital interests at stake.
In 1966, Thomas Schelling both coined the word for, and initially
defined the concept of, the use of compellence. In the context of the
Cold War, he sought to understand the utility and relationship of force in
nuclear strategy. Schelling’s definition of compellence is very inclusive,
embracing coercion, but it is fundamentally different from deterrence. He
asserted deterrence is defensive, negative, and static while compellence
is positive, offensive, overt, and dynamic.6 Since 1966, the expanded
discussion of assurance, deterrence, and coercion suggests Schelling’s
concept of compellence can be refined to arrive at a more complete
understanding of the utility of force.
Whereas coercion uses force to manipulate the adversary’s costbenefit calculations, leaving the decision to comply in his hands, true
compellence offers the enemy no choice, no negotiation—the winner
completely dictates terms of ending the war. Saddam Hussein was
6      Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 71–72.
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coerced to abandon his conquest of Kuwait through the denial created
by Operation Desert Storm; twelve years later he was compelled by
Operation Iraqi Freedom, which offered no opportunity for negotiation
and removed him from power. Think regime change: Adolf Hitler,
Saddam, Manuel Noriega, and Muammar Gadhafi were offered no
choice in abandoning their ambitions and power.
The great theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, asserted resistance is the
product of will multiplied by means.7 In this political formula, compellence
reduces the capability to resist to zero by eliminating the means. Thus,
wars exist in a vast variety of forms ranging from demonstration to total
war in which compellence is the ultimate argument of arms. Of all the
uses of force, compellence is the most expensive and the most decisive.
In the post-World War II period, the United States has rarely had
the recourse to compel its adversaries. The reasons are pretty straight
forward—the advent of nuclear weapons and the fear of nuclear escalation
ushered in an era of limited war. For more than four decades following
World War II, the specter of triggering nuclear escalation kept the use
of force in the realms of assurance, deterrence, or carefully calculated
coercion. Compellence only becomes an option in our backyard, as in
Panama, or after the fall of the Soviet Union, as in Afghanistan and Iraq,
or when seriously provoked in the pursuit of a vital national interest or
in a cheap pursuit, as in removing Gadhafi in Libya.
There is an obvious symmetry between uses of force and levels
of national interest, a range that may be broadly categorized from
peripheral, to important, to vital. This careful calculation of national
interests determines the level of force allowable to achieve them. The
force must be scaled to the perceived interest. Herein lies the first
problem in the United States’s use of force since 1945—the asymmetric
and dynamic nature of national interest.

The Asymmetry of Interest

Few nations or nonstate actors can actually threaten the vital
interests of the United States. Virtually everyone, however, can at some
level threaten lesser interests. American diplomatic and military power
are used to pursue security and economic interests as well as support
American values throughout the world. At what point those interests
become sufficiently threatened to require the use of military power is at
the heart of the cost-benefit calculation in the use of force.
When Clausewitz suggested two kinds of wars exist—limited and
unlimited—he referred not to means, but to objectives.8 Unlimited
wars usually involve vital national interests, existential threats, which
summon the greatest will and effort. Invariably, compellence is often
involved in unlimited wars. Limited wars, however, run the greater
range of conflict, requiring the careful calculation of cost and benefit.
These are wars of coercion, wars of choice. One of the chief problems
in the exercise of US military power since 1945 is that most of these
conflicts have been a limited war for the United States, but unlimited
for its adversaries. Therefore, despite the vast power available to the
7      Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1976), 77.
8      Ibid., 585.
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United States, the careful calculations of costs and benefits have been
domestically controversial and rarely match the will and efforts of
America’s adversaries.
One of Clausewitz’s more emphatic assertions is his insistence
that “the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and
commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war
on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to
turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”9 Policymakers must
understand what kind of war they are embarking upon, limited or
unlimited, and understand the nature of the war for the enemy as well.
While US objectives in the Vietnam War were limited, they were clearly
unlimited for the North Vietnamese.
This asymmetry of interest in a coercive use of force, meant the
North Vietnamese were much stronger, not in means, but in will and
willingness to sacrifice. This element suggests some obvious strategies
for targeting US weaknesses. American efforts to coerce the North
Vietnamese through force, by physically denying them conquest of
South Vietnam, was likely to become expensive and to require constant
vigilance. In contrast, the North Vietnamese could not be coerced,
but only compelled, to abandon their ambition to unify Vietnam—an
unlimited objective. Given the risks of escalation and self-imposed
constraints, compellence was not a likely option for the United States.
This rationale remains the current and likely future case in the
exercise of American power in attempting to maintain regional
stability. Whether designing a policy over Crimea or Taiwan, nucleararmed nation-states have the capability to threaten the United States
existentially. All other threats are likely to be limited in both ends and
means, resulting in controversial wars of choice. The exercise of US
power will continue to be carefully calculated and largely circumscribed
not only by the asymmetry of interest but also by domestic tolerance and
partner capacity to assume or end these conflicts.

The Domestic Clock

In September 2007, General David Petraeus, commander of US
forces in Iraq, traveled to Washington to face a skeptical Congress
conducting a cost-benefit analysis on the Iraq War. Petraeus’s mission
was simple but not easy: put more time on the domestic clock—convince
Congress and the public that more time would permit the United States
to apply power in Iraq successfully.10
Due to the asymmetry of interests between the United States and
its adversaries, America has chosen to limit carefully the amount of
force applied to conflicts since 1945. As a result, in these limited wars
of choice, the public as well as the Congress has been and will continue
to be involved in any cost-benefit analysis involving blood and treasure
in the pursuit of national interests. Consequently, time has become a
problem for the employment of American power, working against the
9      Ibid., 88.
10      Peter R. Mansoor, Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 178. Also see Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a
Secretary at War (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 49.
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consistent use of US force absent a consensus on the threat or the nature
of the national interest.
Inevitably, two questions arise during cost-benefit analyses during
a conflict: are we winning? And, is it worth it? The more limited the
war’s objectives, the more the constraints and the restraints, the more
political and the more partisan the war will become. Any perceived lack
of success will be used as a political bludgeon by the opposing party. As
the clock ticks, the military must provide incremental success to sustain
public and political will. The rheostat for the amount of force used in
limited wars must be adjusted to the objectives, the means, and most
importantly, the clock.
To sustain public support for the use of force, we should use
overwhelming force to eliminate quickly an opponent’s means to resist
or to use protracted war over time with such a low level of violence that
the public remains indifferent. This approach creates a long or short
war scenario measured by the amount violence required. Short wars are
intense, violent, and dominate the media, the national agenda, and public
attention—but, they are short. To make the clock less relevant, violence
can be dialed down such that it drops below the level of public interest.
Following the Persian Gulf War, Operation Southern Watch engaged
significant proportions of US airpower to protect the Shia population.
American airpower attacked any Iraqi air or ground forces from the
thirty-second parallel to the Kuwaiti border. In the first six years alone
86,000 sorties were used to constrain Saddam’s use of military force.11
Virtually every day, the United States delivered violence in southern Iraq
in the pursuit of these objectives. Yet, the low level of violence kept these
operations out of the public eye and allowed the application of force
over a considerable period of time. Absent the ability to achieve political
objectives with the application of minimal or carefully constrained force
over time, we are left with a final option—let someone else do it.

The Partner Capacity

Even with the application of significant US power to any particular
strategic problem, one question always remains: how ought this use of
force end? The proverbial problem of strategic handoff is often the most
vexing. While American military power can sustain weak regimes, our
record of nation-building, or even building sufficient partner capacity
that allows newly constructed allies to sustain or finish the fight, is
decidedly mixed. American optimism in its ability to use force to reshape
local political, economic, or military realities rooted in long-standing and
foreign cultures has been at the core of its failure to succeed in limited
wars since 1945. There are undoubtedly plenty of lessons available. But
perhaps the greatest unlearned lesson evident from Vietnam is that despite
its great military power, the United States constantly overestimates its
ability to effect change in local or regional politics.12
11     
Gregory Ball, “1991—Operation Southern Watch,” Air Force Historical Support
Division, September 18, 2012, http://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458951
/1991-operation-southern-watch/.
12      David L. Anderson, “Introduction: The Vietnam War and Its Enduring Historical Relevance”
in The Columbia History of the Vietnam War, ed. David L. Anderson (NY: Columbia University Press,
2011), 83.
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America views the military as the primary instrument for building
sufficient partner capacity to carry on or finish the fight even as the
public wearies of the cost of such wars. The unfortunate but important
truth is that all militaries are simply reflections of the society which
creates them. If that society is rife with factionalism, corruption,
predatory power structures, and inept leadership—those characteristics
will inevitably be reflected in the military. The United States can give its
partners equipment and teach them how to shoot, but it cannot always
tell them whom to shoot. In short, America cannot change their culture.
In some cases, the only hope is that the enemy, the adversary, is more
corrupt, inept, and predatory than one’s erstwhile ally or proxy. The
relative long-term balance of power can rarely be altered if the enemy
is not already predisposed to failure. The United States can weaken
its adversary through attrition, decapitation, or sheer destruction, but
a better-equipped proxy will soon revert to its own preferred cultural
styles of management, leadership, and interests.
The final assumption in such proxy strategies is that one’s interests
and those of one’s proxies or partners will align. America may be able
to build partner capacity, but can it direct how the capacity will be
used? America’s efforts to influence partners to do its bidding instead
of pursuing their own interests will always be limited. After spending
much blood and treasure in attempting to make Iraq and Afghanistan
capable of defending themselves and ending the wars the United States
started, America should not be surprised if the regimes in power are
more interested in retaining and extending their domestic power than
pursuing the US view of regional peace.
Of course, all alliances are based on mutual interests to some
degree, and diplomacy clarifies and aligns those interests where possible.
American leverage in regions and in countries is invariably overestimated;
however, its perceptions of interest and cultural logic mirror the images
of its partners’ responses. If asymmetrical interests, the clock, and the
problems inherent in building partner capacity make the application of
US power in limited wars problematic, what can be done?

The Potential Solutions

How might a better understanding of the utility of force and the
inherent limitations in the application of American military power
be addressed in formulating strategy? Possible approaches might be
found in better organization and process, innovating a truly national
strategic planning doctrine, or just education. Some years ago Andrew
F. Krepinevich and Barry Watts noted a decline in American strategic
competence. Harkening back to the practices of the Eisenhower
administration, the authors recommended modifying the current
organization of the National Security Council (NSC) to include a
planning board and a coordination board supplemented by small study
groups and invigorated by frequent senior policymaker participation.13
The current council consists of a Principles Committee, a Deputies
Committee, and a set of Policy Coordination Committees. Perhaps a
standing Strategic Planning Committee or strategic planning groups,
13      Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry D. Watts, “Lost at the NSC,” National Interest 99 (January–
February 2009): 63–73

38

Parameters 47(2) Summer 2017

formed as necessary and armed with a strategic planning doctrine, could
plan for the employment of American national power.
Currently, there is no true national staff systematically planning
for the application of American power. The National Security Council
staff advises the president by providing options to address immediate
and long-term national security problems while under the pressure of
political and public scrutiny. That staff also integrates efforts across
and enables cooperation among departments and agencies. Since the
National Security Council serves the president, each administration
usually modifies and employs the staff as it sees fit. While these changes
may aid in political responsiveness, they may not provide a consistent
approach to planning the strategic use of force. More consistency may
be found in the deeply embedded planning culture of the Department
of Defense, which is likely why the National Security Council looks to it
when the nation considers flexing its military muscle.
The Department of Defense has service and joint doctrine at the
tactical and operational levels to consider and to execute a uniform
planning process regarding the application of force even though there
is no true national strategic planning doctrine. Detailed and deliberate
contingency planning is done at the combatant command level in
anticipation of potential conflict before it is reviewed by Defense
Department. Directed theater, strategic, and even global plans are
normally built from the bottom up with an incremental review and
approval; however, these plans target very specific problems reflective
of a strategic approach even though they are, in and of themselves,
only operations.
The challenge is every conflict is essentially unique. Plans can only
be made to address unique snapshots in time, reflecting the domestic,
international, and regional conditions assumed to exist at the moment
of crisis or decision. As conditions may be radically different from any
anticipated scenario, there may be no preexisting deliberate plan, as
was the case for the Afghanistan War. Perhaps it is time for a national
strategic planning doctrine that formalizes the development of strategic
net assessments and mandates strategic reassessments beyond the theater
level, possibly even coordinating global war plans between theaters. In
the absence of such a strategic planning staff or formalized process
within the National Security Council, the Defense Department could
ensure assessments are coordinated and considered across departments
and agencies in the Joint Staff or within the office for Strategy, Plans,
and Capabilities, as appropriate.
As part of a strategic planning doctrine, a strategic net assessment
would clarify friendly and enemy interests and objectives, not as a
checklist but as part of a more deliberate process to avoid impulsive
or inappropriate use force and ensure that force can, in fact, achieve
our national objectives. Additionally, a national-level strategic net
assessment might identify the strengths and the weaknesses of our
partners and adversaries, allowing us to match strengths and weakness
across all the elements of national power. Strategic reassessments would
continue to calculate the costs and benefits as inevitable interactions
with our adversaries change and influence the strategic situation. The
reassessment should also reassess the clock on the pace and scale of the
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national effort to manage public expectations and determine the need
and timing of incremental success to sustain public will.
Enormous challenges—of time, effort, and other resources—
will accompany attempts to improve the application of force through
strategic planning and doctrine at the national level; however, the stakes
are high even though no process, no doctrine, no implementation can
ever guarantee strategic success. But, such forethought may help reduce
the risk of oversight, cognitive bias, and political impulse.
Fundamentally, strategy is an art, a direct result of the talent and
efforts of senior policymakers, commanders, and planners. The entire
process, regardless of the organization and the doctrine, is driven by the
personality of the decision-makers; certainly, the nature and inclinations
of the president are foremost. In this respect, education and awareness
leading to understanding the real utility of force and its limitations in
an era characterized by limited warfare is perhaps the most realistic
solution. Appealing again to Clausewitz, military theory is meant to
guide, to educate, to “light [the commander’s] way, ease his progress,
train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls.”14
With regard to the utility of force and its limitations, some general
observations should be considered. First, the type of conflict should
be identified: it may be limited for us but unlimited for the enemy. A
careful, matched calculation of our own and our adversary’s interests,
resources, and risk must be completed. In this way, a determination of
the appropriate use force for the strategic problem set can be made.
When dealing with state adversaries, the utility of American force in
foreign relations remains its ability to assure, deter, coerce, and compel;
however, American power has demonstrated difficulty in deterring
conflict and coercing nonstate actors and emergent enemies in limited
wars. In such wars, the United States can choose to go fast, go slow, or
not go at all. A strategic net assessment should carefully understand the
international and domestic constraints and restraints in the possible use
of force. The application of overwhelming force to compel an enemy can
be used where appropriate to eliminate nonstate actors primarily with
state support. This demonstration of willingness and capability may also
serve to deter further state-sponsored extremism and assure allies. The
problem of handing off in the smoking ruins of a regime change or in
the sticky use of partners prosecuting proxy wars will remain; however,
realistic expectations and pragmatic, rather than idealistic foreign policy,
may help establish what passes for regional peace, aligned as close as
possible to our national interests.
When international or domestic constraints will not allow
compellence, violence should be applied at such a level of intensity to
allow its application over time. Persistent scaled violence will exhaust the
adversary, slowly destroying the adversary’s capability or at least contain
the adversary until it can be eliminated. The use, scale, and type of violence
over time has two possible objectives: to make the nonstate adversary
strategically irrelevant or simply to drive the level of enemy violence into
the criminal domain. Like crime, fanaticism that makes use of terrorism
may never be eliminated, but it can eventually be exhausted or beaten
14      Clausewitz, On War, 141.
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into the realm of political crime and treated as such. Marshalling the
coordinated resources of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Interpol,
and other allied-state agencies may be the best recourse for countering
strategic-level violence driven into the criminal domain.
Finally, there is restraint. One piece of wisdom attributed to the
Greek historian, Thucydides, suggests “of all the manifestations of
power, restraint impresses men the most.” The decision to use force to
assure, deter, coerce, or compel should be made carefully, deliberately,
and always with the knowledge that violence is escalatory. Perhaps the
great caution about the future use of force is that with rapid development
and use of robotic technology, resorting to force will become altogether
too easy. The promise of delivering violence precisely, with little collateral
damage, and without unnecessary friendly—or even unfriendly—
casualties will be hard to resist when political and public voices demand
action. Unfortunately, the belief that one can shape or influence local or
regional politics and conflict by the carefully measured use of force is
the most persistent and dangerous illusion in the era of limited warfare
following World War II.
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ABSTRACT: This article introduces financial warfare as a valuable
and innovative tool for deterring the sponsors of the “little green”
and “little blue men” of proxy warfare. By analyzing the economic
terrain, financial trace, nodes, and edges of a sponsor’s financial
networks, US policymakers can develop, plan, and deliver financial
deterrence necessary to support international stability as well as to
persuade or coerce an adversary by increasing the costs of their wars.

I

n an era of proxy conflicts—such as Russia in Crimea and Ukraine,
China in the South China Sea, and Iranian proxies in Iraq and the
Levant—financial power may offer the United States the greatest
capability to counter our adversaries’ “little green” and “little blue men.”1
Financial power is simply the means to make warfare—or anything for
that matter—more or less costly. Extracting a cost from our adversaries by
collapsing a single transaction, a single enterprise, or their entire defense
industrial base provides the United States with a potentially unmatchable
deterrent capability useful in conventional and unrestricted warfare.2
Without innovating our strategic capabilities, America may have no
option other than sending its fleets into the cauldron of the South China
Sea in response to China seizing and militarizing islands hundreds of
miles from its shores, intimidating the region using the little blue men
of its maritime militia, restricting freedom of navigation, enforcing the
self-declared air defense identification zone, and rejecting international
law.3 Without innovating our tactical capabilities, North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) tanks and troops may have to respond
conventionally to an expansionist Russian state emboldened by the success

1      For more on the development of the term little green men in reference to unconventional
troops, see Vladimir Zinin, Igra v soldatikov: pochemu reputatsiya armii okazalas’ pod ugrozoy [Playing
soldiers: Why the army’s reputation is threatened], Gazeta.ru, July 22, 2015, http://www.gazeta.ru
/comments/2015/07/22_e_7652977.shtml; and Alexander Anichkin (2014). Zelenyye chelovechki
[Little green men] Tetradki [Notebooks] (blog), March 13, 2014, http://european-book-review.
blogspot.com/2014/03/little-green-men.html. Little blue men similarly refers to irregular maritime militias, see Simon Tisdall, “Little Blue Men: The Maritime Militias Pushing China’s Claims,”
Guardian, May 16, 2016.
2      For more on the importance of the supply chain that forms the defense industrial base, see M.
Thomas Davis, “Blog: The Incredible Shrinking Defense Industrial Base,” Signal, June 16, 2105. For
more on “unrestricted” reflecting the multifaceted approach to modern power projection, see Qiao
Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts, 1999).
3      Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Irregular Forces at Sea: ‘Not Merely
Fishermen’—Shedding Light on China’s Maritime Militia,” Center for International Maritime
Security, November 2, 2015; Alex Linder, “China Swiftly Rejects Hague Tribunal Ruling against
Its South China Sea Claims,” Shanghiist, July 12, 2016, shanghaiist.com/2016/07/12/china_rejects
_hague_ruling.php; and “Arbitration Award More Shameless than Worst Prediction,” Global Times,
July 12, 2016, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/993855.shtml.
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of its special forces and irregular troops seizing Crimea, segmenting the
Ukraine, and exporting irregular war to Latvia, Estonia, or Lithuania.4
Even though America fought successfully against Iranian proxies,
such as Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi militia in the battle of Najaf
in 2004 and Qais al-Khazali’s Special Groups in Iraq thereafter,
conventional constraints failed to limit Iran’s expansion in the Levant
and its influence over Iraq.5 The South China Sea, Ukraine, Crimea,
Iraq, and the Levant illustrate how state-sponsored unrestricted conflict
has become the core of adversarial power projection. Adversaries’
asymmetric capabilities are outpacing US strategy, and America faces a
conundrum—escalate to conventional war or give ground to new threats.
When the United States projects power, it operates through four
principal avenues: military, diplomatic, information, and economic.
Financial power, or the capacity to leverage capital or money, has
typically been considered a subset of economics. Given the capabilities
and effects of computer networks, particularly the internet, finance is
separating from economics to become an affiliated but distinct channel
suitable for power projection.
For the purposes of this paper, the delineation between finance
and economics uses Yale Professor Paul Bracken’s definition: “The
economic system deals with the hard and soft outputs of the economy—
that is, goods and services. The financial system deals with money and
credit.”6 Economics is simply the production and distribution of goods
and services using three factors or inputs: capital, resources, and labor7
Finance, what Bracken colloquially refers to as money and credit, is also
the “system that includes the circulation of money, the granting of credit,
the making of investments, and the provision of banking facilities.”8
Financial power can be used to derive economic effects. Financial
warfare can, at a minimum, disrupt the monetary foundations
underlying production and distribution and, accordingly, disrupt an
adversary’s ability to produce and distribute goods and services. Such
an attack would not only preclude an adversary’s ability to transact (to
price and exchange goods and services) but also to move, to aggregate,
or to store capital necessary for production and distribution; in short,
production and distribution would cease and the adversary’s economy
would collapse.
From another perspective, economic warfare tools such as blockades
and embargoes target the distribution of goods and services—outputs.
Since financial warfare targets capital, it collapses an input. Thus,
economic actions like sanctions, blockades, or embargoes sever
connections between the United States and its target; while financial
4      John R. Haines, “How, Why, and When Russia Will Deploy Little Green Men—and Why the
US Cannot,” Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) E-Notes, March 9, 2016, http://www.fpri.org
/article/2016/03/how-why-and-when-russia-will-deploy-little-green-men-and-why-the-us-cannot/.
5      Kimberly Kagan, The Surge: A Military History (New York: Encounter Books, 2010), 2.
6      Paul Bracken, “Financial Warfare,” FPRI E-Notes, September 13, 2007, http://www.fpri.org
/article/2007/09/financial-warfare/.
7      Factors of production are a neoclassical foundation of economics found in Adam Smith, The
Essential Adam Smith, ed. Robert L. Heilbroner (New York: W. W. Norton, 1986), 151; more fully
developed in David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London: John
Murry, 1821), 24.
8      Merriam Webster, online, September 26, 2016, s.v. “finance.”
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power projection bolsters capabilities by maximizing connectivity
to targets. Economic actions are unit step functions—for example, a
blockade is a definitive, declaratory step, and an incomplete or partial
embargo is not an embargo. As such, blockades and embargoes
are poor tools for a proportionate response. Conversely, the finely
graduated tools of financial power projection, which can target a single
transaction or an entire industrial base equally well, offer a number of
compelling advantages in comparison to the imprecise consequences of
economic power.
Financial power works in physical and electronic dimensions,
and though existing financial markets (open market operations).9 An
advantage of financial power projection is that its indirect or derivative
approach to economic production and distribution presents less
surface area for adversaries to exercise intelligence collection on, or
to react against. Because it offers an indirect, misattributable or even
unattributable approach, finance has significant potential for actively
managing the risk of responding to any adversary.

Responding to Contemporary Conflicts

The wars confronting America today incorporate a range of different
combat modes including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and
formations, and terrorist acts that include indiscriminate violence and
coercion as well as criminal disorder. Such wars allow the sponsor to
operate between the traditional means of state power projection by using
nominally nonstate entities to conceal themselves from conventional
retaliation. Since conventional military formations pursuing total war
could easily destroy these irregular formations, the use of nontraditional
means preserves the sponsor’s ability to project power in operations
short of conventional war, fueling and supporting strategic deterrence.
Further explained, such “deterrence is the manipulation of an
adversary’s estimation of the cost/benefit calculation of taking a given
action”; thus, “by reducing prospective benefits or increasing prospective
costs (or both), one can convince the adversary to avoid taking the
action.”10 The strategic deterrence aspects of such tactics facilitate
Russia’s maintenance of its enclaves in the Ukraine, China’s fortified
islands in its near seas, and ongoing Iranian hegemony in the Levant.

Mechanics of Deterrence

Russian, Chinese, and Iranian deterrence strategies are conducted
through military, diplomatic, and economic coercion of their neighbors,
the United States, and other adversaries. This form of deterrence requires
9      Electronic means include analog approaches that might disrupt the reliability of power generation, transmission, or usage. Cyber or digital means, a subset of electronic which includes analog,
range from data manipulation in ledger systems to targeting core systems and interfaces as well as
the reach and consistency of rule schemas inside liquidity markets (stocks, bonds, commodities, etc.).
Cyber operates at microsecond speeds, which may exceed an adversary’s ability to measure and to
assess its effects. This speed introduces uncertainty and indeterminacy that may suppress or delay
counteraction. The speed also enables the creation of waves and wave-centric methodologies that
use sequenced, discrete vectors at various frequencies. This capability can create powerful waves of
price, supply, and duration volatility that travel across markets, geographies, and time. Such waves can
exploit discrete vector strikes as well as adversarial and allied actions and reactions on an aggregate
or cumulative basis.
10      Austin Long, Deterrence from Cold War to Long War: Lessons from Six Decades of RAND Research
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 7.
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constructing a known status quo, a mutually understood level of conflict,
or nonconflict, within which participants manage risks and expectations.
For example, because the Russians, Chinese, and Iranians cannot
compete independently with the current militaries of the United States
and its allies, they will pursue actions short of direct military engagement.
Consequently, the Russian, Chinese, and Iranian perspectives and
decision calculi rely on the absence of direct conventional military-tomilitary engagement. If the United States or any protagonist is unwilling
to challenge the status quo ante by supplemental or innovative actions,
then, by definition, they capitulate to the antagonists’ actions.
In order to manage multiple conflicts of this type while simultaneously
invalidating their deterrent strategies, the United States must develop new
ways to project power, and challenge, change or annul the adversaries’
decision calculus. Financial power disrupts calculability because it
operates outside the Russian, Chinese, and Iranian formulations of
deterrence, introducing new and unique variables. Socialist or sectarian
political economies subordinate the independence of individual actions
to centrally administrated ideology or oligarchy. The subordination of
individual financial actions is enforced by constraining capital liquidity,
storage or transport to the needs of the State. Ultimately, China, Russia
and Iran are at a direct disadvantage to capitalist economies because
they are, by definition, less capital efficient. Financial power exploits
this disadvantage.

The Object of Financial Warfare

Analogous to military art, combat in financial warfare is conducted
through the engagement. The object of the engagement in financial
warfare is the adversary’s capital.11 The engagement is the only means
of destroying the adversary’s capital, and it may come in the form of a
direct attack on primary capital or an indirect attack on secondary and
tertiary capital components. Primary capital is internal and inseparable
from the enterprise; it is an input to, and a factor of, production. Capital
includes cash, liquid investments and the value of raw materials, worksin-process, and finished goods inventories. If primary capital is removed,
the enterprise collapses.
Secondary capital components are debt and equity, which are sold
by the enterprise in exchange for cash, i.e. primary capital. Both debt
and equity, secondary capital components, facilitate the formation of
primary capital, provide a channel to it, and exercise a claim upon it.
Secondary capital differs from primary capital in two respects: it does not
organically possess capital functions, and it is external to the enterprise.
Tertiary capital components were created to provide the functions
of capital to secondary capital components. Examples of tertiary capital
components include depositories, markets: stock; bond; foreign currency;
and commodity markets, and systems infrastructure: credit and debit
cards; ATMs; point of sales; and real time gross settlement systems.
11      Carl von Clausewitz made an off-handed comparison between war and finance: “The decision by arms is for all major and minor operations in war what cash payment is in commerce.” While
Clausewitz may have used the concept as a background metaphor, the similarities were apparent to
him. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1976), 97.
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In financial war, engagements are fought in physical and electronic
dimensions. Physical or digital capital can be attacked by engagements
in those dimensions. In addition to physical and electronic engagements,
tertiary capital components can be reduced through degrading their
ability to provide capital liquidity—storage or transport.
Financial warfare can reach deep into the interior of a country, a
hostile territory, or a denied area to project national power through
supply and logistics chains. Industrial economies producing complex
products, for example automobiles, use a sequence of specialized
manufacturers, a supply chain, with each manufacturer purchasing
raw materials (inputs) for their production, maintaining in-process
inventory, and outputting finished goods. These outputs become inputs
for downstream manufacturers in the supply chain. The transactions
between or among specialized manufacturers in a supply chain are
generally explicit and priced.
An adversary’s defense industrial base—entirely, by industry, by
geography, or through an individual transaction of a single enterprise—
can be attacked through capital-value transiting supply and logistics
chains. Capital value of raw materials, work-in-process or finished goods
inventories can be attacked by injecting or engineering volatility into
their price, transit duration, or supply. Whipsawing price—creating
sequential stock-outs and gluts that starve and then flood a market—at
one component of the supply chain will cascade to other downstream
companies. If any part of a supply chain is reachable, then all parts of
the supply chain can be affected. In other words, risk to the entire supply
chain is affected by variance in the risk to any single link.
The ability of finance to reach within and among enterprises in
a supply chain is only one vector into a target economy. Engineering
contagions or cascade failures based upon bank lending, credit expansion,
direct investment, and currency exchange are obvious additional vectors.
Contemporary gray-zone warfare is designed to present a level of
conflict that appears unreachable by conventional means. By using
financial vectors exogenous to the conflict state, the United States can
introduce an entirely new category of risk, financial risk, into the conflict
causing a change in valuation between risk and reward. This condition can
increase enterprise and supply-chain risk, raising expenses and eroding
the commercial capabilities of the sponsor’s supporting infrastructure,
defense industrial base, or a vital national interest. Financial risks can
be increased to burden a conflict’s sponsor with greater expenses.
Timing financial engagements to an adversary’s actions reinforces the
immediacy of costs to the sponsor.
Financial strikes can manipulate spot and structural volatility
to induce liquidity crises and bankruptcies for a locality, region, or
province as well as a political leader, party, or regime. While the results
of financial power can be used to coerce and change the decision
calculus of policymakers, financial power can also persuade a sponsor’s
commercial competitors to expand and to challenge them for market
share. Sequential, multivector financial engagements can be used to
engineer contagions, cascade failures, or Black Swans while remaining
almost undetectable. Such financial campaigns can shape the adversary’s
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economy towards fragility by incentivizing over centralization and
socialization of risk as well as promoting asymmetry, agency, and opacity.

Terrain Maps and Traces

The first step in financial power projection is targeting, which
requires the national authority, department, agency, or combatant
command to develop a detailed economic terrain map and financial
trace of the target to construct accurate, precise, and specific financial
vectors. An economic terrain map is a networked view of a targets’
productive, distributive and systemic activities over a physical and
virtual geography identifying integration points among the target,
its vendors, its customers, and the relevant economies, which are all
potential disintermediation targets.
A basic accounting of the factors of production—resources, capital,
and labor—reveals how the target produces and distributes goods and
services. Other characteristics—such as the costs, returns, and margins
from component business processes; the mix of sales, income, and
profit from consumer, industrial, reseller, and government markets; and
the explicit and the reimbursed products or services delivered to the
government—also help quantify potential leverage points by detailing
the breadth of the target’s business.
In addition to identifying productive activities, the economic terrain
map should provide a comprehensive and detailed picture of the target’s
distributive activities including the logistics channels that move goods
from production to consumers and critical factors of time, place, and
possession that separate goods from consumers—for example, what
factors might inhibit the delivery of seafood in Chinese maritime militia
trawlers to purchasers?
Once the target’s economic terrain is mapped, a financial trace of
that economic space is made. This trace identifies and details the financial
providers, networks, mechanisms, operations, and infrastructure that
enable the target’s capital liquidity, storage, and transport activities at
the primary component level. Tracing the secondary and tertiary assetliability network for both current assets such as working capital, credit
lines, bank accounts, raw material, and work-in-progress inventories,
as well as long-term assets such as owners’ equity and infrastructure
illuminates who is at risk.
From this financial trace, the appropriate network nodes—
individuals, vendors, suppliers, commercial industries, and government
entities, as well as the connecting edges that include transaction and
payment networks can be identified. Namely, the nodes clarify where
liability, risk, and reward reside, and the edges show how those elements
flow across the network. The financial trace prioritizes vulnerable nodes
and edges by their capacity to bear or transmit risk or loss.
In the case of a targeted enterprise and its customer conducting a
sales transaction in physical cash, for example, the targeted enterprise
will probably deposit its revenues into a depository (a bank) at some
point. If the buyer uses another notional form of capital such as a
credit or debit card instead of cash, then both parties to the transaction
must have systems and depositories to provide liquidity, transport, and
storage for their capital. The transaction, its supporting systems and
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depositories are all available targets. Thus, traces are subject to multiple
means and methods of attack whose results may range from isolating
the target from its financial service providers; collapsing its ability to
transact, move, or store capital; or bankrupting it.

Targeting

Financial power projection, in many ways like artillery or missiles,
ranges from unguided to precision-guided vectors against an adversary
efficiently and effectively delivering payloads adapted for point, area, or
system targets. Point targets involve a specific transaction, a store or a
transport of capital, or an individual enterprise. Area targets pinpoint
grouped or associated transactions, stores or transports of capital, or
associated enterprises such as a supply chain. System targets encompass
liquidity markets (such as stock, bond, or commodity markets), industries,
geographies, or an adversary’s entire economy. In summary, targeting
financial power can be graduated from capital in specific productive
or distributive activities inside a single company to sovereign systemic
targets that include money supply and circulation velocity.
In overview, the financial targeting process begins with the desired
outcome: specific outcomes require specific inputs while generalized
outcomes may have arrays of complementary inputs. Each outcome
sought must be described in terms of the effects or characteristics
desired, which include:
•• Scale—Is the outcome to encumber a single transaction of a single
company or stop all financial activity within an adversary’s economy?
•• Speed—When is the outcome required in relation to the theoretical or
practical delivery speeds of the available tools?
•• Duration of effects—Should the outcome’s duration be instantaneous
or occur over decades or more?
•• Intensity of effects—Within the scale and duration of an outcome,
how intense are the desired effects—should the efficiency of an
activity be reduced or be collapsed entirely?
•• Overtness of means—How profound is the risk to the initiator, their
sources, or methods—overt, covert, or clandestine?
Combining the desired outcome with the mapped terrain and trace,
the determinations of critical requirements and vulnerabilities can be
made. The means employed—physical, electronic, or open market—
must be determined. Metrics, channels, and vectors must be detailed.
Cost must be determined. If a networked target is involved, consideration
must be given to constructive and destructive interference to preclude
unintended consequences. If approaching the target through cyber
methods, amplitude and frequency of volatility wave functions must be
examined. Lastly, financial power projection can be formulated to occur
independently, in coordination with, or in support of other activities.
To illustrate, the desired outcome might be to collapse the supply
chain of a Chinese maritime militia company of “little blue men” to
preclude its provocative actions against US naval forces conducting
freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. Scale, speed,
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duration, intensity, and overtness should factor in the timing, scope, and
scale of the US exercises and the probable Chinese response.
A critical miscalculation of many contemporary deterrent strategies
is the assumption that the sponsor’s receipt of economic benefits will
remain unchanged even though they segment or destroy the commercial
commons from which those benefits arise. China’s operative assumption
in the South China Sea, for example, assumes it can deconstruct or
segment the global maritime commons militarily through anti-access/
area denial tactics while continuing to receive the commercial benefits,
i.e. seaborne exports and maritime commerce, of a global commons.
Economic and financial systems are, by definition, networked.
Removing the South China Sea from the global maritime commons
renders the commons less than global in scale. Regardless of China’s
locality advantage and the volume and range of its missile and aircraft
coverage, commercial craft seeking to leave or to enter the South China
Sea are eventually outside China’s physical power-projection capabilities
and their transit is dependent upon US acquiescence.
Similarly, Russia’s seizure of Crimea and part of eastern Ukraine
through proxy forces of “little green men” segments the network of
sovereign and legitimate territorial control in Eastern Europe; however,
Russia’s economic assumption appears to be one of uninterrupted trade.
Likewise, Iran’s expectation is that the use of its proxy forces in the
Levant and Yemen will have little impact on their hydrocarbons export
and Persian Gulf maritime commerce.
The economic commons in these cases, the South China Sea, Eastern
Europe, and the Persian Gulf are being segmented or removed from
the global economic commons. This expulsion increases the risks and
expenses as well as distance and duration for trade. Financial warfare is
designed, at a minimum, to capture and deliver these increased costs to
the conflict’s sponsors.

Conclusion

Financial power may enable the United States to develop and to
present the contemporary sponsors of aggression with the costs of their
actions at net present value, which will reduce prospective benefits and
increase prospective costs both directly to the sponsor and inversely
to their competitors. America should meet the Russian, Chinese, and
Iranian challenges by developing and presenting financially enabled
forward contracts, i.e. deterrent strategies, to its adversaries. Moreover,
the United States should match an aggressor’s activities with concurrent
deterrent responses of similar magnitude, and duration.
Financial warfare is an appropriate means: it has the breadth and
depth to project power in a fashion suitable to achieve national policy
goals. As an innovation, not just of means and methods but of efficacy
and efficiency, financial warfare creates and uses a new channel for
power projection to support national aims. Because finance can directly
or indirectly touch every aspect of economic activity, financial warfare
can accordingly range across the entire spectrum of economic responses
to an adversary’s actions accurately, precisely, and proportionately.
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Financial warfare can endow the United States with an unmatched
deterrent capability useful in conventional as well as other wars.
Creating a financial warfare capability initially requires the data and the
analytics necessary to build economic terrain maps and financial traces.
Then, the United States must create internal and external government
competencies to exercise physical, electronic, and open-market means
against primary, secondary, and tertiary capital components of selected
targets, independently and within campaigns.
Financial warfare offers a number of compelling advantages.
America’s use of financial warfare will gain strength over time by
maximizing connectivity to, and penetration of, targets and by
providing precise, proportionate responses. Lastly, financial warfare
can help America counter, if not preempt, an adversary’s nontraditional
warfare capabilities.
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ABSTRACT: After a series of military reforms resulting from
the 2008 conflict with Georgia, Russia used information warfare
operations more effectively in Crimea. Russia’s continued refinement
of its information operations may keep it ahead of the United States.

R

ussia has a long history of propaganda and disinformation
operations—techniques it continues to adapt to the online
environment. As the information space is broader than the
technologies facilitating its use, Russia utilizes broad information-based
efforts classified by effects: information-technical and informationpsychological. A major milestone for these efforts surfaced in 2008 when
pro-Russian cyberattacks occurred concurrently with Russian military
operations in Georgia. During that brief conflict, a resilient Georgia
overtook Russia in the larger information war, forcing Russia to rethink
how it conducts information-based operations.
Russia adjusted its information confrontation strategy six years later
against Ukraine, quickly and bloodlessly reclaiming Crimea and keeping
potentially intervening countries at bay. Clearly, Russia finds value in
manipulating the information space, particularly in an age where news
can be easily accessed on demand through official and nonofficial outlets.
Based on its successes in Crimea, Russia is outpacing its main adversary,
the United States, by leveraging the information space to bolster its
propaganda, messaging, and disinformation capabilities in support of
geopolitical objectives.

Russian Information Confrontation

Russia has been long credited with having formidable information
warfare capabilities.1 Russian information confrontation theory covers
a wide range of these actions and the conceptual understanding of
Russian information operations stemming from cultural, ideological,
historical, scientific, and philosophical viewpoints.2 The broad nature
of these activities views offensive information campaigns more as
influencing agents than as destructive actions, though the two are not
mutually exclusive. Simply put, the information space lends information
resources, including “weapons” or other informational means, to affect
both internal and external audiences through tailored messaging,
disinformation, and propaganda campaigns.
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1      Paul M. Joyal, “Cyber Threats and Russian Information Warfare,” Jewish Policy Center, Winter for domestic and
2016, http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2015/12/31/russia-information-warfare/.
international audiences
2      Timothy L. Thomas, “Dialectical versus Empirical Thinking: Ten Key Elements of the based upon his 15 years’
Russian Understanding of Information Operations,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 11, no. 1 (1998): experience as a strategic
cyberintelligence analyst.
40–62, doi:10.1080/13518049808430328.
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Igor Panarin, an influential scholar and a well-regarded Russian
information warfare expert, outlined the basic instruments involved in
the larger information struggle including propaganda (black, gray, and
white); intelligence (specifically information collection); analysis (media
monitoring and situation analysis); organization (coordinating and
steering channels and influencing media to shape the opinion of politicians
and mass media); and other combined channels.3 In terms of influence
operations, Panarin identified information warfare vehicles such as social
control; social maneuvering; information manipulation; disinformation;
purposeful fabrication of information; and lobbying, blackmail, and
extortion.4 Therefore, the essence of information confrontation focuses
on this constant information struggle between adversaries.
Reviewing the application of these principles in two well-known
instances of Russian geopolitical involvement helps illustrate if and how
Russian understanding of information confrontation has evolved; it also
provides insight into the outcomes of such practices in the context of
on-demand media coverage.

2008 Georgia

Russia and Georgia competed to control the flow of information
to the global community during their brief conflict in 2008. Both sides
employed kinetic (conventional military strikes and troop movements)
and nonkinetic (cyberattacks, propaganda, and denial and deception)
offensives. As reported, Russia’s postanalysis and criticism of its efforts
in the conflict led to some serious military reforms in its larger defense
apparatus.5 Although experts observed alternating mission successes,
Anatoliy Tsyganok, then deputy chief of the General Staff of the
Russian Armed Forces believed Georgia won the information war at
the preliminary stage of the conflict, but lost at the end of it.6

Information-Technical

Russia’s perception of technical and psychological information
confrontation working in concert with military attacks became evident
during the conflict in Georgia. Despite the lack of a substantive
connection between the orchestrators of the cyberattacks and the
Russian government, this nonattributable action was the first time
cyberattacks and conventional military operations had worked together.7
Such attacks included web page defacements, denial of service, and
distributed denial of service attacks against Georgian government,
media, and financial institutions, as well as other public and private
targets.8 The attacks successfully denied citizen access to 54 websites
related to communications, finance, and government, leaving some
3      Jolanta Darczewska, The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, A Case
Study, Point of View 42 (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, May 2014).
4      Ibid.
5      Athena Bryce-Rogers, “Russian Military Reform in the Aftermath of the 2008 Russia-Georgia
War,” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 21, no. 3 (July 2013): 339–68.
6      Timothy L. Thomas, “Russian Information Warfare Theory: The Consequences of August
2008,” in The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow: Essays in Memory of Mary Fitzgerald, ed. Stephen J.
Blank and Richard Weitz (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010).
7      David Hollis, “Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008,” Small Wars Journal 7, no. 1 (January 2011).
8      Eneken Tikk, Kadri Kaska, and Liis Vihul, International Cyber Incidents: Legal Considerations
(Tallinn, Estonia: Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2010).
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to speculate at least some Russian complicity even though no hard
connection was made.9

Information-Psychological

Russia also engaged in concurrent information-psychological
operations—including propaganda, information control, and
disinformation campaigns—with varying results, especially in contrast
to Georgia’s efforts in the same areas. Russia focused on delivering key
themes to the international community: Georgia and Mikheil Saakashvili,
its president, were the aggressors; Russia was compelled to defend its
citizens; and neither the United States nor its Western allies had any basis
for criticizing Russia because of similar actions these nations had taken
in other areas of the world, most notably in Kosovo.10
By using television footage and daily interviews with a military
spokesman, Russia controlled the flow of international information
and sought to influence local populations by dictating news, sharing
the progress of Russian troops protecting Russian citizens, and
propagandizing Georgian atrocities.11 A review of Georgian, Russian,
and Western media coverage during this period reveals Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev was perceived as less aggressive than his Georgian
counterpart and had little justification for Russian intervention in South
Ossetia.12 Indeed, a CNN poll conducted at the time found 92 percent
of respondents believed Russia was justified for intervening.13

Why Did Georgia Win the Information War?

Instead of acquiescing to Russia’s information confrontation
over the course of the crisis, Georgians launched an aggressive
counterinformation campaign by employing their own disinformation
and media manipulation.14 Georgia requested assistance from
professional public relations firms and private consultancies to help
promote its message, limited the availability of Russian news coverage,
and reported Russian air raids on civilian targets, thereby becoming the
victim of a Russian military invasion.15
Ultimately, Georgia gained the upper hand in the conflict—a
fact corroborated by Russia’s review of its military’s performance,
which noted deficiencies in both the information-technical and
9      Jon Oltsik, “Russian Cyber Attack on Georgia: Lessons Learned?,” Cybersecurity Snippets
(blog), Network World, August 17, 2009, http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/44448).
10      Ariel Cohen and Robert E. Hamilton, The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and
Implications (Carlisle, PA: SSI, 2011).
11      Katie Paine, “Reputation Redux: Russia Invades Georgia by Land and by Server,” PR News,
August 25, 2008, http://www.prnewsonline.com/reputation-redux-russia-invades-georgia-by-land
-and-by-server/.
12      Hans-Georg Heinrich and Kirill Tanaev, “Georgia & Russia: Contradictory Media Coverage
of the August War,” Caucasian Review of International Affairs 3, no. 3 (Summer 2009).
13      Yasha Levine, “The CNN Effect: Georgia Schools Russia in Information Warfare,” The
eXiled Online, August 13, 2008, http://exiledonline.com/the-cnn-effect-georgia-schools-russia-in
-information-warfare/.
14      Ibid.
15      Tanya Erofeeva, “Georgia-Russia War: An Information Control Story,” Prezi, May 6, 2014,
https://prezi.com/i4fk4qprev0s/georgia-russia-war-an-information-control-story/; Matthew Mosk
and Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, “While Aide Advised McCain, His Firm Lobbied for Georgia,” Washington
Post, August 13, 2008; Mark Ames, “Georgia Gets Its War On . . . McCain Gets His Brain Plaque . . . ,”
The eXiled Online, August 9, 2008, http://exiledonline.com/georgia-gets-its-war-onmccain-gets
-his-brain-plaque/; and Levine, “CNN Effect.”
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information-psychological domains.16 Georgia won the hearts and
minds of the global community even though Russia won the physical
battlespace. The disinformation campaign was so successful that the
European Union’s final report on the crisis focused on US support and
military assistance to Georgia.17

2014 Crimea

In 2014, Russia created a similar situation with the region of
Crimea. Like South Ossetia, Crimea had a substantial Russian-speaking
population (approximately 58 percent at the time) and was generally
considered pro-Russian.18 Unlike South Ossetia, Crimea served as
Russia’s only year-round warmwater port, hosting a large portion of the
Russian military—the navy’s Black Sea Fleet.19

Information-Technical

Six years after the Georgian conflict, Russia applied the lessons
learned from the informational activities in Georgia to its efforts in
Ukraine. Although there is no evidence of dedicated “information
troops” in the Russian military who could directly engage in local and
regional areas yet, the innuendo reveals Russia is intent on learning from
its failures and fixing its problems.20 Russia also learned about timing
cyberattacks, which have long been considered a first-strike option for
maximum effectiveness, particularly against important targets such as
critical infrastructures.21
Unlike the concurrent digital attacks and military border crossing in
Georgia, cyberattacks against Crimea shut down the telecommunications
infrastructure, disabled major Ukrainian websites, and jammed the
mobile phones of key Ukrainian officials before Russian forces entered
the peninsula on March 2, 2014.22 Cyberespionage before, during, and
after Crimea’s annexation also leveraged information that could support
short-term and long-term objectives, a tactic that had not transpired,
was not reported, or went unnoticed against Georgia.
According to one security company, cyberespionage operations
employed simultaneously with other methods of information collection
appeared to accelerate battlefield tactics.23 Unlike in Georgia,
cyberespionage targeted the computers and networks of journalists
16      Thomas, “Russian Information Warfare Theory.”
17      Peter Wilby, “Georgia Has Won the PR War,” Guardian, August 17, 2008; and Independent
International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report, vol. 1, (Brussels: Council of
the European Union, September 2009).
18      Associated Press and Reuters, “Everything You Need to Know about Crimea,” Haaretz,
March 11, 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/world-news/1.577286.
19      For more on Russia adding frigates to the fleet in early 2016, which further demonstrates the
strategic importance of Crimea, see Alexander Mercouris, “Russia Strengthens Its Black Sea Fleet,”
Duran (Cyprus), June 12, 2016.
20      Keir Giles, “Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in
Moscow’s Exercise of Power” Chatham House, March 21, 2016, https://www.chathamhouse.org
/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-03-21-russias-new-tools-giles.pdf.
21      Cynthia Ayers, “Cyber Triggers and the First Strike Dilemma,” Mackenzie Institute, October
19, 2015, http://mackenzieinstitute.com/cyber-triggers-first-stike-dilemma/.
22      Azhar Unwala and Shaheen Ghori, “Brandishing the Cybered Bear: Information War and
the Russia-Ukraine Conflict,” Military Cyber Affairs 1, no. 1. (2015): doi:10.5038/2378-0789.1.1.1001.
23      Brian Prince, “ ‘Operation Armageddon’ Cyber Espionage Campaign Aimed at Ukraine:
LookingGlass,” Security Week, April 28, 2015, http://www.securityweek.com/operation-armageddon
-cyber-espionage-campaign-aimed-ukraine-lookingglass.
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in Ukraine as well as Ukrainian, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), and European Union (EU) officials. Exploiting such targets
could have provided Russia with insight into opposing journalistic
narratives as well as advanced knowledge of important of key diplomatic
initiatives. Operation Armageddon, for example, began targeting
Ukrainian government, law enforcement, and military officials in
mid-2013—just as active negotiations commenced for an EU-Ukraine
Association Agreement, which Russia publicly deemed a national
security threat.24
As in Georgia, nationalistic hackers, such as the Ukraine-based
CyberBerkut, also engaged in a variety of cyberattacks against Ukraine.
This group executed distributed denial of service attacks and defacements
against Ukrainian and NATO webpages, intercepted US-Ukrainian
military cooperation documents, and attempted to influence the
Ukrainian parliamentary elections by disrupting Ukraine’s Central
Election Commission network.25 While there is no evidence of collusion
or direction on behalf of the Russian government, the attacks did lend
to the overall confusion of the crisis, particularly for Ukraine, and
might be reflective of the Russian military embracing Russian General
Staff General Valery Gerasimov’s strategy on the future of warfare—
conflicts will retain an information aspect part of larger “asymmetrical
possibilities for reducing the fighting potential of the enemy.”26

Information-Psychological

Unlike Russia’s forceful invasion of Georgia, the contest over
Crimean territory was more of an infiltration. In the absence of a
direct threat, Russia relied on nonkinetic options such as propaganda,
disinformation, and denial and deception to influence internal, regional,
and global audiences. This reflexive control strategy—implementing
initiatives to convey specially prepared information to an ally or an
opponent to incline him to make a voluntarily decision predetermined
by the initiator of the initiative—explains Russia’s reliance on the
approach as an extension of information-psychological activities in
Ukraine during and after the Crimean crisis as well as the method’s
prominence in Russia’s information confrontation philosophy.27
More robust in Crimea than in Georgia, one scholar characterizes the
Russian approach to information confrontation as evolving, developing,
adapting, and just like other Russian operational approaches, identifying
and reinforcing success while abandoning failed attempts and moving
24      Jason Lewis, “Operation Armageddon: Cyber Espionage as a Strategic Component of
Russian Modern Warfare,” LookingGlass (blog), April 28, 2015, https://lookingglasscyber.com
/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Operation_Armageddon_FINAL.pdf.
25      Petro Zamakis, “Cyber Wars: The Invisible Front,” Ukraine Investigation, April 24, 2014,
http://ukraineinvestigation.com/cyber-wars-invisible-front/; Unwala and Ghori, “Cybered Bear;”
and Agence France-Presse (AFP), “Hackers Target Ukraine’s Election Website,” Security Week,
October 25, 2014, http://www.securityweek.com/hackers-target-ukraines-election-website.
26      Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand
Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations,” trans. Robert Coalson,
Military Review 96, no. 1 (January–February 2016): 23–29; and Mercouris, “Russia Black Sea Fleet.”
27      The Soviet Union first used the term reflexive control, but the systematic methods of shaping
an adversary’s perceptions, and thereby his decisions, to force actions favorable to Russia’s interests
is used today. See Can Kasapoglu, “Russia’s Renewed Military Thinking: Non-Linear Warfare and
Reflexive Control,” Research Paper 121 (Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, 2015); and Timothy
L. Thomas, “Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 17,
no. 2 (June 2004): doi:10.1080/13518040490450529.
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on.28 A noticeable improvement from its efforts in Georgia, Russia used
television broadcasts to generate support for actions in Crimea and to
bolster the theme of Moscow’s necessary intervention to protect native
Russian speakers.29 Additionally, pro-Russian online media mimicked
anti-Russian news sources to influence opinion; for example, the website
Ukrayinska Pravda was a pro-Russian version of the popular and
generally pro-Ukrainian news site Ukrains’ka Pravda. The pro-Russian
sources would communicate false narratives about actual events, such as
denying the presence of the Russian military in Ukraine or blaming the
West for conducting extensive informational warfare against Russia.30
One significant lesson Russia learned from the Georgian conflict
was how pervasively the Internet could disseminate news from legitimate
and semiofficial organizations as well as personal blogs. Valdimir
Putin, the Russian president, acknowledged the role of the Internet in
influencing the outcome of regional conflicts and recognized Russia was
behind other governments in this space saying, “We surrendered this
terrain some time ago, but now we are entering the game again.”31 Russia
now supports journalists, bloggers, and individuals within social media
networks who broadcast pro-Russian narratives.32
In one case, Russia paid a single person to hold different web
identities, another to pose as three different bloggers with ten blogs, and
a third to comment on news and social media 126 times every 12 hours.33
Such Russian trolls may be crass and unconvincing, but they do gain
visibility by occupying a lot of space on the web. Arguably, “Russia’s new
propaganda is not now about selling a particular worldview, it is about
trying to distort information flows and fueling nervousness among
European audiences.”34
By adapting denial and deception strategies applied during the
Georgian conflict, outside interlopers remained confused during the
Crimean crisis. By denying involvement in the attacks until the later
stages of the conflict, Russia continued messaging its desire to de-escalate
the crisis while increasing chaos.35 Since the United States, NATO, and
28      Keir Giles, The Next Phase of Russian Information Warfare (Latvia: NATO Strategic
Communications Centre of Excellence, 2016).
29      Colin Daileda, “Could Russia Use Cyberwarfare to Further Destabilize Ukraine?,” Mashable,
April 14, 2014, http://mashable.com/2014/04/14/russia-ukraine-cyber-warfare/.
30      Sascha Dov Bachmann and Håkan Gunneriusson, “Russia’s Hybrid Warfare in the East: The
Integral Nature of the Information Sphere,” in “International Engagement on Cyber V: Securing
Critical Infrastructure,” special issue, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (Summer 2015): 198–
211; and “ ‘Ukraine, West Wage Information War against Us’—Russians,” RT, November 12, 2014,
http://www.rt.com/politics/204827-ukraine-west-information-warfare.
31      Paul Goble, “Russia: Analysis from Washington—A Real Battle on the Virtual Front,” Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 9, 1999, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1092360.html.
32      Jill Dougherty, Everyone Lies: The Ukraine Conflict and Russia’s Media Transformation, Shorenstein
Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy Discussion Paper, #D-88 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Kennedy School, 2014).
33      Bachmann and Gunneriusson, “Russia’s Hybrid Warfare.”
34      Alexey Levinson, “Public Opinion and Propaganda in Russia,” Stop Fake, July 29, 2015,
http://www.stopfake.org/en/public-opinion-and-propaganda-in-russia/.
35     Robert C. Rasmussen, “Cutting Through the Fog: Reflexive Control and Russian STRATCOM
in Ukraine,” Center for International Maritime Security, November 26, 2015, http://cimsec.org
/cutting-fog-reflexive-control-russian-stratcom-ukraine/20156; and Yuras Karmanau and Vladimir
Isachenkov, “Vladimir Putin Admits for First Time Russian Troops Took Over Crimea, Refuses to
Rule Out Intervention in Donetsk,” National Post (Toronto, Ontario), April 17, 2014, http://news
.nationalpost.com/news/world/vladimir-putin-admits-for-first-time-russian-troops-took-over
-crimea-refuses-to-rule-out-intervention-in-donetsk.
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the European Union could not predict Russia’s objectives, Russia could
leverage reflexive control to operate within Western decision-making
loops, to reduce the costs of its actions against Ukraine, and to keep
the United States and its allies out of the conflict. Once Putin admitted
the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine, he had already annexed
Crimea.36 Ultimately, the United States conceded Russian control of
Crimea and sent Secretary of State John Kerry to mitigate the threat of
further expansion into Ukraine.37
Noticeably improved, Russia’s strategic communications
proactively targeted pro-Russian rebels, the domestic population, and
the international community to alienate Ukraine from its allies and
sympathizers. Two key themes promoted the Ukrainian government
being anti-Russian Fascist and declared the Russian administration
would improve the population’s quality of life. Messages directed at the
rebels kept them engaged in the fight whereas messages to the domestic
population created moral justification for supporting the rebels and
conveyed the extant intermittent prospect of widespread combat
operations in eastern Ukraine.
Six years after the United States, NATO, and several European
governments sided with Georgia despite the attack on South Ossetia,
Moscow sought to mitigate Crimea’s external support via information
activities aimed at influencing foreign government actions. 38 Moscow
used pro-Russian media sources to spread photos of Ukrainian tanks,
flags, and soldiers altered to bear Nazi symbols in an effort to associate
the Ukrainian government with resurgent Nazism, and thereby
influence some European countries, such as Germany, to distance
themselves from Kiev.39
Another example involved disseminating images depicting columns
of refugees fleeing Ukraine to Russia, when in reality the people
commuted between Ukraine and Poland daily.40 Even cyberoperations
effectively leaked stolen information such as the phone conversation
between US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria J. Nuland and US
Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey R. Pyatt, which may have embarrassed
the United States.41

Russia’s Victory

While the larger struggle with Ukraine continues, Russia’s successful
and bloodless usurpation of Crimea testifies to the lessons learned in
South Ossetia. Russia’s information confrontation strategy was more

36      Bachmann and Gunneriusson, “Russia’s Hybrid Warfare”; and Karmanau and Isachenkov,
“Vladimir Putin.”
37      Paul Lewis, Spencer Ackerman, and Jon Swaine, “US Concedes Russia Has Control of
Crimea and Seeks to Contain Putin,” Guardian, March 3, 2014.
38      “Putin Slams U.S., Georgia’s Western Allies,” Truthdig, August 11, 2008, http://www
.truthdig.com/eartotheground/item/20080811_putin_slams_us_georgias_western_allies#below.
39      Unwala and Ghori, “Cybered Bear.”
40     Peter Pomerantsev, “Can Ukraine Win Its Information War with Russia?,” Atlantic, June 11, 2014,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/can-ukraine-win-its-information
-war-with-russia/372564.
41      Daisy Sindelar, “Brussels, Kyiv, Moscow React to Leaked Nuland Phone Call,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, February 7, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/nuland-russia-eu-ukraine
-reaction/25256828.html.
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centralized and controlled in Crimea.42 Perhaps the most telling aspect
of success, Russia kept its biggest adversaries—the United States and
NATO—from intervening thereby enabling a referendum in which
the Crimean parliament voted to join Russia.43 While the West refuses
to acknowledge Crimea’s secession, Russia attests full compliance
with democratic procedures, a fact difficult to argue against on an
international stage.44
Despite marked improvements, Russia does not deserve all
the credit. Ukraine did not learn from Russia’s missteps and was illprepared to handle Russia’s cyber, media, and kinetic onslaught. With
a lack of funding and information outlets, there is also little evidence
of an aggressive Ukrainian counterinformation campaign. Historically,
Ukraine has maintained passive propaganda, public relations, and
lobbying practices and does not seem interested in changing.45 Even
since the Crimean independence referendum, Ukraine has not
proficiently mitigated Russian information confrontation. According to
one commentator, Ukraine “has no international voice or image” even
though the entire course of events—from the takeover of parliament in
Simferopol and dismantling of the Ukrainian military presence on the
peninsula to the disputed referendum and the de facto annexation of the
area to the Russian Federation—was accompanied by intense activity
aimed to control the flow of information.46

Ukraine Now

While one Ukrainian diplomat believes Ukraine is currently
winning the information war, possibly due to the European Union
maintaining sanctions against Russia, discontent with the sanctions
is growing among European Union citizenry, particularly in Greece,
Hungary, Italy, and perhaps most importantly, Germany.47 Furthermore,
the sanctions are not the result of Ukrainian information warfare efforts
as much as international perception of Russia as the aggressor state—a
view influenced by Russia’s annexation of the region and suspected
involvement in downing Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 (2014).48
What’s more, the longer Russia engages eastern Ukraine, the
more its objectives evolve. No longer entirely focused on inspiring
separatists in the region to rejoin Russia in a manner similar to Crimea,
Russia also seems to be combatting US influence in similar affairs

42      US Army Special Operations Command (SOC), “Little Green Men”: A Primer on Modern Russian
Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013–2014 (Fort Bragg, NC: SOC, June 2015).
43      Luke Harding and Shaun Walker, “Crimea Applies To Be Part of Russian Federation after
Vote To Leave Ukraine,” Guardian, March 17, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014
/mar/17/ukraine-crimea-russia-referendum-complain-result.
44      Sputnik, “US Policy toward Crimea Defies Reality,” Russia Insider, March 16, 2015,
http://russia-insider.com/en/2015/03/16/4534.
45      Taras Kuzio, “Is Ukraine Really Winning the ‘Information War’ with Russia?,” Kyiv Post, July
18, 2016.
46      Pomerantsev, “Can Ukraine Win?”
47      RIA, “Parubiy: Ukraine Is Winning the Information War against Russia,” Fort Russ, July
2, 2016, http://www.fort-russ.com/2016/07/parubiy-ukraine-is-winning-information.html; and
Finian Cunningham, “Europe Revolts against Russian Sanctions,” Strategic Culture Foundation,
May 26, 2016, http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2016/05/26/europe-revolts-against-russian
-sanctions.html.
48      Ibid.
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while trying to keep Ukraine out of NATO.49 Moreover, Russia has
demonstrated that obfuscating its true intent preserves its options while
confusing its adversaries.50
Hypothesizing over Russia’s true intent puts the advantage in its
hands. Leveraging flexibility brings beneficial resolutions—for example,
while assessing Syria in 2016, Russia’s aid to Assad’s forces successfully
stopped US-backed opposition. The United States adopted a quid pro
quo giving operational coordination against terrorist groups in exchange
for a Russian commitment to stop Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from
attacking Syrian civilians and the moderate opposition.51
This involvement made Russia equal partners in the region,
regardless of Assad’s return to power. Similarly, Russia may surrender
its short-term goals for eastern Ukraine to have autonomous rights in
favor of the strategic gain of Ukraine not joining NATO. Some believe
the economic burdens of eastern Ukraine may be too much for Russia
to take on.52 If true, using the region as a bargaining chip for the greater
prize serves Russia’s long-term objectives.

Information Confrontation—Evolutionary Thinking

Information warfare has been referred to as an asymmetric weapon,
and the incidents with Georgia and Crimea certainly support this
categorization.53 Following the Color revolutions, which resulted in
successful regime changes, both the Georgian and Crimean incidents
reinforce the belief that constructing, controlling, and disseminating
information effectively and substantially influences the outcome of
geopolitical events.54
Russia, generally perceived as one of the leading powers in
information warfare, lost its information struggle against Georgia,
the smaller country with less military capability and military history.55
Conversely, by applying an adaptive approach, Russia adjusted its
information confrontation strategy, successfully enabling Crimea’s
secession from Ukraine. Simply, Russia learned from its mistakes in
Georgia, centralized generation and dissemination of its information
and propaganda, and thereby subtly influenced Crimea’s final outcome.
As one Russian expert remarked, “When you look at how Russia is
attempting to copy Western style press briefings by the military . . . it
49      Matthew Chance, “What Does Russia’s President Putin Really Want?,” CNN News, February
11, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/11/world/chance-putin-analysis/.
50      Maria Snegovaya, Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare
(Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, September 2015).
51      Daniel R. DePetris, “America Has No Choice But To Cooperate with Russia in Syria,”
The Skeptics (blog), National Interest, July 18, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics
/america-has-no-choice-cooperate-russia-syria-17027.
52      “Does Russia Really Want Eastern Ukraine?,” World Policy (blog), http://www.worldpolicy
.org/world-views/does-russia-really-want-eastern-ukraine.
53      James R. McGrath, “Twenty-First Century Information Warfare and the Third Offset
Strategy,” Joint Forces Quarterly 82, no. 3 (July 2016).
54      For more on the Rose Revolution (Georgia, 2012), the Orange Revolution (Ukraine,
2004), and the Tulip Revolution (Kyrgyzstan, 2005), see Anthony H. Cordesman, Russia and the
“Color Revolution”: A Russian Military View of a World Destabilized by the US and the West (Washington,
DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014).
55      Andrew Lisa, “Information Warfare: Major Cyber War Powers,” Strategy Page, March 13,
2014, https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htiw/articles/20140313.aspx.
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speaks volumes to their understanding of how better to structure public
opinion around a military operation.”56
Reviewing Russia’s information-related activities since the
2007 Estonia distributed denial of service incident, information
confrontation has evolved from a tool used primarily for disruption to a
tool of influence. The managing director for the Center of Security and
Strategic Research at the National Defense Academy of Latvia echoes
the sentiment by asserting influence operations are “at the very center of
Russia’s operational planning.”57 Indeed, the more nonmilitary means are
employed in areas of geopolitical tension, the more essential leveraging
information confrontation becomes. As information is generally
regarded as a soft power, it may be most effectively implemented in
times other than force-on-force military conflict where, depending on
its intent and objectives, information can be used to inform, persuade,
threaten, or confuse audiences.
Unsurprisingly, Russian writing on information confrontation
continues to evolve, a testament to the strategy being dynamic and fluid
much like the domain in which it is applied. While Gerasimov may have
helped redirect Russian military thinking about the role of nonmilitary
methods in the resolution of conflicts, other thought leadership builds
on the foundation. In 2013, two Russian authors acknowledged “a newgeneration war will be dominated by information and psychological
warfare that will seek to achieve superior control of troops and weapons
and to depress opponents’ armed forces personnel and population
morally and psychologically. In the ongoing revolution in information
technologies, information and psychological warfare will largely lay the
groundwork for victory.”58
The use of “new-generation war” nods to the criticality of information
dominance in a time where the content of information is as heavily relied
upon for civilian-military matters as well as the technologies it traverses.
Though new-generation war does not appear to have been used in military
writings since 2013, a lack of official refutation by military officers
suggests it may still be a relevant professional approach toward warfare.59
Many Western scholars have categorized Russian tactics in Ukraine
as hybrid warfare—the use of hard and soft tactics that rely on proxies
and surrogates to prevent attribution, to conceal intent, and to maximize
confusion and uncertainty.60 A 2015 article from Military Thought
suggests this interpretation of the events in Ukraine may be incorrect,
56      Mike Eckel, “Russia’s Shock and Awe: Moscow Ups Its Information Warfare in Syria
Operation,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Free Liberty, October 7, 2015, http://www.rferl.org
/content/russia-syria-shock-awe-military-air-strikes-information-warfare/27293854.html.
57       Tony Balasevicius, “Russia’s ‘New Generation War’ and Its Implications for the
Arctic,” Mackenzie Institute, November 10, 2015, http://mackenzieinstitute.com/russias-new
-generation-war-implications-arctic/.
58      Colonel S. G. Chekinov (Res.) and Lieutenant General S. A. Bogdanov (Ret.), “The Nature
and Content of a New-Generation War,” Military Thought 4 (2013).
59      Timothy L. Thomas, Russia Military Strategy: Impacting 21st-Century Reform and Geopolitics (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2015); and Timothy L. Thomas, “The Evolution
of Russian Military Thought: Integrating Hybrid, New-Generation, and New-Type Thinking,”
Journal of Slavic Military Studies 29, no. 4. (October 2016): 554–575, doi:10.1080/13518046.2016
.1232541.
60      Andrew Monaghan, “The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare’,” Parameters 45, no. 4 (Winter
2015–16): 65–74.
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more accurately describing Western actions.61 In fact, by the end of 2015,
Russian officers altogether refuted the use of “hybrid” to describe their
activities.62 Nevertheless, the complementary and supportive role of
information confrontation in Ukraine suggests it is best implemented
in concert with other conventional and unconventional activities
to achieve maximum effectiveness in larger campaigns and not as a
stand-alone tactic.
In 2015, the director of the Russian General Staff’s Main Operation’s
Directorate explained a “new-type warfare,” similar yet distinct from
hybrid and new-generation warfare, that associates indirect actions
with hybrid ones.63 Other authors of new-generation warfare accepted
the new terminology, particularly for activities focused on military,
nonmilitary, and special nonviolent measures to achieve information
dominance, which logically includes actions in Ukraine. One author
stressed “information warfare in the new conditions will be the starting
point of every action now called the new-type of warfare (a hybrid war)
in which broad use will be made of the mass media and, where feasible,
the global computer networks (blogs, various social networks, and
other resources).”64
Unsuccessful attempts to place information confrontation under
the rubric of any specific modern war strategy, such as new-generation
war, hybrid warfare, or new-type warfare, may further testify to the
reciprocally dynamic and malleable nature of the strategy and conflict
activities. The one aspect consistently carried through official Russian
documents concerning information security doctrine and military
strategy and carried out in these regional conflicts is the belief that
information superiority is instrumental to future victories.
As the world moves toward conflicts in which, as Gerasimov
describes, “Wars are not declared but have already begun,” it is
evident that—whether referred to as information warfare, information
confrontation, information operations, or information struggle—no
state is guaranteed victory based solely on the abundance of resources
or capabilities. The art of information confrontation must be practiced
continuously, refined over time, and tailored to specific audiences.
Russia actively refines its methods in real-time conflicts as it
leverages and incorporates its information struggle into nonmilitary
means to achieve political objectives. In this way, Russia is not learning
from others as much as it is learning from itself and, in the process, leads
states’ conduct of such operations in the future. And, therein may lie
information confrontation’s greatest strength: there is no cookie-cutter
playbook from which it originates or to which it applies.
Information campaigns can be tailored to suite each unique
environment. The information campaign that worked in Crimea may
produce different outcomes elsewhere, which reinforces Russia’s lessonslearned approach—do not fight the next battle in the same way as the
61      Thomas, Russia Military Strategy.
62      Ibid.
63      Thomas, “Russian Military Thought”; and Timothy L. Thomas, Thinking Like a Russian
Officer: Basic Factors and Contemporary Thinking on The Nature of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS:
Foreign Military Studies Office, April 2016).
64      Thomas, “Russian Military Thought.”
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last one. The greatest asset of this capability is the flexibility to assume
greater or lesser responsibilities given the nature of requirements, which
is paramount as the role of nonmilitary means to achieve political and
strategic goals in conflicts has significantly increased.

Recommendations

The United States needs to address hostile information activities
from its adversaries more efectively. As observed in the recent hacking
scandals surrounding the US presidential election in which Russia targeted
and, according to the US intelligence community, used information to
disrupt and ultimately help its candidate of choice to win, the soft power
most effective in confounding the United States is information itself,
and not necessarily any production or dissemination technology.65 Given
the fact that Russia spends approximately $400–$500 million per year
on foreign information efforts, while the US spends $20 million USD
on Russian language services, it is easy to see that the United States is far
behind.66 Some recommendations to address this shortcoming include:
National counterinformation strategy and center. The United
States’ offensive cybercapability is generally considered among the most
sophisticated and powerful on the planet; however, as observed in efforts
against the Islamic State, America has been less adept in countering
online messaging despite substantial resources.67
In late December 2016, President Barack Obama authorized $611
billion for the military in 2017 and to establish a Global Engagement
Center to track foreign propaganda and disinformation efforts
undermining US national security interests.68 Little information on the
development of this entity is available to date, although a similarly named
center focusing on Islamic State messaging is headquartered in the State
Department. Such a center should serve as a central, coordinating entity
as well as model the operations of the National Counterterrorism Center,
which maintains cross-government civilian and military representation
and directly advises the Director of National Intelligence. Furthermore,
this center needs to collaborate with national security stakeholders to
develop unique strategies for each state and nonstate actor.
Protect against fake news. The rampant proliferation of fake
news, such as observed during the US elections and annexation of
Crimea, undoubtedly plays a pivotal role in Russian information
operations.69 One initiative to help reduce fake news involves leveraging
65      US National Intelligence Council (NIC), Background to “Assessing Russian Activities
and Intentions in Recent US Elections”: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution
(Washington, DC: NIC, 2017).
66      Pavel Koshkin, “The Paradox of Kremlin Propaganda: How It Tries to Win Hearts and
Minds,” Russia Direct, April 2, 2015 http://www.russia-direct.org/analysis/paradox-kremlin
-propaganda-how-it-tries-win-hearts-and-minds; and Warren Strobel, “U.S. Losing ‘Information
War’ to Russia, Other Rivals: Study,” Reuters, March 25, 2015.
67      Danny Vinik, “America’s Secret Arsenal,” Politico, December 9, 2015; Emilio Iasiello,
“Rebooting the U.S.’ New Counter Messaging Efforts against ISIS,” Dead Drop, February 16, 2016,
http://deaddrop.threatpool.com/rebooting-the-u-s-new-counter-messaging-efforts-against-isis/;
Eric Geller, “Why ISIS Is Winning the Online Propaganda War,” Daily Dot (Austin, TX), March 29,
2016; and Arturo Muñoz and Erin Dick, Information Operations: The Imperative of Doctrine Harmonization
and Measures of Effectiveness (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015).
68      National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328 (2016).
69      Andrew E. Kramer, “To Battle Fake News, Ukrainian Show Features Nothing but Lies,” New
York Times, February 26, 2017.
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cutting-edge technology to help identify the fabrications as soon as they
emerge. Artificial intelligence and data analytics can be used to detect
words or word patterns that might indicate deceitful stories. In addition,
the US government via the Department of Homeland Security should
implement a strategy for educating the public as well as identifying
and reporting fake news outlets in much the same way cyberscams are
reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
International engagement. The global nature of the Internet
provides many outlets for disseminating legitimate and illegitimate
information. A myriad of social media platforms can also be used
to promote slanted news stories and propaganda via Internet trolls.
Increasing international collaboration among law enforcement and
intelligence professionals who specifically focus on these outlets will
help agencies identify and disable these sources.

Conclusions

Applying information warfare theories in today’s geopolitical climate
remains a work in progress. An around-the-clock news cycle and the
various ways of disseminating and consuming information worldwide
make implementing information-based operations and tailoring
messaging against competing narratives challenges. As observed in
Georgia, smaller nations can competitively control information and
influence target audiences to at least mitigate the efforts of, if not defeat,
larger nations.
Even after learning from its missteps in Georgia, Russia, did not
gain many Ukrainian regions. Russia lost opportunities in Luhansk and
Donetsk when Russian troops were unable to penetrate the regions
promptly. Russia, however, appears to be guided by Gerasimov’s
principle of refining information confrontation strategies by continuing
to engage in various forms of official and unofficial messaging as well
as perfecting the art.
One scholar of Russian propaganda refers to it as less of an information
war as much as a war on information. Given the value Russia places
on manipulating information, perceptions of the information space as
potentially dangerous and a successful agent for ousting governments
and influencing public opinion and behavior are understandable. A
former KGB general stated the overall goal of Soviet Union propaganda
was not far from the “subversion” pursued by Russia’s modern Internet
disinformation campaign: “active measures to weaken the West, to drive
wedges in the Western community alliances of all sorts, particularly
NATO, to sow discord among allies, to weaken the United States in the
eyes of the people in Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America, and thus to
prepare ground in case the war really occurs.”
While the media has focused on offensive cyberattacks and disruptive
efforts to cripple critical infrastructures and to impede public access
to financial institutions and emergency services, Russia understands
the potential power associated with influencing via cyberspace. As
such, Russia continues to refine its online information operations
against regional and international targets, outpacing the United States
in nonoffensive cybercapabilities and demonstrating not all threats in
cyberspace are written in binary.
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ABSTRACT: This article introduces the concept of organizational
ambidexterity and explains its value to military planning and
problem-solving from the tactical to strategic levels.

I

n 2005, as the US military waged numerous armed conflicts around
the world, Army Chief of Staff General Peter J. Schoomaker was
confronted with a serious troop shortage. In an interview with Time,
he explained not only how he would overcome the shortage but also
why there was no need to institute a draft: “We are developing a modular
Army force that gives us much more rapidly deployable, much more
capable organizations. . . . What you will have is a team of pentathletes.
I want a whole team of Michael Jordans who can play any position. We
must . . . have this pentathlete team better organized, better led, better
trained, better equipped, and more strategically agile.”1
It is not a stretch of imagination to anticipate future troop shortages,
especially for an all-volunteer Army required to sustain numerous small
wars across several regions of the world simultaneously. Thus, the concept
of the pentathlete soldier—multifaceted and agile, proficient in a broad
range of tasks, and capable of accomplishing a variety of missions—is
key to sustaining Schoomaker’s vision of flexible, multifunctional Army
units that effectively operate in complex environments.
While US Army strategists were devising more efficient and effective
ways to train and employ soldiers to meet this vision, Joseph Soeters,
then-dean of management studies at the Netherlands Defense Academy,
was exploring organizational ambidexterity.2 Arguably, he identified and
extended the philosophy of pragmatism practiced by Morris Janowitz,
a pioneer of military sociology, to examine the changing nature of Cold
War and post-Cold War civil-military relations.3 The passage below
introduces Soeter’s perspective:
Peace operations are often mixed military and civilian and led by military
forces, which bring a warrior ethos to the task. The warrior ethos includes
rigid dichotomies such as friend/enemy, victory/defeat, strength/
weakness, good/evil, and life/death. The seeming contradiction of
1      Sally B. Donnelly and Douglas Waller, “Ten Questions with Peter Schoomaker,” Time, April
22, 2005. Later in the interview Schoomaker was asked if America needed a draft. His answer:
“No . . . because it takes too long to train people as pentathletes.”
2      Soeters won the Morris Janowitz Career Achievement Award for excellence in the study of
armed forces and society. For more information on this award, see “The Morris Janowitz Career
Achievement Award,” Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, http://www.iusafs
.org/JanowitzAward.asp (accessed April 21, 2017).
3      Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1971),
264–77, 303–20. Also see Donald S. Travis, “Saving Samuel Huntington and the Need for Pragmatic
Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society, August 30, 2016, doi:10.1177/0095327X16667287.
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warriors administering peace poses challenges for the administration of
a positive peace.4

Soeter’s pragmatic approach to ambidexterity, which implies
something exceptional such as a soccer player’s skillful use of both feet,
can impact warfighting and peacekeeping in many ways. This versatility
can address seemingly contradictory goals imbedded in international
peacekeeping operations that often employ military skill sets concurrently
to carry out other operations. As a pragmatic approach, ambidexterity
recognizes a problematic situation facing leaders of such missions and
suggests a strategy to resolve the problem. The approach deals with the
time-honored culture of the warrior and the need to adapt in the face of
new or evolving missions. The concept also represents an adaptable and
useful cross-disciplinary practice of excelling at seemingly contradictory
skills that is applicable in medicine, business, and many organizations,
including those involved in military affairs. This article addresses each
of these applications and explains several implications of pragmatism
and ambidexterity for the military environment.

Ambidexterity

In 1997 Michael L. Tushman, a leading organizational behavior
theorist from the Harvard Business School, along with his associates
Philip Anderson and Charles A. O’Reilly examined the problem of
ensuring ongoing organizational innovation. They identified two types
of innovation—incremental and discontinuous. Incremental innovations
occur during routine business activities. Discontinuous innovations
are needed to prepare for fundamental changes in technology or the
market. Notably, the team determined “ambidextrous organizations
have multiple organizational architectures to concurrently nurture these
diverse innovation requirements.”5
O’Reilly and Tushman subsequently brought widespread recognition
to the concept of ambidexterity after examining the challenges
of attending to routine matters or exploiting the current business
environment while also exploring opportunities to ensure future
success. Considering how managers maintain stability and prepare for
inevitable changes, they noted the difficulty of attending to exploitation
and exploration simultaneously. Typically, a manager’s attention focuses
on pressing daily activities, which leaves little time for contemplating
future promises and pitfalls.6 This widespread management conundrum
is endemic to the military.
The friction between current operations and the need to improve
capabilities can result in organizations being ill-prepared for the
future; ambidexterity is a way to resolve this competition. Successful
organizations meet this challenge by placing these functions in
4      Patricia M. Shields and Joseph L. Soeters, “Peaceweaving: Jane Addams, Positive Peace,
and Public Administration,” American Review of Public Administration 47, no. 3 (April 2017): 325,
doi:10.1177/0275074015589629.
5      Michael L. Tushman, Philip Anderson, and Charles A. O’Reilly, “Technology Cycles,
Innovation Streams and Ambidextrous Organizations,” in Managing Strategic Innovation and Change: A
Collection of Readings, ed. Michael L. Tushman and Philip Anderson (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1997), 6.
6      Charles A. O’Reilly and Michael L. Tushman, “The Ambidextrous Organization,” Harvard
Business Review 82 (April 2004): 74–81.
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separate divisions that report to a single supervisor—these firms are
ambidextrous.7 Ambidexterity is a way for military leaders to cope
with contradictory demands when carrying out missions that rely
upon cooperation and collaboration with joint forces and nonmilitary
organizations. This represents an example of a pragmatic organizational
culture that can improve organizational effectiveness.8 The pragmatic
approach will be discussed further.

Military Operations and Ambidexterity

The concept of ambidexterity is applied to contemporary military
organizations by examining seemingly intractable dualisms. Take, for
example, a pair of concepts known as bonding and bridging. By drawing
on a common experiential reference, such as traveling, the relevance of
these concepts can be explained for postmodern military operations.
If a person is traveling in a group, interactions establish friendships
and reinforce strong ties—bonding occurs within the community. On
the other hand, if a person is traveling alone, efforts focus on bridging
language and cultural differences to develop acquaintances that can
help the traveler successfully navigate the journey.9 Thus, bonding and
bridging are viewed as a mutually exclusive, fixed dichotomy.10
As a feature of ambidexterity, bonding and bridging can occur
simultaneously: unit cohesion is built while coordinating and
collaborating with other units or organizations.11 Bonding “implies that
servicemen do not want to have anything to do with people outside
their own unit.”12 This is logical when enemies are clearly defined and
understood, but can be problematic in the presence of ambiguity during
complex operations. Further, traditional combat units take orders and
respond in predictable ways; they are not supposed to demonstrate
innovative ideas. Likewise, groups formed with strong ties generally
have “limited cognitive flexibility” and are “less receptive to innovative
ideas.”13 These fundamentals of ambidexterity explain why units must
develop the ability to learn and adapt, especially during complex
multinational operations.
Nevertheless, cohesion is not as essential during a crisis situation
absent a clear friend-and-foe relationship. In these instances, the ability
to bridge—collaborate with other civilian and military organizations—
becomes a necessity.14 This need, however, does not reduce the importance
of internal military cohesion: “Bonding and bridging are required
during multinational non-Article 5 crisis-response operations. . . . Under
those circumstances, the pattern of bonding without bridging clearly
7      Ibid.
8      Joseph L. Soeters, “Ambidextrous Military: Coping with Contradictions of New Security
Policies,” in The Viability of Human Security, ed. Monica den Boer and Jaap de Wilde (Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press, 2008), 109–124.
9      Ibid.
10      Mark S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6
(May 1973): 1360–80; and Mark S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory
Revisited,” Sociological Theory 1 (1983): 201–33.
11      Guy L. Siebold, “Key Questions and Challenges to the Standard Model of Military Group
Cohesion,” Armed Forces & Society 37, no. 3 (July 2011): 448–68, doi:10.1177/0095327X11398451.
12      Soeters, “Ambidextrous Military,” 115.
13      Ibid., 113.
14      Ibid., 115.
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does not work as well.”15 So, there is an inherent contradiction: bonding
and bridging appear to be more or less mutually exclusive, yet groups
and people strongly gravitate toward one connection or the other.
Military organizations dealing with diverse cultures in the uncertain
postmodern environment need to be able to do both. Soeters interprets
recent literature to suggest bonding and bridging can be compatible by
applying the concept of ambidexterity.16
Similar to the soccer player who learns to develop a weak leg,
organizations can learn to deal with the contradictory demands of
bridging and bonding required for joint force operations.17 One technique
to accomplish this proficiency involves structural ambidexterity, which
would involve assigning units varied but distinct roles and missions such
that one unit might orient more on bonding and focus on “war-fighting,
terrorist hunting and other activities that imply the use of violence.”18
Tasks for another unit might involve bridging and focus on peacekeeping,
civil-military cooperation, humanitarian relief, and nation-building.19 In
this manner, military organizations develop the operational capacity to
respond to a variety of contexts quickly and effectively.
An additional approach is contextual ambidexterity where
commanders would develop both bonding and bridging skills to
strengthen relationships with other policymakers and joint force leaders.
As Soeters explains, leaders “need to have a broad view of their work,
being culturally intelligent as well as being alert to opportunities and
challenges beyond the confines of their jobs. They need to act like
brokers, always looking to build internal and external linkages, and if
needed they have to be comfortable wearing more than one ‘hat.’ Most
of all they need to be able to immediately switch from communicating
and negotiating to the actual repelling and use of violence.”20
Ambidexterity also applies to the challenge of defining and achieving
peace—negative peace as the absence of violence and positive peace as the
incorporation of social justice and equality.21 Functioning societies work
to achieve a positive peace knowing it is perhaps an impermanent goal
requiring diligence. To move a society from the sphere of negative peace
to positive peace during turbulent transitions such as those accompanying
peacekeeping operations, soldiers need to use ways of thinking and skills
that are seemingly contradictory. In the pragmatic sense, ambidexterity
helps a soldier to reconcile some of the contradictions, such as the need
15      Ibid.
16      O’Reilly and Tushman, “Ambidextrous Organization.”
17      Soeters, “Ambidextrous Military,” 120.
18      Ibid., 121.
19      Thomas P. M. Barnett recognized the dual role of military forces and called for organizing
them into two functions or types of units: the leviathan specializing in “high-tech big violence
war” and the system administrator specializing in “low-tech security generation and routine crisis
response.” Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century
(New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004), 299–302.
20      Soeters, “Ambidextrous Military,” 122. This kind of challenge was recognized by the US
Marines and codified in General Charles C. Krulak’s article “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership
in the Three Block War,” Marines Magazine, January 1999. Also see US Marine Corps Combat
Development Command (MCCDC), A Concept for Future Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain
(Quantico, VA: MCCDC, 1997).
21      Shields & Soeters, “Peaceweaving”; and Nils Petter Gleditsch, Jonas Nordkvelle and Håvard
Strand, “Peace Research—Just the Study of War?,” Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 2 (March 2014):
145–58, doi:10.1177/0022343313514074.
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to be a shooter and a talker that is associated with the uneven process of
moving from negative to positive peace.22
It is not enough to simply recognize the dualisms fraught in warfare.
Ambidexterity addresses dichotomies that appear to confound both
theory and practice: it can clarify the fog and friction of bureaucratic
inertia. When applied to military operations, pragmatism orients
thinking to improve national security practitioners’ thinking. It can
also affect approaches for achieving peace and stability while striving to
maintain our humanity.

Pragmatism Underlying Ambidexterity

Pragmatism, a philosophy of common sense born in the United
States soon after the Civil War, was a response to dogmatic thinking that
propelled the bloody conflict.23 Using purposeful human inquiry as a
focal point, pragmatism represents a continual process of discovery and
doubt that acknowledges the qualitative nature of human experience
as problematic situations emerge and are recognized.24 Pragmatism
embraces doubt and uncertainty and focuses attention on practical
effects.25 Janowitz employed it to challenge military problems.
The uncertainties of warfare are so great that the most elaborate peacetime
planning and the most realistic exercises are at best weak indicators of
emerging imponderables. Dogmatic doctrine is a typical organizational
reflex reaction to future uncertainties . . . The constabulary concept provides
a continuity with past military experiences and traditions, but also offers a
basis for the radical adaptation of the profession. The military establishment
becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act,
committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international
relations, rather than victory . . . The constabulary outlook is ground in, and
extends pragmatic doctrine.”26

Pragmatists such as Janowitz approach challenges with a spirit of
inquiry, critical optimism, and cooperation by using an experimental
logic—or purposeful human inquiry grounded in a problematic
situation.27 Problems are situated in experience and culture; problematic
situations often challenge existing belief systems and ways of doing things.
Accounting for the qualitative nature of human experience, the uneasy,
doubtful feeling preceding problem recognition and the problematic
situation are recognized and reconciled through the transformations of
inquiry, which involve “critical reasoning, empirical investigation and
actions that are assessed in light of practical consequences.”28

22      Shields and Soeters, “Peaceweaving.”
23      Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club: The Story of Ideas in America (New York: Farrar, Straus,
and Giroux, 2001).
24      Patricia M. Shields, “Using Pragmatism to Bridge the Gap between Academe and Practice”
(presentation, Conference of the American Society for Public Administration, Denver, CO, April
1–4, 2006), 7, https://digital.library.txstate.edu/handle/10877/3955.
25      Charles Sanders Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief,” Popular Science Monthly 12 (November 1877):
1–15; and Charles Sanders Peirce, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” Popular Science Monthly 12 (January
1878): 286–302.
26      Janowitz, Professional Soldier, 24, 418.
27      John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt, 1938).
28      Patricia M. Shields, “Rediscovering the Taproot: Is Classical Pragmatism the Route to
Renew Public Administration,” Public Administration Review 68, no. 2 (March/April 2008): 206,
doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2007.00856.x.
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Inquiry reduces uncertainty, facilitates the next steps, and links
the problematic situation to an end-in-view—a flexible, practical goal
with meaning in the real world that cannot be separated from human
experience. With a goal of continually adapting plans based upon
practicality, a “social component” generally accompanies the curiosity
of this approach, which helps the decision-maker expand information
on a topic of interest through community input.29 Thus, pragmatism
approaches all problematic situations with a spirit of critical optimism—
“the belief that the specific conditions which exist at one moment, be
they comparatively bad or comparatively good, in any event may be
bettered.”30 Critical optimism recognizes evil yet never becomes stuck
in the paralysis of pessimism.31
As forerunners to Janowitz, John Dewey and Jane Addams
pioneered a sophisticated theory of participatory democracy where a
diverse community is involved in shaping or characterizing a problematic
situation, developing approaches to resolve the problem, defining and
refining the end-in-view, and potentially, being transformed in the
process. Their pragmatic vision is embraced by Janowitz in his book
The Professional Soldier, where the constabulary concept depends on
cooperation, collaboration, and critical optimism. Whether any Army
can build and sustain a cadre of pentathletes will impact military planning
from the tactical to grand-strategic levels. Developing valid assumptions
and feasible objectives, which is the primary building blocks of any plan,
could benefit from practical inquiry, critical optimism, and cooperation.

Resolving Dualisms

Resolving two seemingly intractable dualisms central to many
human problematic situations can help postmodern militaries develop
ambidexterity. Psycho-philosophical dualisms deal with the separation
of mind and body and incorporate dichotomies such as theory/practice
and thought/action. Moral dualisms take into account notions of good
and evil such as friend/enemy and oppressed/oppressor. Rigid moral
dualisms mentioned in this section can also be an ongoing impetus
to violent conflict.

Psycho-Philosophical

Dewey’s perspective on psycho-philosophical dichotomy arose from
his organic and holistic model of experience.32 He criticized the reflex
arc, a model that reduces behavior to discrete and separate stimulus and
response observed in situations similar to a child quickly withdrawing
(response) his or her hand from a flame (stimulus). Dewey disagreed with
the model’s artificial detachment of sensory stimulus, central response,
and action into discrete components. He also declared the reflex arc
misrepresents how people interact with their environs, explaining how
organisms do not “passively receive a stimulus and then become active

29      Ibid.
30      John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press 1957), 179.
31      Patricia M. Shields, “The Community of Inquiry: Classical Pragmatism and Public
Administration,” Administration & Society 35, no. 5 (2003): 510–38, doi:10.1177/0095399703256160.
32      David L. Hildebrand, Dewey: A Beginners Guide (Oxford: Oneworld, 2008), 12.
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responders.”33 Concluding organisms interact continuously with their
environment in a cumulative and mutually modifying manner, Dewey
argued the arc too rigidly identifies a clear starting and ending point
when “both stimulus and response are enmeshed in an ongoing matrix
of sensory and motor activities. A stimulus comes from somewhere and
a response leads elsewhere—to further coordination and integration of
both sensory and motor responses.”34
Importantly, stimulus and response occur “in a wider dynamic
context” (culture) that incorporates aims and interests as well as “an
environment, which contains the problems and surprises that spur
us on to grow.”35 Dewey suggested an alternative coordinated circuit
illustrating dichotomies similar to stimulus and response that cloaks
“ancient psychophysical dualisms” such as mind/body, thought/action,
ends/means, and theory/practice.36
These common dualisms are rooted in an erroneous and radical
separation of the perceiver from the world: “Dewey’s model rejects this
inner/outer model from the start. His is an ecological model—mind,
body and world are mutually created by their ongoing interaction.”37
Dewey’s model focuses on relationships: instead of viewing stimulus
and response as discrete disconnected components, he shows their
relationship within a larger environment. Soeters applies this concept
to the relation of culture to human interaction and shows how bonding
and bridging can be applied to complicated, multinational, postmodern
military missions.38

Moral Dualisms

As mentioned earlier, pragmatism was partly a reaction to rigid
moral positions that propelled the US Civil War—for example, Southern
honor was tied to a devotion to the slave system. To threaten slavery
threatened honor, which justified and compelled a violent response.39
Jane Addams, another pioneer of pragmatism and a philosopher of
peace, clearly articulated problems with rigid moral perspectives. She
reacted to the moral paternalism that bound women to the home and
excluded them from the public sphere.40 Notably, such rigid moralisms
contain implicit dualisms because for each right there is a contrasting
wrong; each enemy has corresponding friends. Addams posits “life itself
teaches us nothing more inevitable than that right and wrong are most
confusedly mixed: That the blackest wrong is by our side and within
our own motives; that right does not dazzle our eyes with its radiant
shining, but has to be found by exerting patience, discrimination and

33      John Dewey, “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology,” Psychological Review 3, no. 4 (July
1896): 359.
34      Hildebrand, Dewey, 15–16.
35      Ibid.
36      Dewey, “Reflex Arc”; and Hildebrand, Dewey, 16–17.
37      Hildebrand, Dewey, 21.
38      Soeters, “Ambidextrous Military.”
39      Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1982).
40      Patricia M. Shields, “Democracy and the Social Feminist Ethics of Jane Addams: A Vision
for Public Administration,” Administrative Theory and Praxis 28, no. 3 (September 2006): 418–43.
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impartiality.”41 In this manner, rigid moral perspectives carry the weight
of moral superiority with little room for human frailty or weakness. As a
result, the concerns of the weak and dispossessed can be marginalized,
offering the seeds of terrorism.42

Sympathy as Remedy

As an alternative to inflexible moral certainty, Addams offered
sympathetic knowledge explained as a willingness to suspend judgment,
listen, “see the size of one another’s burden,” and “a determination
to enter into lives that [are] not one’s own, without falling into the
arrogant pretense that one [understand] the lives of others better than
they [do].”43 Addams believed “when we sympathetically and affectively
understand the plight of others, we are more likely to care and act in
their behalf.”44 Armed with this perspective, leaders can incorporate
emotions into their sense of knowledge to bring emotional kindness
and imagination to interpersonal encounters.45 By applying this practice
to the intractable, opposing moral narratives, such as friend/enemy,
oppressed/oppressor, capitalism/communism, and Muslim/Christian,
that are inevitably present in violent conflict, postmodern militaries can
contribute to the puzzle of ending violence.46

Soeters’s Pragmatism

Soeters recognized reciprocal stereotyping between groups who
believe opposing poles of moral dualisms resulted in the groups assigning
greater values to self-associated qualities and increasing requirements
on those with opposing views, which is a “self-propelling process of
ideological escalation” referred to as ethnic outbidding.47 This concept
arose from Soeters’s search for a “coherent set of thematic concerns and
common logic of inquiry” consistent with philosophical pragmatism
that can be traced from Dewey to Janowitz.48 Samuel P. Huntington
focused on this separation between civilian and military groups and the
paradoxes that emerge from that detachment.49
One notion, which acknowledged the separation but accentuated
the societal interpenetration and societal context of the civil-military
environment, veered away from absolutism.50 The pragmatic analysis
41      Jane Addams, “The Settlement as a Factor in the Labor Movement,” in Hull House Maps
and Papers: A Presentation of Nationalities and Wages in a Congested District of Chicago (New York: T. Y.
Crowell, 1895), 199.
42      Jean B. Elshtain, Jane Addams and the Dream of American Democracy (New York: Basic Books,
2002).
43      Jane Addams, Democracy and Social Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1902), 6; and Elshtain, Jane
Addams and the Dream of American Democracy, 122.
44      Maurice Hamington, The Social Philosophy of Jane Addams (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
2009), 74.
45      Patricia M. Shields, “Jane Addams: Peace Activist and Peace Theorist” in Jane Addams
Progressive Pioneer of Peace Philosophy, Sociology, Social Work and Public Administration, ed. Patricia M.
Shields (New York: Springer, 2017), 31–42.
46      Joseph L. Soeters, Ethnic Conflict and Terrorism: The Origins and Dynamics of Civil Wars (London:
Routledge, 2005).
47      Ibid., 84.
48      James Burk, “Introduction: A Pragmatic Sociology,” in On Social Organization and Social
Control, by Morris Janowitz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1, 3.
49      Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957).
50      Janowitz, Professional Soldier, 264–77.
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of military and society leading to this concept ended during the Cold
War, but not before bearing the notion of constabulary force, which
is visible in peacekeeping operations.51 Recent scholarship likewise
emphasizes “inflexible or absolutist doctrine can no longer effectively
address the needs of people in turmoil. A flexible or pragmatic approach
to peacekeeping, on the other hand, offers a way to achieve this critically
important end-in-view.”52

Dualisms

Recognizing the civilian/military dualism overlaying the study of
military affairs, Soeters explored multinational peacekeeping operations,
where the inherent contradictions and tensions are not only a ripe
source for research but also predisposed to deeper implications. Such
peacekeeping operations exist at all levels of war and during all phases
of military operations, and Soeters discovered a way that pragmatism
as a way of thinking could help achieve better results. He came to
understand the methods armies use to defeat enemies and to set the
conditions for peace is a reflection of the values inherent in the societies
they serve, through research involving interpreters, strategic flexibility,
demobilization and transition of soldiers, and operational planning
in Afghanistan.
In a mechanical sense, interpreters, such as those who conducted
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Afghanistan, are tools to
translate words across different languages. Familiar military slang—
translations machines—captures this role and the active/passive
dualism perfectly: the military officer actively communicates with
host nationals, the interpreter passively relays the words.53But Soeters’s
research on translators challenges this metaphor. Harkening back to
Dewey’s criticism of the reflex arc isolating stimulus-response events, a
more organic model of experience developed in which interpreters and
others engaged in negotiations by continuously interacting with their
environment were integrated in a cumulative and mutually modifying
way to prevent strategic faux pas.54
Because something as basic as interpretation could significantly
impact peacekeeping operations, the resolution of the dualism of close/
distant relationships between local interpreters and their military units
must be achieved. Military leaders must facilitate effective communication
in these situations by building cohesion within the team as well as
supporting the ability of the unit’s interpreters to assimilate messages
to cultural differences. The interpreters must likewise accommodate
characteristics of other groups, such as the Dutch military’s direct
51      Travis, “Saving Samuel Huntington,” 2, 5, 7.
52      Patricia M. Shields and Joseph L. Soeters, “Pragmatism, Peacekeeping, and the Constabulary
Force,” in Philosophical Pragmatism and International Relations: Essays for a Bold New World, ed. Shane
Ralston (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013), 105.
53     Geesje Bos and Joseph L. Soeters, “Interpreters at Work: Experiences from Dutch and Belgian
Peace Operations,” International Peacekeeping 13, no. 2 (2006): 264, doi:10.1080/13533310500437662.
54      Bos and Soeters, “Interpreters at Work”; Andrea van Dijk, Joseph L. Soeters, and Richard
de Ridder, “Smooth Translation? A Research Note on the Cooperation between Dutch Service
Personnel and Local Interpreters in Afghanistan,” Armed Forces & Society 36, no. 5 (2010): 917–25,
doi:10.1177/0095327X10379732; and Iris Hoedemaekers and Joseph L. Soeters, “Interaction
Rituals and Language Mediation during Peace Missions: Experiences from Afghanistan,” in Advances
in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (Bingley, UK: Emerald
Group Publishing, 2009), 329–52, doi:10.1108/S1572-8323(2009)000012A024.

74

Parameters 47(2) Spring 2017

communication style and the Afghan military’s less explicit and more
ambiguous style, to build trust among joint forces. Addressing this
dualism simultaneously resolves the tension from the trust/distrust
dualism interpreters experience when their interpretations are relied
upon, but they are excluded from other activities.55
The dualism of large, mechanized forces/small, expeditionary
units associated with Western militaries’ transition from defending a
relatively ordered world to responding to regional instability crises also
vexes military leaders. Given the nature of organizational flexibility and
the ways military organizations could adapt, a problematic paradox of
duality is identified: too much flexibility causes chaos and too much
rigidity prohibits adaptation.56 Organizations often face a power struggle
between stability and change, but organizational sensing enhances
functional flexibility.
A case study involving the Netherlands’ armed forces found “within
highly turbulent crisis response missions, organizational sensing becomes
the predominant driver, stimulating ad hoc solutions that challenge
existing structures, available technology and standard procedures.”57
This observation certainly resonates with insights from pragmatic
inquiry much like the research on demobilizing and integrating Eritrean
fighters into civil service rolls identified a dualism of fighter/nonfighter.58
The ambidexterity displayed during this transition can also be applied:
“Military leaders should be ready for action, violent action if need be.
At the same time they are requested to hold their fire when they operate
in peacekeeping missions in which talking to people is more important
than shooting.”59
Other research on an effects-based approach to operations identified
seemingly contradictory intuition driven/assessment driven approaches
to leadership as an implementation challenge to the International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan.60 Although the researchers’ metaphor
described the culture of the mind as software and the organization (or
body) as hardware, Soeters provided a perfect rejection of the psychophilosophical dualism: “The implicit body versus mind analysis doesn’t
work out because culture comprises body, soul and mind.”61
When contemplating the source of violent ethnic conflicts, Soeters
notes “there is no simple emotional or rational understanding of the
55      Bos and Soeters, “Interpreters at Work,” 266.
56      Erik de Waard, Henk W. Volberda, and Joseph L. Soeters, “Engaging Environmental
Turbulence: Drivers of Organizational Flexibility in the Armed Forces,” European Security 22, no. 4
(2013): 579, doi:10.1080/09662839.2013.822367.
57      Ibid., 577.
58      Mussie T. Tessema and Joseph L. Soeters, “Practices and Challenges of Converting Former
Fighters into Civil Servants: The Case of Eritrea,” Public Administration and Development 26, no.4
(2006): 359–71, doi:10.1002/pad.402.
59      Erik de Waard, E and Joseph L. Soeters, “How the Military Can Profit from Management
and Organization Science,” in Social Sciences and the Military: An Interdisciplinary Overview, ed. Giuseppe
Caforio (New York: Routledge, 2007), 191.
60      Sebastiaan Rietjens, Joseph L. Soeters, and Willem Klumper, “Measuring the Immeasurable?
The Effects-Based Approach in Comprehensive Peace Operations,” International Journal of Public
Administration 34, no. 5 (2011): 329–38, doi:10.1080/01900692.2011.557816.
61      Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, and Michael Minkov, Cultures and Organizations: Software
of the Mind (New York: McGraw Hill, 2005); and Urlich vom Hagen, René Moelker, and Joseph L.
Soeters, “Introduction: Cultural Interoperability” in Cultural Interoperability: Ten Years of Research into
Co-operation in the First German-Netherlands Corps, ed. Ulrich vom Hagen, René Moelker, and Joseph L.
Soeters (Strausberg: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, 2006), 7.

Innovations in Warfare & Strategy

Shields and Travis

75

incredible events taking place around the world.”62 He delves into
dichotomies such as micro/macro factors, grid/group, us/them, tough/
soft, male/female cultures, economic growth/environment, collectivism/
individualism, victim/perpetrator, and identification/disidentification.
These dichotomies provide frameworks for useful analytical distinctions
and illustrative examples. These and other dualisms depict cultural
rigidities that contribute to violence.
The American Civil War sheds an example of the problems with
moral dualisms associated with rigid belief systems where unwavering
cultural conceptions of honor can contribute to violence. Offended
by events that could be trifling or profound, people retaliate against
perpetrators for revenge or as an effort to restore others’ perceptions
of a valuable self-associated characteristic.63 A contrasting approach
to influence others’ perceptions during dysfunctional conflicts applies
sympathetic knowledge or empathy to “cement” relationships, which can
also enhance cooperation and promote peacekeeping.64 Dutch Muslim
servicemen are particularly effective working with host nationals because
of their ability “to approach the local population in an empathetic and
trustworthy manner.”65

Conclusion

Soeters first employed the tenets of classical pragmatism to analyze
peacekeeping operations during the United Nations Organization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). By
studying the strained relationships among the peacekeepers and the
populace, in the context of institutional theory related to gaining public
acceptance and legitimacy, Soeters found the four P’s of pragmatism—
practical, pluralism, participatory, and provisional—particularly
useful to identifying “the sore spots of MONUC’s reputation and
legitimacy.”66 Such an approach can be useful to examine the second
Iraq war. Beginning with the December 2003 troop rotation, combat,
stability, and enabling civil authority operations were intermingled,
forcing Commanders and soldiers to step outside of their comfort zones.
Artillery batteries performed military police duties. Armor companies
became scouts and infantryman. Transportation units fought running
battles along main supply routes, and nearly every soldier assumed advise
and assist roles to support the fledgling Iraqi military. When developing
war plans, going in with an Army of pentathletes might be better than

62      Soeters, Ethnic Conflict, vii.
63      Ibid., 63.
64      René Moelker, Joseph L. Soeters, and Urlich vom Hagen, “Sympathy, the Cement of
Interoperability,” Armed Forces & Society 33, no. 4 (July 2007): 496–517
65      Femke Bosman, Joseph L. Soeters, and Fatima Ait Bari, “Dutch Muslim Soldiers during Peace Operations in Muslim Societies,” International Peacekeeping 15, no. 5 (2008): 695–705,
doi:10.1080/13533310802396376.
66      Ingrid van Osch and Joseph L. Soeters, “Fragile Support: MONUC’s Reputation and
Legitimacy in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” in Mission Critical: Smaller Democracies’ Role in
Global Stability Operations, ed. Christian Leuprecht, Jodok Troy, and David Last (London: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2010), 78, 79; and David Brendel, Healing Psychiatry: Bridging the Science/
Humanism Divide (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006).
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creating pentathletes ad hoc.67 This type of force would add needed
flexibility and resilience.
Thus, Soeters’ approach represents a fusion of European
perspectives with American pragmatism that can be helpful for today’s
American military thinkers who dichotomize military challenges.
In the spirit of Janowitz, Soeter’s willingness to embrace uncertainty
illustrates his understanding of the provisional nature of not only social
science scholarship but also of the real world, where theory can be
tested to optimize organizational effectiveness.68 The practical problems
associated with managing and leading military organizations calls leaders
to recognize and work with inherent contradictions and to develop
ambidexterity within the force structure.69 Through inquiry, critical
optimism, cooperation, and sympathetic knowledge, commanders,
their staffs, and the soldiers they lead, as pentathletes, can more fully
understand the operational environment, identify valid assumptions and
appropriate objectives, and develop strategies and plans to optimize the
effectiveness of military operations in complex environments.
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ABSTRACT: This article examines the strategic logic of siege
warfare in counterinsurgencies and questions the perception
that siege warfare as an effective and relatively low-cost form of
counterinsurgency. Sieges do allow the besieging side to conserve its
military resources, avoid direct contact with the enemy, and minimize
a rapid escalation of civilian casualties. Yet, on a strategic level, siege
warfare is ineffective without major outside military support or the
willingness to use overwhelming force.

S

ieges, among the oldest and most recognized forms of warfare, are
often poorly understood by military planners and policymakers
alike. Siege warfare is almost completely absent from current
US military doctrine. From the Joint perspective, the term “siege” does
not appear in, and is not defined in, either the Joint capstone document
discussing Joint operations, the Joint doctrinal publication providing the
fundamental principles of Joint operations, or the Department of Defense
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.1 Similarly, siege is not included
or defined in the US Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 1-02 Terms
and Military Symbols. Nor does the term appear in the Army doctrinal
publication discussing Army operations or the specific doctrine covering
offensive and defensive operations.2 There is some discussion of siege
warfare in the US Army Field Manual 3-06 Urban Operations; however, the
majority of that discussion is in an appendix focusing on a single case
study regarding the siege of Beirut in 1982.3
Interestingly, that discussion indicates a list of factors deemed
central to the success of siege warfare that include understanding the
importance of information and psychological operations, preserving close
combat capability, avoiding the attrition approach, minimizing collateral
damage, controlling essential services and critical infrastructure,
separating noncombatants from combatants, and transitioning control
to civil authorities as quickly as possible.4 Even so, these lessons have
The authors would like to thank Jillian Kutner for her research assistance as well as Alexander
Downes, Liam Collins, John Spencer, Devlin Winkelstein, and the International Studies Association
2017 participants and panelists who provided helpful feedback incorporated in this article.
1      US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication
(JP) 1 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2013); JCS, Joint Operations, JP 3-0 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2011); and
JCS, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: JCS, March
2017).
2      Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDOA), Terms and Military Symbols, Army
Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 1-02 (Washington, DC: HQDOA, 2016); HQDOA, Unified
Land Operations, ADRP 3-0 (Washington, DC: HQDOA, 2012); and HQDOA, Offense and Defense,
ADRP 3-90 (Washington, DC: HQDOA, 2012).
3      HQDOA, Urban Operations, Field Manual (FM) 3-06 (Washington, DC: HQDOA, 2006),
A1–A7.
4      Ibid., A4–A7.
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not been well integrated into the doctrinal frameworks of offensive or
defensive urban operations. In fact, sieges are not included as a form of
offensive maneuver or a type of urban offensive operations.5 Similarly,
little academic research theorizes about the tactical and the strategic
advantages of siege warfare as a tool of counterinsurgency. Moreover,
most of the existing literature on siege warfare hails from strategic
studies or military historiography and focuses primarily on the use of
sieges in the context of conventional interstate wars.6
This article fills that gap by addressing the logic, motivations,
and some of the internal contradictions of siege warfare in modern
counterinsurgencies. The authors predict siege warfare will become
even more relevant in the future if urban migration patterns persist
since counterinsurgencies will be carried out increasingly in dense
urban environments or megacities, not in the jungles of Southeast Asia
or the empty deserts of Mesopotamia.7 Still, few academic studies have
looked at sieges in the context of modern counterinsurgencies, which are
increasingly asymmetrical, urban, and fought with methods—including
the use of chemical weapons or the deliberate targeting of civilians—
that are blunt violations of international humanitarian law.

Siege Warfare and Counterinsurgencies

A siege is any attempt by an adversary to control access into and out
of a town, neighborhood, or other terrain of strategic significance to
achieve a military or political objective. The military objective of a siege
during the Middle Ages was to drive out enemy forces by weakening
their defenses and denying them access to reinforcements. In effect,
sieges provided a way to subdue an enemy while limiting direct hostilities
and reducing one’s own casualties. Whereas strong fortifications during
medieval times favored the defense, more infantry weapons from cheaper
iron in modern warfare favored the offense.8 But in the contemporary
era, given the greater density of urban terrain, siege warfare is arguably
more challenging for the offense. Even with the assistance of Russian
arms and aircraft, for example, the stronger Syrian military was unable
to dislodge the modest Syrian rebel forces from entrenched positions in
Aleppo for most of 2016.
The typical modus operandi of siege warfare dating back to Roman
times has been one of conquest. In counterinsurgency, however,
the military objective is often not conquest but control of territory.
Counterinsurgency is largely seen as either enemy-centric—focused
on defeating the foe militarily—or population-centric—focusing on
separating the insurgents from the civilian population.9 In the latter case,
the use of force does not typically revolve around a large concentration
5      Ibid., 7–12.
6      See Harrison E. Salisbury, The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad (New York: Harper & Row,
1969); P. F. Purton, A History of the Early Medieval Siege, c. 450–1220 (Woodbridge, NY: Boydell &
Brewer, 2009); and J. Bowyer Bell, Besieged: Seven Cities under Siege (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction,
2006).
7      On these urbanization trends, see David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the
Urban Guerrilla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
8      Stephen Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” International Security 22, no. 4
(Spring 1998): 5–43. doi:10.1162/isec.22.4.5.
9      Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir, “What After Counter-Insurgency? Raiding in Zones of
Turmoil,” International Affairs 92 no. 6 (November 2016): 1427–41. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12751.
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of firepower per se, but rather lighter foot patrols and targeted attacks
that deny the enemy their center of gravity: the population.10 This type
of counterinsurgency has been framed as a fight between the state and
the insurgency over the allegiance of the population.
Accordingly, counterinsurgency does not require killing as many of
the enemy as possible or retaking all the contested territory, but rather
winning the population over to the state’s or counterinsurgent’s side. Put
otherwise, winning battles is less important than effective governance
that pacifies the population and provides public goods. A core tenet
of US counterinsurgency doctrine practiced over the past decade has
indeed been to selectively target hostile parties and forcibly separate them
from the local civilian population.11 Under this logic, insurgencies are
seen as armed competitions for locals’ allegiance. Greater control over
territory provides counterinsurgents with greater information about the
enemy, which allows the counterinsurgent forces to avoid indiscriminate
violence and deny the insurgents a base of popular support.12
The origins of this strategy date back to the British counterinsurgency
in Malaya (1948–60) as well as the Strategic Hamlet Program from the
Vietnam War (1954–75).13 Then, as now, the philosophy was to isolate
entire villages—to separate insurgents forcibly from civilians. Even
for counterinsurgencies employing a more punishment-driven strategy
heavy on firepower, the aim is not to eliminate the population per se
but rather to control and to prevent it from supporting the insurgency.
The military objective of enemy-centric and population-centric
counterinsurgencies overlaps with that of modern siege warfare, which
is to isolate the population by force. Also like siege warfare, populationcentric counterinsurgencies require patience. Data collected from 1900
show the average siege lasts longer than 12 months.14 In Aleppo, for
example, the campaign of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime
to besiege the eastern side of the city lasted for over three years, with
little movement in the lines of control, before the Russian intervention
in September 2015 facilitated the full encirclement of the rebel-held
pockets there, speeding up the eventual capitulation.
A key difference between population-centric counterinsurgency and
siege warfare, however, is the geography of force: in the former, security
and the insurgency’s clearing and holding areas begin at the center of a
city, before slowly moving outwardly, much like a spreading oil spot.15 By
contrast, siege warfare generally takes an outside-in approach whereby
10      Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006).
11      Sir Robert Grainger Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and
Vietnam (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1966).
12      Kalyvas, Logic of Violence. This logic provides the intellectual backbone of the “clear, hold,
and build” model applied in Iraq after 2006, as US soldiers moved out of forward operating bases
(FOBs) and engaged in smaller-scale military patrols to liberate and expand security in areas previously held by insurgents.
13      For more on the intellectual origins of US counterinsurgency, see Conrad C. Crane, Cassandra
in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016).
14      Data varies but counterinsurgencies typically last over nine years. Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency
in Afghanistan, RAND Counterinsurgency Study Volume 4 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
2008).
15      Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr, “How to Win in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (September/
October 2005): 87–104.
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counterinsurgents seize territory along a city’s outskirts and slowly
enclose the enemy.
Not unlike counterinsurgencies at large, siege warfare introduces a
number of perverse incentives among combatants and noncombatants
alike.16 First, siege warfare may be advantageous for the besieged side as
it allows it time to regroup and rearm, to hold key terrain under stalemate
conditions, and to signal strength to outside powerbrokers capable of
pushing for a ceasefire. Paradoxically, a siege can lead to strengthening
the level of dependency and control a rebel group has on the civilian
population. Moreover, a siege can perversely generate economic benefits
for the besieged group by creating self-sustaining “siege economies”
created by actions such as aid manipulation and smuggling.17 Siege
warfare thus holds some strategic logic for both besieged and besieger.
Siege warfare, while tactically attractive to counterinsurgents,
is strategically ineffective unless two conditions are met: first, the
counterinsurgency must be willing to use overwhelming force, which
includes indiscriminate violence or scorched earth tactics. Second, there
must be a forceful military intervention on behalf of the besieger by an
outside power.18 Otherwise, the siege effectively becomes a protracted
war of attrition that favors the side with sufficient will and resources
to outlast the other. Considering the dense terrain of today’s cities and
the unwillingness of democracies to sustain heavy losses, siege warfare
to gain territory is only advantageous to the besieger who enjoys the
support of outside backers or who is willing to use overwhelming force.19
Thus, siege warfare, whether to protect the population from harm or to
prevent it from joining the fight, should only be used to isolate a territory
similar to Sadr City, a Shiite slum in Baghdad (2004–2008).20

The Strategic Logic of Siege Warfare

Western military strategists debate counterinsurgency tactics and
strategies that focus on winning over the population’s loyalty. Primarily
nondemocratic states have sought the opposite objective—to starve
an enemy populace into capitulation—thus robbing the insurgency’s
base of popular support. This approach is driven by a common set of
assumptions. First, laying siege to an area appears a cost-effective way
to be perceived as staying on the offensive, conserving resources for
battles elsewhere, and avoiding a large-scale atrocity that might provoke
an outside intervention on behalf of the besieged.21 Sieges allow armies
to keep the enemy geographically contained in urban areas and to
prevent their resupply while minimizing the besieger’s own casualties by
avoiding direct combat. These benefits can be especially important when
16      See Stathis N. Kalyvas and Matthew Adam Kocher, “How ‘Free’ Is Free Riding in Civil
Wars?: Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem,” World Politics 59, no. 2 (January
2007): 177–216.
17      Peter Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).
18      Alexander B. Downes, Targeting Civilians in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).
19      For a challenge to this logic based on the argument that democracies may be more willing to
engage in indiscriminant violence because it is perceived as winning the war more quickly given the
costs democratic leaders face if they do not win a war, see Downes, Targeting Civilians.
20      “The April 2004 Battle of Sadr City,” US Army Center of Military History, April 21, 2014,
http://www.history.army.mil/news/2014/140421a_sadrCity.html.
21      Downes, Targeting Civilians, 158–59.
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a great parity of military power exists between the opposing sides and
the advancing army does not possess the human, financial, or military
resources to seize and control the city outright.
Second, siege warfare seems an attractive option for both types
of counterinsurgencies when civil wars drag on for years, becoming
a stalemate; thus, the counterinsurgency becomes a war of attrition,
redolent of World War I trench warfare. In Syria, for example, dozens
of cities suffered prolonged and repeated sieges between 2012 and 2016.
Infamous examples include the brutal siege of Madaya, a town in the
rural Damascus governorate, where a Syrian and Hezbollah-backed
siege culminated in the complete lock-down of the city in June 2015
and led to a severe humanitarian crisis.22 With military checkpoints and
antipersonnel landmines preventing the delivery of goods into, and
civilians’ departure from, the besieged area, Syrians in Madaya were
literally starved to death.23 A similar account emerged in the Palestinian
refugee camp of Yarmouk that former UN Secretary-General Ban
Ki-Moon described as the “deepest circle of hell.”24
Moreover, sieges can displace the populations of key embattled areas.
This depopulation deprives the insurgency of human resources and
demoralizes the rebellion, while it renews manpower and international
assistance for the government. It can also strengthen a regime’s claim
to legitimacy by allowing it to rule over the majority of the population.
To be sure, technology has also changed the intensity, lethality,
and length of siege warfare. Besieging forces now rely more on heavy
and indiscriminate bombardment by air and artillery as a form of
psychological warfare and as a method of increasing the risk and cost
of rebel and civilian refusals to surrender. These mechanisms also blunt
the tools counterinsurgents have at their disposal, especially when there
is poor intelligence on the enemy.25
But this can be counterproductive—for instance, indiscriminate
targeting of civilians, despite international rules barring such uses of
force, remains widespread but arguably, counterproductive, especially
in non-expeditionary counterinsurgencies. In the siege of Grozny,
“indiscriminate bombing and shelling turned the local population
against the Russians” largely because the Russians were attacking their
own people who were living in the center of the city.26
Other exogenous conditions of modern warfare that should favor the
defense exist. First, the increasing density of urban areas, subterranean
infrastructure, and suburban sprawl, along with the role of networked
populations, can increase connections between the insurgency and the
population, allow undetected mobilization of insurgent forces, and
provide a buffer zone advancing armies must penetrate to advance.
22      Editorial Board, “The Siege of Madaya Casts a Shadow on Syrian Peace Efforts,” Washington
Post, January 9, 2016; and Human Rights Council (HRC), Report of the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/33/55 (New York: United Nations, 2016).
23      “Syria: Siege and Starvation in Madaya,” Medecins Sans Frontieres, January 7, 2016,
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/syria-siege-and-starvation-madaya.
24      AFP, “U.N. Chief: Yarmouk Camp Now ‘Deepest Circle of Hell’ in Syria,” Al Arabiya
English, April 10, 2015.
25      Kalyvas and Kocher, “How ‘Free’?”
26      Timothy L. Thomas, “The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat,”
Parameters 29, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 87–102.
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Second, the glacial pace of sieges can effectively freeze a conflict, since
lines of control rarely budge much during the operational phase: a
siege is mostly an all-or-nothing campaign of attrition, not one to gain
ground or shift momentum. This dynamic can allow insurgents time to
regroup, mobilize the population, and boost morale even though food
and ammunition may be in short supply. Civilians in cities can weather
severe hardships almost indefinitely.
Third, a siege can foster the development of dysfunctional, yet
self-sustaining, siege economies. In Sarajevo, a small core of Bosnian
soldiers relied heavily on ordinary citizens who took up arms to protect
the city. These ad hoc groups of citizen-soldiers organized around
existing social structures with little or no immediate access to military
materials or resources. They relied heavily on supply routes the Bosnian
Serbs purposefully left open.27 The most notable was a tunnel system
connecting Sarajevo to Bosnian-controlled territory beyond the city’s
limits. This underground network became the Bosnian army’s main
way of transporting food, humanitarian supplies, and weapons into the
city and prevented Sarajevo from deteriorating to the point of complete
chaos and worsening the humanitarian crisis.28
Finally, a siege can signal resolve, determination, and commitment
to an insurgency’s goals at a fairly low cost to both outside parties and
potential recruits. This advantage can also provide perverse incentives
for the modern insurgent who may, even at the risk of great civilian
suffering, favor hunkering down to fighting their enemy, retreating, or
melting into the countryside to fight a Maoist-style guerrilla war.
In sum, despite its growing popularity as a counterinsurgency
strategy, siege warfare rarely is effective to defeat an enemy, seize or
control important terrain, or change the balance of power to end a war—
barring a major outside intervention or a willingness on the part of the
counterinsurgent to nearly level the area under siege. To better illustrate
this point, two short case studies of the sieges of Aleppo and Grozny
counterintuitively reveal some of the tactical and strategic limitations
of siege warfare, short of relying on overwhelming indiscriminate force
and external backing.

Case Study: Aleppo (2013–2016)

Beginning in 2013, the Syrian regime of President al-Assad attempted
to lay siege to eastern Aleppo, a small enclave that gradually became
choked from all sides by government-controlled forces. With about
25,000 troops initially, the regime lacked the material strength to occupy
the area and struggled to take and to hold territory, especially in this
dense urban terrain, without sustaining high casualties and carrying out
an extensive house-to-house counterinsurgency campaign. So, instead
of attempting a ground assault to retake eastern Aleppo, the regime
began a series of offensive maneuvers aimed at encircling the rebel-held
pockets of the city, cutting off their supply lines, and restricting their

27      Michael Jackson, Samuel Ruppert, and David Stanford, Contemporary Battlefield Assessment—
Bosnia and Herzegovina (West Point, NY: Modern War Institute, 2015).
28      Andreas, Blue Helmets.
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access to basic services such as electricity and water.29 At the same time,
through systematic airstrikes and artillery shelling, the regime focused
on targeting civilians and combatants alike, traumatizing Aleppo’s
civilians into a mass exodus. Meanwhile, through fortified positions and
airpower, the regime strengthened its own positions in the city, creating
a static frontline.30 By encircling eastern Aleppo, Assad’s forces gained
control of the surrounding governorate with aerial bombardments,
laying the foundation for the movement of ground forces composed
of Syrian army and militias.31 While destroying civilian infrastructure,
these operations also complicated the work of international and local
humanitarian actors on the ground.
But, the push to encircle and besiege eastern Aleppo also revealed
the Syrian military’s weaknesses. Siege operations alone were unable to
force capitulation even though the enemy’s advance was halted and an
incredibly high price tag was imposed on the rebels and the civilians living
under their control. Despite the high reliance on foreign and domestic
militias, the encirclement operations preceded slowly and suffered from
repeated setbacks, revealing just how overextended the regime and its
allies were. Yet, while not decisive, the encircling maneuvers contained
the opposition and forced a painful stalemate, all while conserving
force and avoiding the high cost of storming and holding the rebel
neighborhoods. Moreover, the siege, combined with sustained aerial
attacks, forcefully displaced the population, which effectively reduced
the number of people under rebel control.
The Russian military intervention in Aleppo during September
2015 as well as its active and increased air support for the Syrian Army
and its allies—especially after December 2015—was, in this context,
highly valuable to the regime, allowing the balance of power in the battle
to shift. Rebels accused the Russians of carrying out a “scorched earth”
policy of counterinsurgency redolent of the siege of Grozny.32
For the regime, Russia’s intervention was a game changer facilitating
a key breakthrough. In February 2016, the regime and its allied forces
cut off the rebels’ northern supply lines to the Turkish border, known
as the Azaz corridor, further restricting goods and people to and
from rebel-controlled pockets in Eastern Aleppo.33 The complete
encirclement, in the summer of 2016, cut off the last rebel supply line,
Castello Road, trapping roughly 300,000 civilians.34 Over the following
months, Russia’s heavy bombing of eastern Aleppo, including its civilian
infrastructure, combined with the tight siege and the withholding of
humanitarian assistance eventually led to the regime’s advance into the
embattled city, the rebels’ capitulation in December 2016, and the forced
displacement of tens of thousands of people.
29      Caerus Associates, Mapping the Conflict in Aleppo, Syria (Fort Lauderdale, FL: Caerus /
American Security Project, 2014).
30      Christopher Kozak, An Army in All Corners: Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria, Middle East
Security Report 26 (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, 2015).
31      HRC, Report.
32      “The Agony of Aleppo,” Economist, October 1, 2016.
33      Fabrice Balanche,”The Battle of Aleppo Is the Center of the Syrian Chessboard,” Policywatch
2254, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 5, 2016, http://www.washingtoninstitute
.org/policy-analysis/view/the-battle-of-aleppo-is-the-center-of-the-syrian-chessboard.
34      HRC, Report.
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Case Study: Grozny (1999–2000)

The five-month-long siege of Grozny by Russian forces during the
early phase of the second Chechen war isolated the city, which was an
indigenous separatist enclave in the North Caucasus region, as a way
of compelling local Chechens to forego their struggle for separation.
The Russians had suffered a humiliating defeat during the first Chechen
war (1994–96), and the force they brought to bear in the final months
of 1999 against 3,000 to 6,000 Chechen rebels reflected the challenges
they faced during the previous ill-fated campaign.35 At the time, foreign
witnesses described Grozny as the most leveled city they had ever seen.36
The plan included an intensive and indiscriminate bombing campaign
with airstrikes and heavy artillery barrages from a nearby ridge to wear
down the Chechen defenses and isolate the city; then Russian ground
troops would initiate a ground offensive with small units. In December
1999, the commanding officer on the ground, General Viktor Kazantsev,
said the city was fully blockaded on all sides.37 The campaign sparked a
great deal of controversy as there were still some 40,000 civilians holed
up in central Grozny without supplies and subjected to the violence and
chaos “despite pledges from senior military figures . . . that there would
be no Russian assault on Grozny while ‘a single civilian’ remained.”38
In the previous siege of Grozny, similar “indiscriminate bombing and
shelling turned the local population against the Russians” largely because
there were Russian civilians living in the center of the city and so the
Russians were attacking their own people.39 Before the second attempt,
the Russians dropped pamphlets over the city that warned civilians of
the imminent force and even encouraging rebels to accept “safe conduct
passes” allowing them to leave the city without punishment.40 Yet, there
were widespread reports of Russian soldiers firing upon refugees who
were leaving the city and invading while civilians were still present.41
The Chechen forces were surprisingly strong and resilient, even in
the face of heavy air strikes, forcing Russian ground forces to engage
the rebels within the city itself. Much of this resilience stemmed from
successful application of previous tactical experience from the first
Chechen war. The rebels were also well armed and, having used the
bombardment period to build up various bunkers within the city, well
fortified.42 These preparations enabled the Chechen rebels to ambush
the initial ground force invasion and destroy an entire Russian convoy.43
The Russian forces quickly learned from their initial underestimation
of the rebel capabilities, increased their bombardments, and leveled huge
35      “Grozny to fall ‘in days’,” BBC News, December 15, 1999.
36      Jeremy Bowen, Doris Meissner, Lina Sergie Attar, and Joshua Landis, interview with Joshua
Johnson, How to Turn Things around In Syria, 1A, WAMU broadcast, January 30, 2017, http://the1a
.org/shows/2017-01-30/how-to-turn-things-around-in-syria.
37      “Russia denies killings during Grozny assault,” BBC News, December 5, 1999.
38      Ian Traynor and Amelia Gentleman, “Russians in Grozny Bloodbath,” Guardian, December
15, 1999.
39      Thomas, “Battle of Grozny.”
40      Michael R. Gordon, “Russians Issue an Ultimatum to Rebel City,” New York Times, December
7, 1999.
41      “Russians Fired on Refugees” BBC News, December 4, 1999.
42      “Russians Ambushed in Grozny” BBC News, December 16, 1999.
43      Traynor and Gentleman, “Russians in Grozny Bloodbath.”
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swatches of the city. The Chechen fighters they encountered resisted,
exploiting the terrain while luring the Russians into interconnected
firing positions. Aslambek Ismailov led the Chechens to fortify the city
with antitank ditches, trenches, and landmines along the perimeter. The
rebels boarded up and booby-trapped buildings pockmarked from the
previous war.
Allegations of Russian war crimes, including the use of chemical
weapons, linger in the decades since the second Chechen war, and
contribute to inconclusive estimates of civilian deaths during the
siege. Ultimately, the combination of complete isolation, air strikes,
and overwhelming and unrestrained force proved too much for the
Chechen rebels, who fled into the mountains in early February 2000.44
Unfortunately for the Chechen forces, the Russians created a false sense
of safety that allowed small groups to escape through a mined escape
route. Some Chechens did survive the minefield, swearing to one day
recapture the city they left to the Russians. While there were smallscale skirmishes with guerrillas in the years that followed, the Russians
firmly controlled the city and actively began reconstruction in 2006.45
Though strategically counterproductive and blatantly disregarding
international humanitarian law, especially regarding nonexpeditionary
counterinsurgencies, the use of scorched-earth tactics during the siege
derived a tactical “victory” for Russia.

Applications to US Military Doctrine

Neither Russia nor Syria possessed an operational doctrine
for siege warfare in the context of carrying out nonexpeditionary
counterinsurgency. Similarly, US military forces are unprepared to fight
in dense urban environments against violent nonstate actors who have
deep networks, possess superior knowledge of local terrain, use civilians
as human shields, and fight indirectly. A recent case illustrates this point:
US-backed Iraqi forces failed to cordon off a strategic corridor west
of Mosul in 2015, which allowed Islamic State militants to escape and
resupply. Although the importance of megacities in modern warfare has
been emphasized, US Army doctrine should also address the critical
aspects of siege tactics to urban warfare as a first step in correcting the
lack of training, organization, and matériel for urban or siege warfare.
Moreover, the current body of knowledge contains surprisingly few
rigorous studies on the conduct of siege warfare in modern urban
environments that are dense, networked, and reliant on informal
economies. As a greater risk of civilian casualties arguably exists on these
battlespaces, identification and mitigation of the specific challenges of
siege warfare should also be undertaken.
The short cases outlined above highlight some of the challenges
with siege warfare in the modern era that justify the Clausewitzian
admonition that the worst policy is to attack a fortified city.46 In Aleppo,
the siege may have lasted indefinitely or failed without the strong external
intervention from Russian airpower as well as Hezbollah, Iranian, and
44      Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2000: The Russian Federation,” Human Rights Watch,
2001, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k1/europe/russian.html.
45      Andrew E. Kramer, “Chechnya’s Capital Rises from the Ashes, Atop Hidden Horrors,” New
York Times, April 30, 2008.
46      Bell, Besieged, 1.
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Iranian-backed forces. The siege of Grozny achieved the Russians’
military objective, but only through overwhelming force that included
immense bloodshed and leveling the city. Some might quibble that these
two cases are not generalizable given the fact they were carried out by
authoritarian regimes who were unconcerned with protecting civilian
lives or using indiscriminate force. But these examples do highlight the
challenges every military force faces when laying siege to a piece of
complex or unfamiliar urban terrain.
The United States, rightly unwilling to conduct scorched-earth
campaigns such as Russia’s and frequently unable to rely on allied support,
faces unique challenges when conducting urban military operations in
the context of counterinsurgencies. Since such types of warfare cannot
always be avoided, the US military should not only include but prioritize
siege warfare as part of its Joint doctrine. Notably, the doctrine should
establish best practices to seal off terrain, provide humanitarian aid,
avoid civilian casualties, and ultimately break a siege to prepare the
military for future urban combat operations in complex terrain.

Lionel M. Beehner
Dr. Lionel M. Beehner teaches courses on military innovation and research
methods as an assistant professor at the US Military Academy Defense and
Strategic Studies Department. He also researches transnational use of force,
civil-military relations, and military interventions as the research director of
West Point’s Modern War Institute. He holds a PhD in political science and
international relations from Yale University and previously worked as a senior
writer at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he was also a term member.

Benedetta Berti
Dr. Benedetta Berti focuses on human security and internal conflicts as well
as postconflict stabilization and peacebuilding as a foreign policy and security
researcher, analyst, consultant, author, and lecturer. She is a Robert A. Fox
Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a TED Senior Fellow,
a Non-Resident Fellow at the Modern War Institute at West Point (2016-17).
She has written three books, including Armed Political Organizations: From Conflict
to Integration, and several articles. In 2015, the Italian government awarded her
the Order of the Star of Italy.

Michael T. Jackson
LTC Michael T. Jackson, a former deputy director of the Modern War Institute
at the United States Military Academy, holds masters degrees in liberal studies
with a concentration in international affairs from Georgetown University and
in military arts and science from the US Army Command and General Staff
College. During five deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq as an infantry officer
and army strategist (FA-59), he gained combat experience at the platoon,
company, brigade, division, and corps-levels.

Army Expansibility

Mobilizing for Major War
Olen Chad Bridges and Andrée Navarro

ABSTRACT: Given recent developments in the strategic
environment and the heightened emphasis on readiness by senior
US Army leaders, the Army must assess its ability to mobilize the
force rapidly in the event of a major conflict. This article identifies
some critical elements of the mobilization process that are currently
deficient and require greater attention for the Army to execute a
short-notice, full-scale mobilization.

A

t present, it is unlikely the United States could mobilize its entire
military as quickly as it might like to. More importantly, it is
unlikely the United States could mobilize its entire military as
rapidly as it might need to in the event of a major war. The US Army has
only conducted total mobilization twice in the last one hundred years.
Both instances, World War I and World War II, are almost beyond living
memory. Historically, the US Army has been unprepared when called
upon to mobilize and expand. Even recent small-scale conflicts such
as Iraq and Afghanistan revealed gaps in the US Army’s mobilization
capabilities and its readiness.1
Moreover, the National Commission on the Future of the Army
recently highlighted the Army’s lack of a total mobilization plan
and recommended it develop one by September 30, 2017.2 Given the
increased emphasis the Department of Defense and the Department of
the Army have placed on the mobilization process, this article discusses
some key findings from research conducted by students of the US Army
War College regarding the potential impact of nondeployable soldiers
and the status of mobilization force generation installations (MFGIs).
Senior Army leaders have recently noted numerous deficiencies in
the readiness to fight a major war. Some senior officials have gone so far
as to say a “ready” Army cannot exist until at least 2020; others claim
2021–23 is a more reasonable time frame to “restore sufficient readiness.”3
The central problem is the Army’s present low level of readiness. For
instance, Army Chief of Staff General Mark A. Milley testified:

1      Institute for Defense Analyses, Sharing the Burden and Risk: An Operational Assessment of the
Reserve Components in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Washington, DC: Institute for Defense Analyses,
2      National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA), Report to the President and the Congress
of the United States, January 28, 2016 (Arlington, VA: NCFA, 2016), 80.
3      Army G-3/5/7, “Army Readiness Guidance,” US Army, May 19, 2017, https://www.Army
.mil/standto/2016-05-19; and Hearing on Readiness before the House Armed Services Committee SubCommittee on Readiness, 115th Cong. (March 8, 2017) (Statement of Lieutenant General Joseph
Anderson, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, US Army; Lieutenant General Aundre Piggee, Deputy
Chief of Staff, G-4, US Army; and Lieutenant General Gwen Bingham, Assistant Chief of Staff,
Installation Management, US Army).
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about a third of our Regular Army Brigade Combat Teams [BCTs] are
currently ready for high-end combat against a nation state. . . . Our goal is
to have Regular Army Brigade Combat Teams achieve 60–66 percent full
spectrum readiness, and I estimate that it will take the Army approximately
four years to achieve that assuming no significant increase in demand and
no sequestration levels of funding.4

Former Army Vice Chief of Staff General Daniel Allyn likewise
assessed, “about two-thirds of the Army’s initial critical formations are
at acceptable levels of readiness to conduct sustained ground combat
in a full spectrum environment against a highly lethal hybrid threat or
near-peer adversary.”5 Moreover, only one-third of the brigade combat
teams, one-fourth of the combat aviation brigades, and one-half of the
division headquarters were deemed ready for combat in early 2017.6
Since a crucial step toward readiness for more than half the Army is
mobilization, the Army has begun to reexamine its mobilization plans.
Clearly, every delay in aligning personnel requirements with updated
matériel, such as “long-range precision fires, air and missile defense,
Armored BCTs, and aviation,” would increase the risk of “losing
overmatch in every domain” to our peer or near-peer competitors.7
This challenge has become even more acute because the Army’s senior
leadership now believes “conflict between nation-states is ‘virtually
guaranteed at some point.’ ”8

Total Force Mobilization

For the past 14 years, most mobilization requirements were
handled by the president’s partial mobilization authority, which can
activate up to 1,000,000 members of the Army Reserve for a period
not to exceed 24 consecutive months. A congressional authorization
for full mobilization, calling-up all of the existing active and reserve
components for the duration of a declared war, has not been needed and,
hence, has not been tested.
It now seems conceivable that a full mobilization is more probable
than at any time since the Cold War. During a strategic-level wargame
held in November 2016, participants gained “awareness of related
challenges and innovative approaches to mitigate those challenges.”9
Scenarios concerning deliberate mobilization, contingency mobilization,
and defeat-deny-defend mobilization revealed more than a few problem
4      Hearing on Military Services Challenges Meeting Readiness, Modernization, and Manning under Current
Budget Limits, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 114th Cong. 3–4 (September 15, 2016) (statement of General Mark A. Milley, Chief of Staff, United States Army).
5      Hearing on the Department of the Army 2017 Budget Request and Readiness, 114th Cong. 4 (February
26, 2016) (statement of General Daniel Allyn, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army).
6      Hearing on the State of the Military, Before the House Armed Services Committee, 115th Cong. 4
(February 7, 2017) (statement of General Daniel Allyn, Vice Chief of Staff, US Army).
7      National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA), Generating Force Analytics: Briefing
to the National Commission on the Future of the Army (Arlington, VA: NCFA, 2015); Hearing to Receive
Testimony on the Army Modernization in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2017 and
the Future Years Defense Program, 114th Cong. (April 5, 2016), 15; Hearing on Readiness, 5; and State of
the Military, 6.
8      Mark A. Milley, “Future War is ‘Almost Guaranteed’,” (speech, Dwight David Eisenhower
Luncheon, Association of the United States Army, Walter E. Washington Convention Center,
Washington, DC, October 4, 2016) quoted in Joshua Urness, “Milley Addresses Attendees of AUSA
Meeting,” Fires Bulletin (November-December 2016): 4.
9      Ken Gilliam, “Full Mobilization Wargame,” Collins Center Update 18, nos. 3 & 4 (April–
September 2016): 4.
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areas regarding full and total response requirements. One of these is the
status of nondeployable soldiers. Another is the state of mobilization
force generation installations; most are inactive and might require
substantial time and resources before they can assume operations.

The Army’s Deployability Challenge

During both World Wars, conscription enabled the US Army to
expand greatly to play critical roles in defeating large-scale aggression.
For both political and practical reasons, Congress abolished the military
draft in 1973, and transitioned to a large-standing all-volunteer force
(AVF). Despite early problems, the AVF became an effective fighting
force expansible, when necessary, by no more than a partial mobilization.
The all-volunteer force has not yet, however, had to confront a great
power. That inexperience does not mean the force will not be successful;
it simply means we are moving into uncharted territory, territory that
will likely require full and possibly total mobilization.
As much as 40 percent of a mobilized total Army may not be ready
for a specific contingency. Medical conditions may prevent as many as 10
percent of soldiers from responding to a conflict.10 Another 13 percent
may be Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students.11 And, 16 percent
of soldiers, the minimum strength recommended by the National
Commission on the Future of the Army, comprise the generating force
“whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operational
Army’s capabilities.”12
Of the deployable force, at least 182,000 soldiers (18 percent) cannot
be expected to mobilize during a major war due to the Army’s global
commitments to combatant commanders in at least 140 locations.13 In
2017, for example, 5,000 soldiers were deployed to the Middle East, 8,000
were in Afghanistan, 33,000 were in Europe, and nearly 80,000 were
in the Pacific.14 Although some global commitments, such as theater
security cooperation exercises, would be reduced during a major war,
not all of these requirements could be eliminated. Even increasing the
Army’s size to 2,000,000 soldiers would mean approximately 360,000
soldiers would become part of the generating force.
Furthermore, should regional actors attempt to take advantage
of America’s involvement in one major conflict, the Army would be
required to support combatant commanders in shaping their respective
theaters, as well as providing enough presence to assure America’s allies
and partners.

10      Hearing on the Quality of Life in the Military, Before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military
Construction, Veteran’s Affairs and Related Agencies, 114th Cong. 6 (February 26, 2016) (statement of
Sergeant Major of the Army Daniel A. Dailey).
11      Scott Arnold et al., Non-Deployable Soldiers: Understanding the Army’s Challenge (strategy research
project, US Army War College, 2011).
12      National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA), Generating Force Analytics: Briefing
to the National Commission on the Future of the Army (Arlington, VA: NCFA, 2015), 3–4; and Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Generating Force Study: Innovation and Adaptation in Support to
Operations, Pamphlet 525-8-1 (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, 2010).
13      Hearing on the State of the Military, Before the House Armed Services Committee, 115th Cong. 1
(February 7, 2017) (statement of General Daniel Allyn, Vice Chief of Staff, US Army).
14      Ibid.
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Mobilization Force Generation Installations

Mobilization force generation installations are responsible for
providing power projection, combat preparation, postmobilization
training, and other capabilities that support the Army’s readiness for
war, contingencies, and national emergencies. Although mobilization
and deployment are distinct activities, they intersect at the MFGIs,
which are identified as essential power-projection platforms. These
platforms “strategically deploy one or more high priority active
component brigades or larger and/or mobilize and deploy high priority
Army reserve component units.”15 Thus, MFGIs are doubly critical.
The United States had 25 designated MFGIs before the military
drawdown in Afghanistan during 2014. Of these, 7 primary installations
were federally-activated, state-operated, and designated for continuous
support, which included combat training center events. The 5 secondary
installations, which are inactive, maintained equipment sets and provided
postmobilization support for reserve components. The remaining 13
were used to support postmobilization training for reserve component
units. Indeed, of the 25 designated MFGIs, the Army now relies solely
on only two active primary installations to train and validate active and
reserve components.16 Hence, without due preparation, there will not be
enough MFGIs to enable the Army to conduct a short-notice, large-scale
mobilization, such as responding to a national emergency.
To be sure, efforts are underway to define, identify, and prioritize
power-projection platforms, aerial ports of embarkation, and MFGIs
in the conflicting organizational publications to support no-notice
deployment operations that would be necessary during a major war. But,
more needs to be done.

Low Likelihood, High Consequence

Admittedly, the likelihood of a major war is low. But, the risks are high
and the potential consequences of delayed and inefficient mobilization
are severe. The Army’s routine, predictable mobilization apparatus has
worked well during more than a decade of rotational deployments to
Iraq and Afghanistan. In the event of a total mobilization, however, the
Army may be expected to double or triple its size in quick order, and the
defense industrial base may be asked to respond in-kind.
When America is called to execute a war plan to defend against a
great power, or a bundle of war plans to respond to multiple threats,
an updated and robust mobilization plan must be in place to direct the
command and control element as well as the rapid expansion of the
MFGIs. The structure must identify and incorporate all of the force
enablers—including the reserve component capabilities such as support
groups, medical units, and postal units—required to operate the MFGIs.
These units must maintain high levels of readiness to ensure they can
mobilize on short notice. Essentially, a standing mobilization task force
15     “Power Projection Platform,” Global Security, May 7, 2011, http://www.globalsecurity.org
/military/facility/ppp.htm.
16      Headquarters Department of the Army G-3/5/7 Training Directorate (DAMO-TR), RC
Capability and Capacity Analysis, Line of Effort #3-Installation Capability and Capacity (Washington, DC:
DAMO-TR, November 18, 2016), briefing slides.
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structure must already be monitoring readiness and ready to assume
command and control during total mobilization.
Failure to prepare MFGIs, or to plan for the time needed to return
them to operational status, will put the Army on the path to repeating
the mistakes of previous wars and potentially losing the first battles.17
While the likelihood of a total mobilization may be low, the high risks
and severe consequences of failing to plan for it are real. Mobilization
must be a clear priority. The Army has not mobilized a large force that
required standing up new MFGIs since 2003. The current reliance
on predictable, rotational deployment procedures will not provide an
effective short- or no-notice response in a major war. Deliberate planning
efforts must be made to determine the proper training equipment sets
and appropriate temporary or permanent MFGI facilities to support
mobilizing units adequately. The current mind-set of the unlikelihood
of short-notice, large-scale mobilization must change.
Assessments of the Army’s ability to support a full mobilization
must be transitioned to mobilization planning efforts based upon war
plans containing detailed time-phased force deployment data. Limited
defense planning guidance scenarios that dictate assumptions-based
forces during mobilization planning exercises should be replaced by
realistic force-strength data from combatant commanders’ responseplanning requirements. Comprehensive mobilization planning should
include major war scenarios that involve competing requirements
across multiple theaters of operation and warfighting domains to build
a realistic, executable mobilization plan.

Recommendations

Forces Command currently has the implied task of working
concurrently with mobilization enterprise partners that include Army
Installation Management Command, Army Materiel Command, Army
Medical Command, Army Commands, Army Service Component
Commands, Army Agencies, the National Guard Bureau, and the Army
National Guard. Within this structure and as part of a new standing
mobilization task force, the Army should designate several full-time
mobilization planners who conduct full-scale, ongoing assessments
to include examining the private sector’s ability to expand rapidly the
capacity of each MFGI. These planners could develop and maintain
mobilization plans, which include a short- or no-notice mobilization plan
for a large force, as well as plan and oversee rehearsal of concept drills
and mobilization exercises to test and refine installation mobilization
plans. Mobilization planners would also be responsible for capturing
lessons and insights throughout the process to help the lead command
prioritize mobilization, training, and deployment of both active and
reserve components based on their priority of need.
Additional and periodic wargames, exercises, and simulations
across the Army’s mobilization enterprise—similar to commandpost Warfighter Exercises that ensure corps, division, and brigade
headquarters’ staff can perform their wartime missions—should be
17      Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), Decade of War, Volume 1: Enduring Lessons
from the Past Decade of Operations (Suffolk, VA: JCOA, 2012); and R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Military
Admits Major Mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Atlantic, June 11, 2012.
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used to identify gaps, seams, and challenges that can be mitigated. The
Army should not expect the mobilization enterprise to be as responsive
as needed if it does not routinely exercise or resource it.
Because total mobilization of the Army will not occur in isolation,
active data collection efforts should integrate other services. Exercise
Nifty Nugget-78, which estimated “400,000 troop ‘casualties,’ and
thousands of tons of supplies and 200,000 to 500,000 trained combat
troops would not have arrived at the identified conflict scene on time,”
serves an illustrative example because the lessons and insights resulted
in the Department of Defense Master Mobilization Guide (1989) and the Joint
Deployment Agency, a forerunner to Transportation Command.18

Conclusion

With gradual and persistent attention, these tools can not only
increase the information available to today’s leaders but also provide
data useful to future decision makers: information from such exercises
can help leaders identify, develop, and implement a systematic, parallel,
enterprise-level planning process for total mobilization throughout the
Army and update the Army’s doctrinal publications as well as support
Defense Department efforts to update the Department of Defense Master
Mobilization Guide used by the Joint staff, military departments, and other
defense agencies.
Greater understanding of US military capabilities and limitations
can reduce force-response times and lead to better support to combatant
commanders. The requirement should be to expand planning
perspectives, incorporating more scenarios in which there is active
competition for limited military resources. To reiterate, planning for
US military success should be based on information from realistic
enterprise-level exercises.
Historically, major wars have been the exception not the norm;
however, they are not extinct. The all-volunteer force has never fought
a conflict requiring a full mobilization on short- or no-notice. It is,
therefore, not safe to assume today’s Army can successfully prosecute
such a conflict. The actual deployable size of the one-million-soldier
Army makes it a high-risk force to meet Defense Planning Guidance
requirements.19 Therefore, Army leaders must continue to examine and
to update policies for improving the management and readiness of its
additional manpower pools. Realistic mobilization planning and exercises
to mitigate low readiness levels and to reduce delays in operational
planning timelines are imperative to success. Much more important,
however, is achieving the capability to integrate and synchronize the
total Army so it is ready for all conflicts, including a major war.

18      Danita L. Hunter, United States Transportation Command, 10 Years of Excellence, 1987–1997
(Scott Air Force Base, IL: USTRANSCOM). JP 4-05 references the Department of Defense Master
Mobilization Guide, as “the first level of mobilization planning.” See also, DoD, Master Mobilization
Plan, 1.
19      Hearing on 2017 Budget Request and Readiness.
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Mobilization: The State of the Field
Ken S. Gilliam and Barrett K. Parker

ABSTRACT: This article provides an overview of key definitions
and themes related to mobilization, especially of reserve component
forces, for large-scale contingency operations. The article also
discusses the US Army’s ongoing and future research efforts
on mobilization.

T

he current Army operating concept is to “Win in a complex
world.” But to accomplish that objective, the Army will need
to mobilize elements of the Army Reserve. In today’s Army,
the reserve components bring not only required capacity but also key
capabilities no longer resident in the active duty force. Understanding
the timelines and challenges associated with large-scale mobilizations is
critical to informing senior leaders’ decisions regarding the employment
of the total Army force during deliberate and crisis situations. In
accordance with the Army chief of staff ’s designated priorities, the
United States Army War College is conducting research to expand the
body of knowledge for this core task and enduring first-order problem.
Over the past fifteen years, the Army has become well practiced
at mobilizing and deploying the reserve components—both the Army
National Guard and the Army Reserve—for limited contingency
operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Despite this experience,
many mobilization experts assert the current processes may prove
insufficient to mobilize the total Army force rapidly for large, sustained
contingency operations.1 While the term mobilization may seem to apply
only to the reserve components, a large-scale mobilization will impact
the entire Joint Force due to the anticipated competition for resources
including personnel, training areas, equipment, transportation, and
supporting organizations.

Mobilization: Definitions and Themes

In a broad sense the Department of Defense defines mobilization as
“the process by which the military services or part of them are brought
to a heightened state of readiness for war or other national emergency.
This includes activating all or part of the [Reserve Component] as well
as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel.”2
Title 10 of the US Code (10 U.S.C.) defines different statutory levels
of mobilization ranging from voluntary call-up to total mobilization.3
1     Department of Strategic Wargaming, Full Mobilization Wargame White Paper (Carlisle, PA: Center
for Strategic Leadership, United States Army War College, 2016), 1.
2     US Department of Defense (DoD), Accessing the Reserve Components, Department of Defense
Instruction 1235.12 (Washington, DC: DoD, 2016).
3     10 U.S.C. §§ 12301–12304 (2017).
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Each level of mobilization is characterized by emergency authority,
level of military commitment, and length of mobilization.4 Current
mobilizations, for example, are in accordance with 10 U.S. C. § 12304(b).
Partial mobilization occurs under a presidential declaration of
emergency with limited activation of Reserve forces for a limited
duration. Full mobilization requires a Congressional declaration of national
emergency, provides access to all existing active and reserve forces, and
allows those forces to remain on active duty for up to six months after
the end of the crisis.
Large-scale mobilizations in the context of this article include
presidential reserve call-up, partial mobilization, full mobilization, and
total mobilization because these situations would require large-scale
force quantities beyond the currently planned mobilization capacity.
Mobilization is an enduring first-order problem. The Army War College
conducted a series of workshops and wargames to understand better the
Army’s readiness to mobilize the total Army force under full mobilization
authorities. Early research reveals a fragile assumption underpins Army
and combatant command contingency planning: every unit will be fully
ready for deployment on the date indicated in the deployment planning
documents. There is, however, no reliable way to inform these planning
dates because no model exists to quantify the time needed for the
Army Reserve and Army National Guard to achieve various levels of
mobilization readiness. Additionally, many of the mobilization process
challenges identified and cataloged over a decade ago remain challenges
today.5
The United States last mobilized for war in 1942, when ultimate
success was determined by industrial might developed over an extended
period of time, was protected by a relatively isolated homeland, and was
projected over great distances.6 Each of these three variables will be
tested if the United States conducts a large-scale mobilization. America’s
potential adversaries are not likely to provide the time necessary to
prepare adequately, and the US political system may provide its own
delays. Over reliance on space and cyber assets, once believed to be
protected from attack, seem increasingly vulnerable. A lack of strategic
lift capabilities also severely limits how quickly the United States can
project landpower globally.
Training timelines will increase. Unlike the first presidential mobilization
of the National Guard in 1916, when basic training was not a requirement,
today’s reserve components are expected to deploy at the same levels of
readiness as the active duty Army.7 Training and readiness timelines for
all units will continue to trend longer because of increased requirements
and emerging challenges.8 The Army’s goal to achieve sustainable
4     US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Mobilization Planning, Joint Publication 4-05 (Washington,
DC: JCS, 2014), I-6.
5     Reserve Forces Policy Board, Mobilization Reform: A Compilation of Significant Issues, Lessons
Learned and Studies Developed Since September 11, 2001 (Washington, DC: DoD, 2003), 2–5.
6     Ken S. Gilliam, “Repeating the Miracle of ’42: Fixing Army Mobilization,” War on the
Rocks, May 8, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/repeating-the-miracle-of-42-fixing
-army-mobilization/.
7     Bob Haskell, “Dry Run,” National Guard 70, no. 11 (November 2016): 31.
8     Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Enable, Resource, Build, Assess, and Sustain
Training Readiness, Execution Order 002-16 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2016).
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readiness should have a positive impact on the number of individuals
and units ready to mobilize for large-scale contingency operations.9
Further analysis is, however, necessary to quantify and understand
how sustainable readiness initiatives will affect mobilization processes,
training timelines, and resource requirements.
Mobilization is the first step for more than half the total force. For Fiscal Year
2017, the reserve component is more than half of the total Army, with
343,000 Army National Guard and 199,000 Army Reserve soldiers.10
The current five year rotation model has approximately 2/5 of reserve
component units conducting or preparing for a mission. Sustainable
readiness initiatives will help, but the impact is unknown. The Army
needs to improve comprehension on the impact of mobilization timelines
when a large portion of the force is subject to statutory notifications and
susceptible to potential delays in personnel arriving to their units.11
Capabilities and capacities in the reserve components are critical for major war.
While combatant command contingency plans are based on available
resources and undergo a study of vigorous force flow, multiple conflicts
in different regions will strain the total force and present competing
signals for rapid delivery of all capabilities, not just low density, high
demand units. Success for any protracted conflict will depend on Army
Reserve capabilities and its capacity to sustain forces in theater as well
as the Army National Guard’s capacity to provide ready combat forces.12
Diversity and dispersion drive complexity. The reserve components depend
on a diverse and geographically dispersed population—such as dualstatus military technicians, civilian employment, and state militia—to fill
formations, which can significantly exacerbate mobilization timelines.
The commands and organizations that support and execute mobilization
tasks are also diverse. Medical, logistical, theater, service commands,
and active duty Army units all play their parts in mobilization, which
further complicates resourcing and decision-making.
The United States will be a contested homeland. The ability of an adversary
to disrupt mobilization processes in the homeland through cyber or
physical means can no longer be ignored. The mobilization processes
for reserve components contain vulnerabilities, such as reliance on
cell-phone communication for initial alerts and reporting, isolated unit
locations, and soldiers travelling long distances to report for duty, that
are not present for the active duty Army. Thus, simplistic attacks on
cellular infrastructure, isolated facilities, or transportation networks—
especially, if focused on small units providing key, low-density reserve
9     Hearing on the Posture of the United States Army, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 114th
Cong. 18 (March 5, 2015) (statement of John M. McHugh, Secretary of the US Army and Raymond
T. Odierno, Chief of Staff of the US Army)
10     Active Army end strength for fiscal year 2017 is 476,000 Soldiers. National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, §§ 401–2.
11     Congress provided that soldiers in the reserve components who are called to active duty for
more than 30 days be provided at least a 30 day notice before the mobilization date, with a goal of
90 days notification. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110181, 122 Stat. 99 § 515 (2008); and 10 U.S.C. § 12301. DoDI 1235.12 recognizes that some reserve
component members may not report to active duty if “it is physically impossible or would clearly be
a threat to the health, welfare, or safety of others” (21).
12     The US Army Reserve explains it “is structured to manage specialized capabilities, including
those not present anywhere else in the Joint Forces, such as sustainment capabilities required for
major operations, but too expensive to maintain on active duty, such as theater-level transportation,
engineer, and logistics units” (January 12, 2017, www.usar.army.mil/About-Us).
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capabilities, such as bridging, refueling, or biological agent detection—
could effectively lengthen initial musters and reporting.

Ongoing Efforts

Many on-going efforts across the Army are examining mobilization
issues. United States Forces Command and the First United States Army
continue to refine the steady-state mobilization processes while planning
for relatively small-scale mobilizations to support combatant command
contingency plans. The Army G-3/5/7 is coordinating analysis to
support large-scale mobilizations related to Defense planning guidance.
Most recently, the Army chief of staff designated mobilization as a
strategic research priority for the US Army War College. Coordinating
these efforts further and instituting the research as an Army warfighting
challenge (AWFC) would solidify an enterprise-wide emphasis to
ensure mobilization research and analysis endures beyond the current
leadership.
Warfighting challenges, “enduring first order problems, the
solutions to which will improve the combat effectiveness of the current
and future force,” are the focus of the Army Capabilities Integration
Center (ARCIC).13 A review of the current warfighting challenges,
and their associated learning demands, reveals a limited treatment of
mobilization along very narrow lines of inquiry.14 Not addressed are
the personnel, installation, training, equipment, and transportation
challenges associated with mobilizing a larger force, which will be
needed for simultaneous or near-simultaneous contingency operations
in a defeat-deny-defend scenario. The current disconnected nature of
these mobilization elements within the warfighting challenges highlights
the disjointed nature of mobilization within the Army enterprise.

A Way Ahead

Building on previous wargame insights and leveraging the Army
chief of staff’s strategic research mandate, the US Army War College
will undertake a deliberate study to deliver a digital mobilization proving
ground. This simulated environment will allow senior leaders to make
decisions about the mobilization enterprise and policies, to test them
over the long-term and with various conditions, and to determine if the
decision will produce acceptable results. The approach over the next two
years will build on previous Army War College research, which advocates
for a layered approach of addressing each of the levels of mobilization:
• Make the steady-state mobilization system more efficient in conducting
deliberate mobilizations. Current small scale mobilizations provide
the framework for decision-making during larger scale scenarios.
• Build a system that can rapidly accommodate a contingency
mobilization. Refining the current systems and understanding which
13     Army Capabilities Integration Center, Army Warfighting Challenges (Fort Eustis, VA: ARCIC,
January 31, 2017), slides, www.arcic.army.mil/Initiatives/ArmyWarfightingChallenges.
14     In early 2017, only two challenges addressed mobilization related issues: “What CONUS/
OCONUS infrastructure capabilities are necessary to ensure the rapid deployment of entry operation
forces?” (12, learning demand 9), and “What organizational design changes can be enacted in the
Near-, Mid-, and Far-Terms which improve speed of employment and/or close or mitigate capability
gaps?” (20, learning demand 8). “Initiatives: Army Warfighting Challenges,” ARCIC, January 9, 2017,
www.arcic.army.mil/.
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processes will quickly scale and which will take more deliberate actions
allows for more relevant and timely application of resources.
• Develop a plan to mobilize a force capable of executing a complex
scenario. It is critical for the Army to define and understand clearly
the initial mobilization actions and the limitations associated with
multiple near-simultaneous contingencies. Developing a plan at the
time of crisis will cause unnecessary delay.
• Understand the decisions senior leaders will encounter and the strategic
trade-offs and risks associated with a full mobilization. In a complex
scenario, leaders will be compelled to balance force readiness, time of
delivery, and operational challenges with limited resources.
• Understand vulnerabilities and impacts in a contested homeland.
Globalization and increased cyber and space capabilities reduce
America’s physical isolation from potential adversaries. It is necessary
to define how these elements will drive force generation and allocation.
• Think strategically about the challenges associated with a total
mobilization, to include expanding the force. Adding manpower
and matériel to the current structure will require time and extensive
resources. The Army must understand the strategic implications of
expansion and be prepared to influence the national level dialog.15
The research team will consist of a diverse group of faculty from
several external partners, including the United States Military Academy,
Forces Command, Center for Army Analysis, and United States
Transportation Command. The team will focus on the implications of
full mobilization for the Army and the Joint Force during the first year;
total mobilization during the second. Researchers will conduct analysis
using senior leader engagements, workshops, and wargames throughout
the study period.
The first year of research and analysis is already underway. The
first event, a test of the prototype simulation against a single combatant
command operations plan, will occur in September 2017. Further testing
will incorporate progressively larger demand signals, starting with two
operations plans in November 2017, then a full mobilization scenario in
February 2018. Lastly, in keeping with the researcher role, the Army War
College will ask resident and distance education students to examine
strategic mobilization issues and use the simulation to test plausible
futures. Preliminary results are expected to be released in May 2018.
The second year of research and analysis will focus on total
mobilization and the implications associated with expanding the force
and the industrial base. This effort will incorporate insights from
faculty and student research from the previous year. Projected research
questions include:
• What insights might previous mobilizations provide for the future?
An examination and analysis of historical large-scale mobilizations

15     Department of Strategic Wargaming, Full Mobilization Wargame, 4.
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can set the stage for planning and potentially prevent relearning
lessons the hard way.
How did the current concepts and practices of mobilization come
to exist? Understanding the intent of statutory requirements and
evolution of the current system can shape future recommendations.
What are the strategic implications of large-scale mobilizations? Better
understanding of mobilization limitations and requirements might
alter the strategic scenarios which drive defense resourcing decisions.
How quickly can the Army achieve the various levels of mobilization?
It is critical to understand the capabilities and limitations of the current
system in order to inform future decisions.
What is the proper command and control structure for mobilization?
Organizing the Army for large-scale mobilization sets the stage for
effective, integrated decision-making.
How much installation infrastructure is necessary to mobilize the total
Army? Understanding the current capacities and shortfalls informs
planning and rapid contingency decision-making.
Which policies and procedures need to change in order to mobilize the
total Army quickly? Understanding the trade-offs and risks associated
with these changes enables decision-makers to identify alternative
approaches and maximize available resources.
What effect, if any, do different contingencies have on mobilization
requirements and timelines? Awareness of the resources needed to
respond to diverse threats in a variety of battlespaces, and possibly
against multiple foes, builds the capability to mobilize the total Army
effectively.
How can we make mobilizations more robust and less vulnerable to
interference? Recognizing mobilization vulnerabilities presents Army
leadership with opportunities to develop contingencies that would
facilitate total-force mobilization.
How can the Army exercise the tasks associated with large-scale
mobilizations? Wargaming mobilization under diverse scenarios will
help the Army anticipate critical challenges.

The challenges associated with large-scale mobilization, which
are too complex to begin addressing at the time of crisis, make it an
enduring first-order problem. Mobilizing the total Army force requires
a collaborative effort across the entire enterprise to assess requirements,
identify capabilities, develop solutions, and implement decisions. This is
exactly the environment provided by the Army warfighting challenges
analytical framework. Through rigorous research and analysis, the
US Army War College will provide senior leaders with findings and
recommendations to improve the readiness of the current and future force.
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ABSTRACT: This article advises Army leaders to return to previously
successful strategies of influence to articulate a collaborative vision
for the future of air mobility. By underscoring the requirement for
multiservice capabilities to deliver personnel and matériel wherever
they are needed, US air mobility can once again become a strategic
force multiplier.

T

he capability of transporting matériel and personnel remains
essential to the US Army’s effectiveness.1 Likewise, maneuver
momentum—mass x speed—remains a relevant element of
national defense as Army operators and defense planners make the
necessary provisions to get land forces where they need to go, when they
need to go there, and with the necessary momentum. Accordingly, this
article addresses two questions regarding American air-mobility forces.
First, can the present and future US Air Force airlift force structure
support existing and emerging US Army movement and maneuver
requirements? Second, should the Army address its mobility concerns
passively, by declaring its requirements and hoping the Air Force will
come up with appropriate forces, or assertively, by involving itself more
deeply in all details of airlift force structure planning? The importance
of these two questions is obvious given the integral role of inter- and
intratheater air mobility in most Army warfighting concepts. Ultimately,
the Army’s vision of itself as a global response force, able to conduct
rapid and agile “expeditionary maneuver” over strategic and theater
distances, is compromised by shortfalls in our nation’s airlift program;
but the Army can do something about that vulnerability.2

The Army and Airlift Relevance

An airlift planning adage states “the Army does not have light units;
it has heavy and incredibly heavy units.” This adage will remain painfully
relevant to the current global environment of burgeoning strategic
complexity, insufficient budgets, continuous (and probably expanding)
overseas commitments, a predominantly homeland-based force
structure, and “diverse enemies employing traditional, unconventional,
and hybrid strategies.”3 Enemies such as international criminal gangs,
1      US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The U.S. Army Functional Concept
for Movement and Maneuver, 2020–2040, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-6 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC,
2017), 34.
2      For the Army’s emerging vision, see TRADOC, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a
Complex World, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, October 14, 2014), 18; and
General Mark A. Milley, “Developing the Future Force, Part 2,” interview by Jen Judson, Defense
News, October 6, 2016.
3      TRADOC, Operating Concept, 8–14.
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transnational terrorists, and insurgents are growing stronger. Some are
approaching the point of near-peer status in local areas and in certain
realms of combat, gaining a capacity for coordinated or concurrent
attacks on the United States and its interests. Nuclear proliferation and
inexpensive communication networks also increase the possible danger,
velocity, and complexity of future crises and conflicts.4
In response, Army leaders and planners are exploring numerous
doctrine, training, force structure, and equipment innovations to
preserve future readiness. The recently released Army movement and
maneuver concept, for example, calls for task-organized forces moving
in unpredictable ways and maneuvering throughout the depth of future
battlefields to “defeat enemies by forcing them to fight against multiple
types of attacks from multiple directions and domains.”5 To survive and
fight decisively, these task-organized forces will need to be capable of
semi-independent—but mutually supporting—cross-domain land, sea,
air, space and cyber operations for at least one week before pausing to rest
and refit.6 In many circumstances, these operations will enable sea and
air forces to achieve their missions and support in-theater preparation
activities by Joint commands. Agile strategic maneuver and logistical
support by air and sea will be essential to achieving these effects.7
The success of these emerging lines of development will depend on
the support of robust air mobility. Future combat scenarios often will
require the Army to “maneuver over strategic distances along multiple
axes of advance by air and sea,” without stopping at intermediate staging
bases.8 If enemy anti-access/area denial operations block the arrival of
sea and air forces in the early phases of future campaigns, Army forcible
entry operations likely will involve airlifts of assault and then follow-on
forces to seize terrain in unpredictable locations and to transition quickly
to offensive operations. Throughout these activities, Army commanders
will require high-capacity airlifts to build up and sustain maneuvers,
achieve missions, evade enemy fires, reduce logistical footprints, and
facilitate mutual support among widely dispersed units.9
The Army’s dependence on airlift gives it a practically bottomless
quantitative appetite for airlift support. Moving a single Stryker brigade
combat team, for example, involves around 4,200 personnel as well
as 15,000 tons of matériel and sustainment, taking about 380 C-17

4      Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster, “Harbingers of Future War: Implications for the Army”
(presentation, Military Strategy Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 4, 2016);
and Milley, “Developing the Future Force.”
5      TRADOC, Functional Concept, 15,
6      Ibid., 13–15, 25.
7      Eric Lindsey, Beyond Coast Artillery: Cross-Domain Denial and the Army (Washington, DC: Center
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2014), 1–6; Milley, “Developing the Future Force”; and
William G. Braun III and David Lai, U.S.-China Competition: Asia-Pacific Land Force Implications (Carlisle,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2016), 66–68.
8      DoD, Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) (Washington, DC: DoD, 2012), 34
9      For the Army’s vision of the relationship between maneuver and air and sea mobility, see
US Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) and US Marine Corps Combat Development
Command (CDC), Gaining and Maintaining Access: An Army-Marine Corps Concept (Fort Eustis, VA:
ARCIC / CDC, 2012), 7–13. For the Air Force’s tentative view of the aircraft needed to support
Army maneuver, see Air Mobility Command (AMC), Joint Future Theater Lift: Technology Study Final
Report (Scott Air Force Base [AFB], IL: AMC, 2013), 16–18.
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Globemaster sorties.10 Assuming an out-and-back cycle time of 36
hours and a continual commitment of 40 C-17s, or approximately 20
percent of the US fleet, deploying the brigade from the middle of the
continental United States to the Baltic Sea region would take about 14
days. Adding more C-17s and C-5 Galaxies might accelerate the move,
but only if adequate airfields and parking spaces are available at the
delivery points.11 Simple multiplication illustrates the timelines involved
in air movements of multibrigade forces, their supporting elements, and
sustainment supplies over longer distances can stretch into months.
Even if equipment arrives by sea, onward movements to their points of
need often will consume substantial theater airlift efforts to spare forces
long, dangerous, and tactically undesirable road marches.
The Army also has articulated challenging qualitative requirements
for airlift support under austere conditions. Indeed, in the face of strong
enemy anti-access/area denial capabilities, Army air movements and
maneuvers are far more likely to terminate at austere airfields and unpaved
landing grounds than at developed airports and bases with long runways
and extensive but easily identified and targeted parking areas. At the
extreme of its maneuver vision, the Army’s mounted vertical maneuver
concept calls for “the maneuver and vertical insertion of medium-weight
armored forces into areas in close proximity to their battlefield objectives
without the need for fixed airports, airfields or prepared airheads.”12 Similarly, the
current US Army operating concept links the availability of Air Force
airlift assets and improvements in Army rotary-wing transports to its
“maneuver advantage . . . to overcome challenges of restrictive terrain
and operations across long distances . . . to deter adversaries; respond
rapidly to crises; and conduct expeditionary maneuver.”13 Succinctly, the
Army wants airlift support capable not only of delivering all types of
combat units and their matériel into the widest possible range of tactical
destinations but also for maintaining delivery densities necessary to
dominate any point in their battlespaces.
Delivery density, an uncommon term, is a useful consideration in
evaluations of airlift aircraft and force structures. To maintain tactical
dominance in circumstances characterized by fast-breaking events and
waiting enemies, deployment times of these movements—measured
from the first aircraft’s “wheels-up” to the arrival of the last aircraft—
must be narrow enough to get ready-to-fight units on the ground and
reinforced with light- to medium- mobile protected firepower elements
before enemies can react. Consequently, the term has its most acute
relevance to land forces transitioning across domain boundaries such
as airland or airborne assaults. Under such circumstances, the interval
between the arrival of the first and last aircraft to the battlespace must
be short, or dense, enough to allow units to maintain tactical dominance
even as they organize for offensive operations. For airlift planners,
10      Deployment Process Modernization Office, TRADOC, Fort Eustis, Virginia, e-mail message
to author, February 27, 2013; and in Alan Vick, David Orletsky, Bruce Pirnie, and Seth Jones, The
Stryker Brigade Combat Team: Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Options (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002), 15–17.
11      Vick, Orletsky, Pirnie, and Jones, Stryker, 13–29.
12      Brigadier General Robin P. Swan and Lieutenant Colonel Scott R. McMichael, “Mounted
Vertical Maneuver: A Giant Leap Forward in Maneuver and Sustainment,” Military Review 87, no. 1
(January–February 2007): 52–62; emphasis added.
13      TRADOC, Operating Concept, 15, 17, and 22.
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then, achieving tactically viable delivery densities mandates acquiring
and operating the airlift force necessary to get soldiers, equipment, and
sustainment on the ground as quickly as possible and in increments
configured for immediate and effective combat. Delivery density does
not imply forces must arrive instantaneously—though helicopter assaults
of infantry can approach that ideal—but forces must arrive fast enough
to establish and preserve tactical dominance.
The ability of airlift forces and their aircraft to achieve dense
airland deliveries of ground forces is directly related to their terminal
agility—the variety of runways and terminal infrastructures into which
they can operate. Airlift forces dependent upon the long and paved
runways and parking areas of global and regional airports are far less
likely to get Army forces to their points of need than airlift forces that
can use short and unpaved airstrips, sections of multilane highways,
open fields, or (best of all) helicopter landing zones.14 A study by the
Army Capabilities Integration Center provides a useful example of these
considerations. Examining the airfield availability to support force flows
into a large African country, the study found the number of locations
available to vertical takeoff and landing aircraft was virtually limitless.
In comparison, only 24 percent of the territory lay within 50 kilometers
of airfields capable of receiving a C-130 Hercules or a C-17 needed to
deliver Stryker units. Moreover, the country possessed only 13 airfields
able to accommodate C-5s.15 Only a few of those airports possessed the
maximum-on-ground aircraft parking capacity to receive large airlift
flows or to serve as global-theater intermediate staging bases. This issue
is critical since airfield limitations or available transportation personnel
will impose maximum on-ground limitations that will consequently
limit throughput at forward airfields regardless of the number of aircraft
available.16 Indeed, one recent Air Force review estimated only 16
airfields surveyed in sub-Saharan Africa had the runways and capacities
needed to serve as C-17 hubs for onward C-130 operations.17

Shortfalls in the Airlift Program of Record

A complex relationship exists between the Army’s airlift support
requirements and the current airlift program of record’s ability to satisfy
them. The American national air-mobility system is unparalleled in its
capacity and personnel expertise.18 But, its ability to deliver combat
forces to the places and with the delivery densities the Army wants is

14      For discussion on the operational and aerodynamic characteristics of these different airfield
profiles, see Robert C. Owen, “Theater Airlift Modernization: Options for Closing the Gap,” Joint
Force Quarterly 75 (4th Quarter 2014): 17.
15      Jim Young, “A Strategic Terrain Analysis Examining Deployment Considerations within the
Arc of Instability” (briefing, US Army Capabilities Integration Center Deployment Modernization
Office, February 4, 2009), slides 13 and 14.
16      Importantly, the Air Mobility Command’s 621st Contingency Response Wing only fields a
handful of mobile transportation elements, which are able to support two aircraft on the ground
at expeditionary airfields. Vick, Orletsky, Pirnie, and Jones, Stryker, 47; Christopher G. Pernin et
al., Enabling the Global Response Force: Access Strategies for the 82nd Airborne Division (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2016), 22, 30–31, 40; and Robert C. Owen, “Humanitarian Relief in Haiti,
2010: Honing the Partnership between the US Air Force and the UN,” in Air Power in UN Operations:
Wings for Peace, ed. A. Walter Dorn (Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2014), 90.
17      Christopher M. Jones, e-mail message to author, December 29, 2015. At the time, Captain
Jones was an operations research scientist at the combined headquarters of United States Air Forces
Europe (USAFE)—Air Forces Africa, USAFE A9/A9A.
18      For a general history of the development of American air-mobility capabilities, see Robert C.
Owen, Air Mobility: A Brief History of the American Experience (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2013).
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demonstrably inadequate. Moreover, the Department of Defense (DoD)
has no comprehensive plan in place to address these shortfalls any time
soon despite spending funds on piecemeal modernization programs that
will not meet the full scope of the Army’s future needs much more than
do the current requirements.
The American air-mobility system consists of several interconnected
components. Its total force military arm consists of operationally
integrated Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard
components that possess a core airlift fleet of 54 C-5s, 222 C-17s, and
over 300 C-130s. These components also operate just over a hundred
specialized transports, ranging from presidential Boeing 747s to small
business jets.19 Additionally, some 20 air carriers contribute around 450
airliners to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet.20 The rest of the airlift enterprise
consists of a global system created by commands, headquarters, operating
bases, logistics elements within each service, depots, and supply centers
as well as training, education, and professional organizations.21 In a
maximum effort, the Air Force expects this mobility system to produce
around 50 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D) of lift. For perspective,
this much cargo equates to transporting 4,600 tons per day over 11,000
nautical miles (nm)—a roundtrip between Joint Base Lewis-McChord,
Washington and the Philippine island of Luzon—perhaps the equivalent
of a brigade delivery every 4 days.
Of course, the ideal airlift would only exist if “someone shows up
with enough fairy dust to wish away all of the things that hinder airlift
efforts.”22 Historically, hindrances include competing demands on fleet
capacity, changes in local operational circumstances and priorities,
enemy and enemy-sympathizer military and diplomatic actions, limited
availability of suitable enroute and destination airfields, breakdowns
in movement coordination and cargo tracking, crew force limitations,
shortages of cargo pallets and aircraft loading equipment, aircraft
maintenance challenges, and more. During the Persian Gulf War, these
impediments limited the airlift throughput to 13.6 MTM/D out of a
notional airlift system capacity of about 49 MTM/D.23 The military
services have done much to improve airlift management since then, but
the complexities of and competition for airlift support have increased. In
other words, the system will work better in the future but probably not
enough to justify confident expectations that it will perform at capacity.
The mismatch in the cargo compartment sizes and the capacities of
aircraft in the core airlift fleet also undermines the efficiency of many
airlift operations. The airlift fleet has two categories of aircraft based
19      Brendan McGarry, “USAF Almanac: Equipment,” Air Force Magazine 99, no. 5 (May 2016):
32–33. The number of C-130s in the fleet is variable at the moment, as the Air Force is slowly
reducing the size of the fleet towards about 300 aircraft.
20      Michael Lowder to Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Program Participants, memorandum,
“Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Allocation Changes—2016,” January 20, 2016, US Department of
Transportation, Washington, DC, 1 and enclosure 1. For a comprehensive discussion of the workings of the CRAF, see USTRANSCOM and AMC, Civil Reserve Air Fleet Study, Phase 2 Report (Scott
AFB, IL: USTRANSCOM / AMC, 2014).
21      For a detailed discussion on the national air mobility system, see Air University, Air Mobility
Operations, Annex 3-17 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Lemay Center for Doctrine, 2014).
22      Major General Timothy Zadalis (comments, Air Mobility and the Future of Air and Land
Warfare panel, 2016 Airlift/Tanker Association Conference, Nashville, TN, October 29, 2016).
23      Military Airlift Command, History of Military Airlift Command, Calendar Year 1991, vol. 1,
Narrative and Appendices (Scott AFB, IL: Air Mobility Command History Office), 175.
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on cargo compartment size. C-5s and C-17s comprise a category of
big airplanes capable of carrying outsized loads such as battle tanks,
self-propelled artillery, and up-armored M1126 Stryker infantry carriers
between developed airfields. The second category includes C-130s, much
smaller aircraft capable of operating on unpaved airstrips while carrying
medium-weight and oversized loads such as early variant, lightly armored
Strykers, towed artillery, medium-weight engineering equipment, and
tactical radars. The cargo compartment mismatch separating these two
transport categories chokes force movements at intermediate staging
bases when cargoes are transferred from the big planes to the C-130s
capable of landing at less developed airfields closer to points of need.
This disconnect can impose painful operational choices on commanders
trying to preserve unit integrity while moving to austere forward bases.
The limited range and payload characteristics of the current theater
transport fleet exacerbates the operational dilemmas inherent in force
deployments since they can force commanders to conduct intermediate
staging base operations within range of enemy weapons. A C-130J
carrying a 38,000-pound basic Stryker vehicle, for example, has a
range of about 1,600 nm. In comparison, the Airbus A400M can carry
the same vehicle for 3,700 nm; the developmental Embraer KC-390
tanker-transport aircraft for 2,100 nm.24 Considering that unrefueled
operational radius is around 40 percent of an aircraft’s range, an
intermediate staging base receiving C-130J support for a Stryker brigade
move would have to be within 640 nm of its point of need. That distance
is well within the range of tactical aircraft armed with standoff weapons
and by medium-range ballistic missiles, such as the Chinese DF-21. In
such situations, Army movements affected by the previously mentioned
chokepoints would be more vulnerable to enemy attacks.
The defense community has been fully aware of these long-standing
mobility shortfalls as expressed in a US Transportation Command
report in 2011:
Future operations described in joint concepts require the ability to transport
forces over strategic and operational distances directly to points of need and
to routinely operate on austere, short, and unimproved landing areas. The
current mobility airlift fleet cannot. C-130s can carry cargo to semi-prepared
runways, but not the medium-weight forces needed. C-17s and C-5s, on the
other hand, can carry the medium-weight force, but not directly to a short
or soft landing area that may be the point of need.25

More recently, US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)
Commander General Darren W. McDew reported to Congress: “The
current pace of today’s operations requires the full effort of our . . . fleet.
Should the need arise to respond elsewhere in the world, the mobility
resources required could exceed our existing capacity.”26 McDew
expressed the fleet’s capacity would be “sufficient with a manageable
amount of risk.”27 Whatever “manageable” meant in this context, the term
24      Robert C. Owen, Shaping Air Mobility Forces for Future Relevance (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force
Research Institute, 2017), appendix.
25      USTRANSCOM, Future Deployment and Distribution Assessment: Mobility Lift Platforms, Final
Report, vol. 1 (Scott AFB, IL: USTRANSCOM, 2011), 2–11.
26      Hearing on the U.S. Transportation Command 2017 Readiness Posture, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement
of General Darren W. McDew, commander, USTRANSCOM), 6:50.
27      Ibid., 37:57.
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implicitly reinforces the perception that the simultaneous, multithreat,
and multiregion crises visualized by current Army commanders—and
the entire defense community—could quickly overwhelm American
air-mobility capabilities, forcing difficult operational decisions within
combatant commands.
Despite the obvious shortfalls and operational limitations of the
existing airlift fleet, planning in this area by the Defense Department
and the Air Force proceeds at a glacial pace. The Mobility Capabilities
and Requirements Study-2016 (MCRS-16) and related strategic guidance
documents remain the authoritative baselines for DoD discussions
of airlift force structure issues. MCRS-16 found the existing airlift
force sufficient to meet current DoD conflict planning scenarios
but recommended the Department of Defense “continue to explore
strategies to mitigate the adverse impacts of infrastructure constraints”
to support major force deployments.28 Oddly, the report also implied
the availability of C-17s to support intratheater movements reduced
the requirements for C-130s even though the bigger aircraft is more
infrastructure-dependent than the smaller one.29 The Government
Accountability Office subsequently questioned the usefulness and
even the relevance of MCRS-16 since the study provided no specific
risk assessments of identified shortfalls and the basic DoD planning
guidelines had changed since its publication.30 Since then, various
DoD and Air Force organizations have conducted limited studies of
technology and fleet mix issues, but the Defense Department will not
update MCRS until 2018, presumably after the Trump administration
has issued new strategic guidance. So, apart from vague pronouncements
about possibly recapitalizing the strategic airlift fleet in the 2030s and
the theater fleet a decade or so thereafter, the defense community has no
comprehensive plan to address the qualitative and quantitative shortfalls
in the airlift fleet.

The Army’s Essential Role in Past Airlift Force Modernizations

If the past can be a prologue, it is important to understand no
major modernization of American airlift forces has ever happened
in the absence of strong, public, institutional, and detailed leadership
from the Army. Certainly, Army leadership was pivotal to such policy
milestones as the creation of the battlefield airlift component of Army
aviation and global airlift forces as well as the acquisition of the C-17.
Faced with Air Force reluctance in the mid-1950s to acquire fixed- and
rotary-wing airlift forces adequate for their vision of maneuver on
nuclear battlefields, Army leaders bootlegged their own technical and
tactical development program, successfully pressing for funding to buy
thousands of helicopters and a small fixed-wing fleet.31 Concurrent Army
28      William J. Lynn III, deputy secretary of defense, memorandum, “Mobility Capabilities and
Requirements Study—16 Executive Summary,” February 26, 2010, US Department of Defense,
Washington, DC, 4.
29      Ibid., 4–5.
30      US Government Accountability Office (GAO), Defense Transportation: Additional Information
Is Needed for DOD’s Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 to Fully Address All of Its Study
Objectives, Report 11-82R (Washington, DC: GAO, 2010), 3, 6–7.
31      Christopher C. S. Cheng, Air Mobility: The Development of a Doctrine (Westport, CT: Praeger,
1994), 85–111; and James W. Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on
Terror (New York: iUniverse, 2005), 69–80.
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advocacy for true global mobility and the “politicking” of sympathetic
Air Force enthusiasts, two presidents, and many engaged legislators
obliged the Air Force to fund the development of a turbofan-powered
transport fleet truly capable of lifting all types of ground units over
the oceans.32 As America’s strategic circumstances changed and the
end-of-service life for the original turbofan fleet loomed, strong and
persistent advocacy by Army leaders, overseas commanders in chief,
and interested congressmen helped Air Force mobility leaders keep the
replacement program focused on the uniquely capable C-17.33 Without
that advocacy, the program’s focus might have drifted to cheaper options,
such as upgraded C-5s and slightly modified commercial designs, less
compatible with the Army’s emerging mobility needs. Conversely, the
Army’s recent failure to package its proposed Joint Heavy Lift and Joint
Cargo Aircraft programs to bridge interservice doctrines, roles, budgets,
and professional languages led to the collapse of both programs.34
The US Army’s advocacy for these programs had several consistent
features. Most important, leaders did not cross the boundary between
aggressive advocacy and insubordination.35 Rather, they worked within
legal and constitutional structures to influence national policy and the
Defense Department’s military requirements processes. They and their
sympathizers surely stepped on institutional toes, but nothing suggests
laws were broken or the good order and discipline of American defense
services was undermined. Also, the Army galvanized every critical airlift
debate with clear, confident, and credible vision documents. These
documents ranged from the 1954 Project Vista study that coalesced Army
thinking about air mobility in nuclear warfare to the Objective Force
concept of the early 2000s that reaffirmed and quantified the Army’s
need for long-range global mobility.36 Last, Army leaders approached
advocacy as a team effort, assiduously informing and cooperating with
other services, government leaders, and civil authorities on its airlift
needs. Ultimately, this broad-based support carried visions of airlift
modernization to the national level of endorsement and funding.
Current circumstances indicate requirements for successful advocacy
of Army airlift interests will not change significantly. Conflicting
perspectives dominate the complex and costly realm of military affairs.
Army leaders view airlift as a vital underpinning of their mission and
relevance; Air Force leaders consider Army movement aspirations as
elements of a broader set of operational obligations and budgetary
demands. Neither side clearly understands the tactical requirements of
the other. Corporate leaders not only love their country but also market
specific aircraft. Congressional members worry about national defense
while protecting their Air National Guard units and preserving the
32      Robert C. Owen, Air Mobility, 139–55.
33      Owen, Air Mobility, 229–39. For a definitive discussion of this project and its advocacy, see
Betty R. Kennedy, Globemaster III: Acquiring the C-17 (Scott AFB, IL: Air Mobility Command, Office
of History, 2004).
34      Owen, Air Mobility, 291–94.
35      For more than this summary of the content and tone of Army airlift advocacy based on
numerous sources, see “Army Aviation in the 1950s” and “Vietnam—The Air Mobility War” in
Owen, Air Mobility. Also see Williams, History of Army Aviation, 66–77, 97–104, 407–14. For a useful
case study into the Army’s development and advocacy of the air mobility concept, see John J. Tolson
in Air Mobility 1961–1971 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1973), 1–22.
36      California Institute of Technology, Final Report on Project VISTA: A Study of Ground and Air
Tactical Warfare with Especial Reference to the Defense of Western Europe, series A, vol. 1 (February 4, 1952).
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economic well-being of their constituents. The intellectually stagnating
effect of strategic uncertainty accompanying the increasing complexity
of the military’s future overshadows each of these interests.
So, if the Army intends to shape an air-mobility fleet capable of
supporting battle through the remainder of the century, it had better get
engaged. As General Mark Milley said on the eve of becoming the Army
chief of staff, it is time for him and the other service chiefs to “elbow” their
way into more assertive participation in Joint modernization decisions.37

Shaping the Future Airlift Program for Warfighting Relevance

Assiduous long-term airlift policy requires sustained knowledge
acquisition and context-setting campaigns by the appropriate Army
commands and leaders. The Army must clearly articulate its key airlift
goals and ardently hold the Air Force to its responsibilities to maintain
capability requirements. The first goal might address transporting
forces and outsize cargoes from intermediate staging bases located
outside enemy weapon-engagement zones to dispersed and austere
points of need. Some solutions Army leaders might champion include
equipping the Army with improved medium-weight protected firepower
vehicles and advancing vertical takeoff and landing technology. Should
advancing vertical technology prove unattainable or unaffordable, supershort takeoff and landing systems capable of lifting medium-weight
forces might be a practical alternative. Due to the extreme MTM/D
requirements, profoundly increasing the throughputs and delivery
densities of long-range airlift forces into global class and regional
airfields cannot be overlooked.
Army leaders should broker an agreement between their service, the
Air Force, and other willing stakeholders, particularly the combatant
commands, to identify the appropriate technologies and to develop
acquisition strategies for modernizing air-mobility forces to meet specific
operational requirements rather than simple gross-lift calculations. This
step is essential to shaping the focus of the forthcoming MCRS and
to initiating modernization and development programs quickly—for
example, if all agree filling the existing gap in delivering medium-weight,
oversize loads to austere airfields is a pressing need, incrementing a fleet
of A400Ms for operations over the next 30 years can begin shortly after
the MCRS. Likewise, if emphasis is given to the strategic throughput
problem, development of a new strategic airlifter, probably larger than
the C-5 but with better airfield agility, can start. One compelling reason
for expediting these assessments is maximizing opportunities to offset
some costs by terminating acquisitions and service-life extensions of less
useful systems.
Finally, the Army should encourage stakeholders to create a new
multiservice airlift knowledge-management organization similar in
concept and tasking to the Airlift Concepts and Requirements Agency,
established in 1984 to “coordinate and integrate . . . the development and
promulgation of joint airlift concepts, doctrine, training, procedures,
and materiel which support current and future Air Force and Army
37      Marcus Weisgerber, “US Army’s New Chief Sets Three Goals,” Defense One, October 8,
2015.
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doctrine and unified and specified command requirements.”38 Given
changes in the Joint system since then, the structure of a new airlift
knowledge management organization will likely differ in many respects
from the Airlift Concepts and Requirements Agency, but the defense
community will benefit from the centralization. Such an organization
can facilitate the efforts of many groups to arrive at a common, detailed,
and comprehensive understanding of airlift useful for wisely building
the most capable fleet.

38      Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force, MAC-TRADOC Airlift Concepts
and Requirements Agency (ACRA) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army and Department of
the Air Force, 1985), 1.
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P

rofessor Graham Allison gazes into the future of US-China
relations in Destined for War: Can America and China Escape
Thucydides’s Trap? only to find the best guide to the future is the
past. Specifically based on Thucydides’s well-known observation that “It
was the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired in Sparta that made
war inevitable,” Allison has popularized the phrase “Thucydides’s Trap”
to describe the dangerous historical dynamic that develops when a rising
power threatens to displace an established ruling power.1 This dynamic
was summarized aptly in an earlier article: “The rise of a new power has
been attended by uncertainty and anxieties. Often, though not always,
violent conflict has followed. The rise in the economic and military
power of China, the world’s most populous country, will be a central
question for Asia and for American foreign policy at the beginning of a
new century. ”2
In researching cases of rising powers challenging ruling powers over
the last 500 years, Allison and the Thucydides Trap Project at Harvard
University found 12 of 16 cases resulted in war. Avoiding Thucydides’s
Trap thus equates to avoiding war. Based on this analysis, Allison
concludes that “as far ahead as the eye can see, the defining question
about global order is whether China and the United States can escape
Thucydides’s Trap.”3
The high percentage of cases that resulted in war provide persuasive
support to the overall argument that war between the United States and
China may be more likely than generally considered. Yet a few cautionary
notes on the data set and methodology are warranted.
First, while the principal result of the study (12 of 16 cases led to
war) seems objective, decisions on what cases to include necessarily
involve some subjective analysis. As such, the overall data supporting
the general argument have evolved since the initial Thucydides’s Trap
argument was presented. In 2012–14 the argument cited 11 of 15 cases
leading to war.4
1      For more on Professor Allison’s paraphrase of Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, ed. Robert
B. Strassler, trans. Richard Crawley (New York: Free Press, 1996), bk. 1, ch. 23, line 6, see Destined
for War, n. 2, 297.
2      Joseph S. Nye Jr., “As China Rises, Must Others Bow?,” Economist, June 25, 1999.
3      Graham T. Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?,”
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), xvii.
4      In a 2012 op-ed in the Financial Times, and subsequently in the New York Times, Professor
Allison supported the general argument by noting that “In 11 of 15 cases since 1500 where a rising
power emerged to challenge a ruling power, war occurred. ” Graham Allison, “Thucydides’s Trap
Has Been Sprung in the Pacific,” Financial Times, August 21, 2012; and Graham T. Allison, “Obama
and Xi Must Think Broadly to Avoid a Classic Trap,” New York Times, June 6, 2013.
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In 2015 and subsequently, the data set
was revised to include 12 of 16 cases that
resulted in war.5 Later in 2015, a detailed
argument presenting the Thucydides’s
Trap metaphor appeared in the Atlantic.
The 16 cases were identified in a table
accompanying the article and included
information on time period, ruling power,
rising power, and result. 6
In Destined for War the data also
include 12 of 16 cases leading to war, but a
comparison between the table in the book
(42) and the table from the 2015 Atlantic
article shows one case from the 2015 data
was dropped and another was added. In the
Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can
event, they both resulted in “no war” so the
America and China Escape Thucydides’s
overall numbers remain the same; but, such
Trap? (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt, 2017), 384 pages, $28.00
changes highlight the difficulties inherent
to determining which cases to include.
While 12 of 16 may have a scientific ring, the result may be less rigorous
than it appears; certainly, it is subject to further analysis.7
Notwithstanding such questions about the aggregate data, the
book’s use of the Thucydides’s Trap metaphor to alert the potential,
indeed the seeming likelihood, that the current global shift in power
could lead to war is its principal strength. The book’s conclusion, based
on the available evidence, “when a rising power threatens to displace a
ruling power, the resulting structural stress makes a violent clash the
rule, not the exception,” is a powerful warning that should help focus
the attention of both policymakers and scholars to the perils inherent in
the uneven growth of power.8
Although a valuable lens through which to see the current shifting
relationship between the United States and China, the text is somewhat
less useful in prescribing policy or strategy responses that might be taken
in pursuit of US objectives given the international context described.
As an aid to statecraft, Allison says, “History shows that major ruling
powers can manage relations with rivals, even those that threaten to
overtake them, without triggering war. The record of those successes,
as well as the failures, offers many lessons for statesmen today.”9 The
challenge for strategists and policymakers, however, is to distinguish the
5      In Professor Allison’s 2015 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the
data set was updated to include 12 of 16 cases which led to war. See Hearing on China, the US, and
the Asia-Pacific, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 114th Cong (April 14, 2015) (statement, Dr.
Graham T. Allison, Director of Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and
the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard’s Kennedy School).
6      Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?,” Atlantic,
September 24, 2015.
7      For example, a list on the Thucydides’s Trap Project website of potential additional cases that
may be included in a second phase of the analysis includes 14 cases of which 7 led to war and 7 did
not. While none have yet been included in the overall data, the variance in the result highlights the
importance of decisions of which cases to include and which not to include. See “Can America and
China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?,” Belfer Center, Harvard Kenndey School, accessed July 18, 2017,
http://www.belfercenter.org/thucydides-trap/methodology/thucydides-trap-potential
-additional-cases.
8      Allison, Destined for War, xv.
9      Ibid., xvii.
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historical lessons to avoid war, which vary widely and are in some cases
mixed if not contradictory. Here former Presidential Historian Arthur
Schlesinger’s lament “that the past is an enormous grab bag with a prize
for everybody” would seem applicable.10
To illustrate how differing conclusions might be drawn, we might
compare two cases from the Thucydides’s Trap analysis which had the
same result of “no war.” In case number 11 regarding the British response
to rising American power in the early twentieth century, Allison observes
that Great Britain chose a strategy of ad hoc accommodation, deciding
“to make a virtue of necessity and to yield to the Americans in every
dispute with as much good grace as was permitted.”11In case number 15, a
rising Soviet Union challenged the United States for several decades, but
the end result was “no war.”12 In what Allison describes as the “greatest
leap of strategic imagination in the history of America diplomacy,” a
“comprehensive strategy for a form of combat never previously seen”
was developed to conduct a cold war “by every means short of bombs
and bullets.”13 The result, though not war, was that “the US and Soviet
Union made systemic, sustained assaults against each other along every
azimuth except one: direct military attacks.”14
For the statesman or strategist intent to avoid Thucydides’s Trap
the above two examples offer starkly different historically-derived
approaches: accommodation or cold war. The advice to “apply history”
found in chapter 10, “Where Do We Go from Here?,” while sensible,
still begs questions on which history and how it is to be applied.
A fundamental challenge arises for efforts to apply the Thucydides’s
Trap methodology and data to strategy and policymaking. The study
designates war as the dependent variable. Could dependent variables
other than war be understood in the context of Thucydides’s Trap? In
other words, could strategic objectives beyond avoiding war be addressed
by the information and evidence presented in the study? Allison cites
Clausewitz’s famous line: “War is an extension of international politics
by other means.”15
In case 9, the rise of Germany in the mid-nineteenth century, the
“war” result suggests France and Germany fell into Thucydides’s Trap.
Yet, the Franco-Prussian War assisted in the attainment of Bismarck’s
main strategic objective of unifying the German states around a strong
Prussia. Is it possible that war could be a rational choice in pursuit of
national objectives? The answer, according to the analysis in Destined
for War, is no. Of the “Twelve Clues for Peace” offered in chapter 9,
several point out, given the unprecedented nature of nuclear weapons,
war between modern great powers is “madness” and “no longer a
10      Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., “ ‘Lessons’ of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in
American Foreign Policy. By Ernest R. May,” Journal of American History 61, no. 2 (September 1974):
443–44; doi:10.2307/1903961, cited in Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien
Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 8.
11      Allison, Destined for War, 42; and Ernest R. May and Zhou Hong, “A Power Transition and Its
Effects,” in Power and Restraint: A Shared Vision for the U.S.-China Relationship, ed. Richard Rosecrance
and Gu Guoliang (New York: Public Affairs, 2009), 13, cited in Allison, Destined for War, 197.
12      Allison, Destined for War, 42.
13      Allison, Destined for War, 202–203.
14      Ibid., 203.
15      Ibid.
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justifiable option.”16 Without doubt, this is an exceedingly sensible
position. Yet, must we then discount historical analogies drawn from
events in the prenuclear age?
To resolve the conundrums of the Thucydides’s Trap metaphor
posed in the preceding two paragraphs, a couple of suggestions are
offered. First, using a variety of different dependent variables to review
the historical cases of a rising power challenging a ruling power could
yield important knowledge. By identifying a nation’s strategic priority
as the dependent variable, for example, insight could be collected into
whether either power achieved its objectives. A possible observation
would be that in x of y cases the rising power achieved its objectives,
or alternatively, the ruling power achieved its objectives. How they did
so would be the subject for further inquiry. Several variations on this
approach might be useful.
A second approach might be to disaggregate the data and conduct
detailed analyses of each case compared to the present using the
structured methodology articulated by Richard Neustadt and Ernest
May in their book, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers
and cited favorably in Destined for War.17By shifting the focus from the
aggregate to the specific; identifying known, unknown, and presumed
facts; and detailing both similarities and differences between the cases,
the historical record would reveal a more comprehensive and nuanced
picture that could provide important insights. Indeed, Allison previously
used this approach to good effect, and it would complement the more
general description of the cases included in Destined for War.18
Yaacov Vertzberger reflected “history does not contain an inherent
truth which necessarily reveals itself to the scholar or practitioner. It
maintains many faces when studied with great care and through the
application of scientific methodology.”19 Seen in that light, Destined
for War presents not inherent truth, but one face, an important face,
revealing a dangerous historical dynamic reflected more prominently in
description rather than prescription.

16      Ibid., 206–209.
17      Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for DecisionMakers (New York: Free Press, 1986), 232–46, cited in Allison, Destined for War, n. 5, 337.
18      Graham Allison, “Just How Likely Is Another War? Assessing the Similarities and Differences
between 1914 and 2014,” Atlantic, July 30, 2014.
19      Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, “Foreign Policy Decisionmakers as Practical-Intuitive Historians:
Applied History and Its Shortcomings,” International Studies Quarterly 30, no. 2 (June 1986), 244.

Book Reviews
On Contemporary & Future War
Scales on War: The Future of America’s Military at Risk
By Maj. Gen. Bob Scales, USA (Ret.)
Reviewed by COL Tarn Warren, Chair, Department of Military Strategy,
Planning, and Operations, US Army War College

T

his work is about the infantry, in close combat, the unique burden it
has and will continue to bear for our nation, why we are neglecting it,
and the cost of this neglect. A compelling narrative packed with piercing
insights, Scales on War: The Future of America’s Military at Risk is a well-earned
tribute to the military personnel who shoulder the weight of victory or
defeat on the battlefield and a cogent and persistent argument that future
conflict will demand more than ever before in our history from small
combat units. Written principally for US policymakers but immensely
useful for the wider defense community, Scales on War reminds readers
those who do most of the dying overseas—the infantry—often also, and
ironically, suffer at home from resource neglect and thin advocacy. With
urgency, Major General (Ret.) Bob Scales implores national leaders not to
be lured by high-tech, clean, quick, and bloodless thinking about victory
that distorts the true character and nature of war. Although his book is
thinly sourced, he effectively uses his lifetime of combat, senior military
leader, and national security experience to make his case.
Galloping through the past 100 years of US military history, Scales
adeptly describes the cyclical buildup and breaking of the Army before
and after each major war or conflict. As a result of this cycle, the US Army,
and especially the infantry, suffered from what he calls “amateurism,”
at least until the beginning of the all-volunteer force in the early 1970s.
This amateurism has, in part, resulted in higher and needless casualties
on the battlefield by those most likely to face close combat and has, again
in part, accelerated the pursuit of quick and bloodless victory using hightech standoff weaponry. To be sure, Scales does not eschew technology
in warfare. On the contrary, he embraces the need to leverage technology
to ensure dominant small-unit lethality and to better protect the soldier.
He asserts, however, that current policymakers and the entrenched
defense industrial base continue to steer warfare to a place it will not
naturally go—to a clean, quick, strategic victory via technology.
Indeed, Scales spends a considerable amount of time describing
current and future threats as those nearly immune from US technological advantages and willing to trade space and lives for time. Using
the oft-cited “asymmetric” playbook, future threats do not have to win
but merely not lose, run out the clock, and wait for the inevitable US
domestic aversion to increased casualties, resulting in gradual withdrawal
from the effort. His point here is to leverage resources and technology
at the small-unit level to improve lethality, reduce friendly casualties,
and achieve victory where the enemy lives and exerts its political power.
Simultaneously, Scales sternly rebukes those that claim big-ticket
warships and fifth generation jet fighters will claim the inheritance of
future victory. To achieve future victory, he calls for an unprecedented
investment in human capital, especially in the infantry. The United States
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must carefully select, train, and educate these warriors to be more like
special operations forces, including using social science as an amplifier.
Deep and persistent cultural training and education will greatly improve
small-unit effectiveness in complex environments with an enemy sometimes hidden in plain sight.
Lamenting the fact that soldiers and marines are still using nearly
obsolete and unreliable small arms, among other paraphernalia, Scales
also calls for a diversion of resource investment towards systems that
improve small-unit lethality and survivability, such as new semiautomatic
rifles, better ammunition of a caliber with more impact, lighter and
more-effective body armor, soldier-view cameras, and handheld devices
that replace secure radios and track not only the soldier’s location but
also his vital signs. Along with the gear, the US Army must also raise
its training and retention standards, accepting only personnel mature
enough to handle warfare in complex environments.
Furthermore, leader judgment and small-unit resilience are critical.
At more senior officer levels, the US Army must identify and groom
future strategic thinkers early with rigorous professional military and
civilian education. Admittedly, the author recognizes the cost and
time required to achieve these standards. He does not offer any easy
solutions. Despite his pleas, the author concludes with an ominous
forecast: without these needed reforms at the small combat unit level,
the US Army will break again within three years.
Overall, Scales on War reminds us victory in modern war may be
tough and elusive, but it still resides where sovereignty and political
power actually live: on the ground, up close. Although the narrative
occasionally makes hard gear-shifts and is redundant in a few instances,
the book delivers persuasive arguments for US policymakers and senior
military leaders to consider. Interestingly, there is a hint of “fighting the
last war” in this book. What if the next enemy is a high-end peer willing
to fight symmetrically? In this case, while the book’s prescriptions may
still be sound, its critique of our current defense investment may lose
some punch. The author, nevertheless, makes a strong case for investing in the aspect of our military perhaps most likely to achieve lasting
military and political outcomes—lethal, resilient, mature, and survivable
small ground combat units.

Cyberspace in Peace and War
By Martin C. Libicki
Reviewed by Aaron F. Brantly, Assistant Professor, Cyber and International
Relations, United States Military Academy

C
Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2016
496 pages
$55.00

yberspace in Peace and War by Martin Libicki is arguably the most
ambitious and thorough individual analysis of cyberspace challenges
written to date. Libicki places his deliberate and robust analysis into a
readable yet exhaustive work. He advances dozens of arguments from
the basics of cyberconflict to deterrence, coercion, and strategic and
asymmetric conflict—and nearly everything in between. The true value
of this volume resides both within its immense breadth, which exposes
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readers to the nuances of debates that have been forming within the
cyberconflict studies community, and within its depth on each topic.
The book should gain immediate prominence within the cyberconflict
literature canon and should be included in required readings of serious
graduate-level courses on cyberspace conflict.
What separates Libicki’s analysis from the field at large is his
willingness to understand deeply the technical, tactical, operational,
and strategic implications of a range of decisions. He is not a Pollyanna
for cyberspace, making prognostications about the impending doom
or the lack thereof in cyberspace, rather he charts a reasoned middle
ground that will challenge both pessimists and optimists. His central
argument resides in the realization that cyberspace is a complex domain
that engages a variety of core attributes across civilian and military government as well as the public, social, and economic sectors. Any attempt
to set policy or strategy in this domain requires coming to terms with
the domain’s nuance and complexity.
In coming to terms with nuance and complexity, Libicki builds on
his previous works on cyberdeterrence, cyberdefense, and cyberconflict
in cyberspace which provided more detail on individual topics but did
not encompass the full breadth necessary to understand the relationship between the different aspects of peace and conflict in cyberspace.
Cyberspace in Peace and War remedies the lack of breadth by walking readers
through nearly every debate in the field. The downside of this treatment
is some of the latter chapters, in particular, lose the depth necessary to
fully develop complex arguments. In the scope of a work connecting such
a robust variety of concepts, this lack of depth is not a major weakness,
but rather the starting point for academic and policy arguments.
Any chapter could constitute a stand-alone book, yet by consolidating arguments and linking chapters together Libicki provides a nearly
linear path for readers to follow. The section on the foundations of
cyberspace should be required reading for all senior leaders entering the
field. The chapters in this section provide a concise, easily understood
foundation for nontechnical individuals. Subsequent sections on
policies, operations, strategies, and norms provide ample evidence for
arguments on topics such as: how deterrence does or rather does not
work, how coercion in cyberspace is lacking, and why a nuclear analogy
to cyberspace is inaccurate. Senior leaders who read the entire book
will understand very well how one of the most-respected scholars in
the field rightly or wrongly interprets the challenges addressed—not
come away from the arguments presented having a fixed position. Senior
leaders who read the book as a debate rather than a fait accompli will
be able to apply the arguments and robust sourcing to their work in the
operational and policy worlds.
The greatest benefit of Cyberspace in Peace and War is that it removes
the rose-colored glasses that cyberspace is the final domain of conflict,
one which will solve or create problems independent of other domains.
Rather conflict in cyberspace, just as conflict in any domain, is part of a
larger whole, a whole that if approached studiously can yield a range of
benefits. Libicki does not gloss over the challenges presented by conflict
in cyberspace, instead he addresses each challenge in a reasoned manner
that continues to place him—and his work—at the forefront of the field.
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Reviewed by Richard M. Meinhart, Professor of Defense and Joint Processes,
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ajan Menon, who has published extensively on many related topics,
provides a realistic approach to the reasons nation-states become
involved in humanitarian interventions with military campaigns focused
on ending mass atrocities. Mass atrocities may be spurred by a variety
of reasons to include ethnic conflict or cleansing, wars of succession
or revolutions, and genocide or race hatred. Menon proposes that states
primarily become involved in these warlike humanitarian interventions if it
is in the state’s national interests. Others, using a more liberalist approach,
have articulated that many campaigns were focused on ensuring universal
human rights across the globe, which have expanded with the ending of
the Cold War and the need for a “Responsibility to Protect (R2P).” There
are real tensions between these two approaches with the author exploring
these tensions in multiple ways by clearly examining the “why” behind
many armed humanitarian interventions of the last four decades. The
book’s smooth introduction, followed by eight succinct chapters with
appropriate titles, and almost 50 pages of expansive source notes provide
well-supported insights.
The book’s first chapter, “The Animating Ideal,” examines
tensions between a realist and liberalist approach by exploring the
intellectual foundation of humanitarian intervention. Menon discusses
the boundaries of sympathy towards the oppressed and duty to help
others, as well as how universal human rights and an enlightenment
mind-set have gained traction. This mind-set has the potential to cloud
the judgment of interventionists, who may not consider challenges or
counterarguments to their approach. The second chapter, “Altruism’s
Limits,” focuses on challenges and limits to this approach by a reticent
public that does not want to spend their nation’s blood and treasure
in warlike humanitarian intervention operations. Menon provides
many examples of deaths related to a state’s inability to provide foreign
aid to address poverty in certain areas and, most importantly, to not
addressing or minimizing the response to mass atrocities in Rwanda,
Darfur, and Syria.
From this impressive examination of the tensions between these two
approaches, Menon grounds readers in a more academic perspective,
providing historical examples of issues impacting humanitarian intervention in the third chapter, “Sovereignty, Legitimacy, and Intervention,”
followed by “The Legal Debate,” which highlights states’ rights versus
human rights, unilateral intervention by states or regional organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the
challenges with aligning law and morality. He shows how states have
used these concepts to justify to the global community their reasons for
engaging in, or conversely, for blocking the involvement of other states
in interventions. Examples from both chapters support the author’s
insights and include Pakistan and Bengali, Vietnam and Cambodia,
Tanzania and Uganda, NATO and Kosovo, and the United States in
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Panama and Grenada. Menon concludes with the thought that “power
and interest, not law, will prove decisive” when states decide to become
involved in humanitarian interventions.
The approaches and tensions on when to intervene are covered in
the fifth chapter, “Human Rights and Intervention,” which begins with
historical examples from the 1800s. Menon seamlessly transitions to
the complicated journey of the United Nation’s (UN’s) R2P debate and
the 2005 World Summit to gain a global consensus on humanitarian
intervention. Comments from the leaders of many of the nations at
the summit illustrate the extent of global divisions as the original R2P
proposal was diluted to provide more vague UN guidance for engaging
in humanitarian interventions.
The sixth chapter, “The Primacy of Pragmatism,” clearly cements
the author’s realistic approach to humanitarian intervention. He states:
“When friendly states commit atrocities, the great powers are wont to
look away, offer political cover, or even provide materiel assistance.”
Examples he provides to support this pragmatic approach include: the
West’s support for three decades of the brutal Indonesian dictator Suharto
following his take over in a 1965 coup, the United States overlooking
Turkey’s war against the Kurds in the 1980s and 1990s, the United
States and European nations ignoring Bahrain’s oppression to quash a
2011 popular uprising with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation
Council states’ assistance, and the way different states have approached
the ongoing Syrian conflict. The lack of humanitarian considerations in
these and other examples was compared with the UN Resolution and
R2P-worthy actions in 2011 by NATO and Arab states; both parties
wanted to oust Gadhafi due to his internal Libyan violence.
The book’s seventh chapter, “War and Post War,” smoothly
provides a needed historical perspective to a leader’s overconfidence in
quickly achieving their objectives when becoming involved with wars
and humanitarian campaigns. Many humanitarian campaigns can create
even more dire conditions within a region, especially when a dictator is
removed. Examples include: the killing and turmoil associated with the
former Yugoslavia region and NATO’s Kosovo and Bosnia campaigns,
and NATO’s and the Arab nation’s risk aversion strategy in ousting
Gadhafi and the anarchy and international rivalries that spilled over in
neighboring states. The final chapter, “The International Community,”
examines the influence, or better said the lack of effective influence, of
global organizations. Starting with an international relations philosophy
for how the global community has become more connective, Menon
examines international organizations such as the UN High Commission
for Refugees, the International Criminal Court, the World Food
Program, and the International Court of Justice. He provides examples
of how these organizations desire to address humanitarian challenges,
but lack the power, resources, and needed support of key nations.
The author’s conclusion succinctly describes how his realistic
perspective differs from humanitarian interventionists anchored by
normative values, and why his approach is important. He provides
final reasons “that I speak of the conceit of human intervention.” The
Conceit of Humanitarian Intervention is well worth the read whether you
agree or disagree with the author’s perspective, for it provides multiple
perspectives from theory and practice on past and ongoing humanitarian
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interventions. Perhaps, for future complex and uncertain humanitarian
interventions, leaders may want to integrate relevant principles from
both realist and liberalist approaches when making decisions if, when,
and how to intervene.

War & Legality
Waging War: The Clash between Presidents
and Congress, 1776 to ISIS
By David J. Barron
Reviewed by John C. Binkley, Professor of History and Government, University
of Maryland University College

New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2016
576 pages
$30.00

O

n April 6, 2017, President Donald Trump authorized a cruise missile
attack on a Syrian airfield in response to the use of poison gas by
Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The administration based the legality of the
missile attack upon the president’s power as commander-in-chief. While
many in Congress welcomed the attack, there was considerable concern
over the lack of congressional approval for the action. As any student
of American civics understands, the Constitution contains numerous
points of contention as institutional checks and balances come into play.
While the Constitution clearly gives Congress the authority to declare
war, its management of military operations sets the power of Congress
against the authority of the president as the commander-in-chief. Two
fundamental questions are raised regarding actions such as Trump’s: can
Congress interfere in the military’s operational decisions once war has
been declared, and to what extent can the president order the military
into harm’s way absent a declaration of war? These are the questions
David Barron attempts to answer in Waging War.
The answers to these questions tend to fall into two contradictory
categories. For analysts who believe in the unitary executive, such as
a John Yoo, a law professor at the University of California, Berkeley
and author of Crisis and Command: A History of Executive Power from George
Washington to George W. Bush (2009), the power of the executive as the
commander-in-chief is effectively almost unlimited, checked only by
the budgetary and impeachment authorities of Congress. Even in the
absence of a congressional declaration of war, the commander-in-chief
has unfettered authority to use military force to sustain America’s
interests. Once Congress has declared war, it abdicates operational
authority to the president.
Barron, a federal judge on the US Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, rejects the unitary executive vision of almost unchecked
presidential power. Instead, he argues presidents have been very
cognizant of the constitutional prerogatives of Congress and have tried
to gain congressional acquiescence to presidential actions. According
to Barron, this deference to the legislative branch originated during the
American Revolutionary War when George Washington followed the
lead of the Continental Congress on a number of issues. This deference,
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however, was based on the explicit grant of authority given Congress in
the Articles of Confederation to direct military operations. Barron goes
on to argue that even with the creation of the executive branch at the
constitutional convention in 1787, the founders still believed implicitly
that congressional power was to be dominant. While his analysis of the
founders’ intentions is well written, interesting, and argued effectively,
his conclusions are less sure-footed. For example, Barron does not discuss
the important debate over whether to substitute the more operational
term “make war” instead of the legislative authority to “declare war.”
The next 25 chapters are a series of historical studies on the use
of presidential military power and how commanders-in-chief exercised
this power in relation to Congress prior to the Global War on Terror.
In most cases, the issue was how the president was going to achieve his
desired goals in the face of congressional obstinacy, and in many cases,
statutory obstacles. As Barron succinctly describes, the “commandersin-chief have found themselves mired in statutory restrictions in every
phase of American war-making, from the Revolutionary War, to the
early wars with France and England, to the Civil War and its aftermath,
to the specter of total war culminating in World War II, to the Cold War
itself.” In each case, the president had to figure out how to circumvent
Congress or co-opt its acquiescence either explicitly or implicitly. Since
the last declaration of war in 1941, the solution for both branches of
government has been a series of legislative grants of authority to conduct
military operations short of a declaration of war. The Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution (1964) is one of the more famous of these grants of authority.
The final three chapters address post-9/11 events. Barron delves
into the conflict existing between the unitary executive supporters,
primarily located in the Office of the Vice President and the Department
of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, and Congress, which believed it had
certain power over post-9/11 military operations. The conflict between
the George W. Bush administration and Congress over enhanced
interrogation techniques was probably the most contentious.
In assessing the quality of Waging War, this reviewer noticed the
writing style. While Barron, a former assistant attorney general of the
Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice, clearly knows his
way around legal opinions and briefs, his writing is clear and uncluttered
with legal jargon. In comparison, many books on this topic read as though
they have been “cut-and-pasted” from a legal brief. Instead, Barron tells
a series of well-written stories supporting his position regarding the
presidents’ deference to Congress. While this style is readable for the
nonattorney, some of the stories could have used more legal analysis.
This is particularly apparent in the discussions of the writing of the
Constitution and the crucial Supreme Court decisions relating to the
executive/congressional war powers. Also, Barron selected stories
supportive of his general proposition, while ignoring those that might
have undermined it. For instance, he simply refers to President Thomas
Jefferson’s use of the navy against the Barbary pirates in the First Barbary
War (1801–5) as “a deft handling of the use of force” even though this
decision is an early example of the use of unilateral executive power.
Notwithstanding these minor criticisms, Barron has written
an extremely readable and effectively argued counterbalance to the
viewpoint of unitary executive theorists. For anyone interested in
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the constitutional relationship between the president and Congress
regarding war powers, Waging War belongs on your bookshelf.

Court-Martial: How Military Justice Has Shaped
America from the Revolution to 9/11 and Beyond
By Chris Bray
Reviewed by C. Anthony Pfaff, Research Professor for Military Profession and
Ethic, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

I
New York: W. W. Norton,
2016
416 pages
$28.95

n Court-Martial: How Military Justice Has Shaped America from the Revolution
to 9/11 and Beyond, historian Chris Bray chronicles the evolution not
just of the military justice system, but also of our sense of what counts
as military justice. Thoroughly researched, Bray writes in an entertaining,
narrative style that sheds a fascinating light on a process that shaped both
the US military and the society it serves.
Civil-military relations in the early United States were very different
than they are today. In those days, every “able-bodied white male
citizen,” was a militiaman. This broad imposition, though popular at
the time, embedded in the militia an irreconcilable character: it was
simultaneously a government organization run by a strict hierarchy and
a neighborhood association that relied on mutual consent and a sense
of community. So while today our civil-military concerns are driven by
fears that the military and society are too far apart, in those days the
concern was they were too close together. Bray relates numerous stories
where bar fights and business disputes between neighbors ended up in
court-martials when one party happened to outrank the other in the
militia. Similarly, many units simply evaporated because the commander
did not treat subordinates as neighbors and gain their consent before
giving orders.
This conflation of civil and military came to a head during the War
of 1812, when Andrew Jackson declared martial law in New Orleans,
bringing civilians and military alike under military rule. He conscripted
soldiers from the local population and banished those who refused to
serve. When several militiamen from Tennessee tried to go back home
after their enlistments had expired, Jackson had eight of them executed.
When a state senator objected to Jackson’s continued imposition of
martial law months after his victory over the British, Jackson had the
senator, and any who tried to support him, including his lawyer, thrown
in jail. While Jackson’s own officers acquitted the senator, it was incidents
like these, and Bray chronicles many, that drove the American public
to prefer a large standing army rather than constant, if inconsistent,
subjugation to military law.
Even after civil and military split, military courts continued to serve
as an agent of change on the larger American society. While the role
of the military in improving racial equality is well-known, what is less
known is the important role of the court in that process. For example,
during the Civil War, some African-Americans drafted by the Union
army were tried for mutiny for objecting to serve for less than equal pay.
A number were executed. But because they were tried in court, their
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claims of injustice were aired, which prompted the same commanders
who ordered the executions to lobby Washington to provide the necessary
funds to right what they too saw as a wrong.
If the Civil War made the military more sensitive to racial inequality,
it did not resolve it. While African-Americans struggled for equality
under the law in civil society, military courts handed them a few
victories. Jackie Robinson, the first African-American to play professional baseball, was also one of the few African-American officers
commissioned during World War II. While stationed in Texas in 1944,
he found himself on trial for disrespecting a superior officer and
disobeying orders. The source of the disrespect and disobedience was
Robinson’s refusal to sit in the back of an Army shuttle bus, which, in
accordance with Army regulations at the time, had no segregated spaces.
The prosecution, realizing Robinson’s cause was just, tried to make the
trial about his justifiably angry response to an abusive interrogation by
the camp’s provost. The plan backfired, and Robinson was acquitted.
While the military justice system moderated over time—only one
person was executed for desertion in World War II—it still delivered
wildly inconsistent outcomes, which Bray describes in great detail. These
inconsistencies got a public airing in the aftermath of World War II
and forced reform. While there had been attempts at reform during the
interwar years, those efforts failed because the Army leadership, including its chief lawyer, saw them as undermining command authority. By
1948, however, in the wake of this public accounting, congress enacted
the Elston Act, which established the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
This legislation enacted many of the reforms sought previously. Notably,
enlisted service members would serve on tribunals where the accused
was an enlisted soldier. Lawyers, furthermore, would participate in all
parts of the legal process, meaning soldiers would no longer be defended,
prosecuted, or judged by the officers who commanded them. Perhaps
most importantly, the Elston Act prohibited “unlawful command
influence,” which meant commanders could no longer tell courts they
expected a particular verdict.
Court-Martial: How Military Justice Has Shaped America from the Revolution
to 9/11 and Beyond makes fascinating reading for military lawyers and
historians—and anyone interested in American history. The book will
be especially useful to military leaders at all levels who will benefit from
this deep, nuanced description of how military justice has evolved in order
to better understand where it—and American society—is likely to go.
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Counterterrorism
Eyes, Ears & Daggers: Special Operations Forces
and the Central Intelligence Agency in America’s
Evolving Struggle against Terrorism
By Thomas H. Henriksen
Reviewed by Dr. Adrian Wolfberg, Chair of Defense Intelligence, School of
Strategic Landpower, US Army War College
Stanford, CA: Hoover
Institution Press, 2016
194 pages
$19.95

T

homas Henriksen has written a relatively short, easy-to-read, quasihistorical account of the evolutionary relationship between the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Special Operations Forces (SOF).
This book is targeted exclusively to the general public. To that audience,
this book will seem tantalizing and sexy, providing a glimpse into a dark
and mysterious topic.
The meaning of the title, Eyes, Ears & Daggers, is partially alluded
to in the book. The “eyes and ears” refers, in general, to the intelligence community, while “eyes” seem to have been synonymous with the
CIA. The metaphor of eyes for CIA is not meant to be a literal analogy
to imagery intelligence, even though part of the CIA’s roots included
ownership and control of such. The term “ears” is not explicitly referred
to in the book although the plethora of mentions about the National
Security Agency (NSA) and its signals intelligence capability are the
obvious metaphor. As Henriksen points out, however, the CIA has a
signal intelligence capability, but one dwarfed by NSA. Daggers refers
to the military instrument of power, in this case, the author usually
means the SOF.
Henriksen’s premise, which he reuses throughout the book, is that
the individuals who are soldiers sometimes become spies, and vice versa.
Using the analogy of the eighteenth-century American Revolutionary
War army officer Nathan Hale who became a spy—and was caught by
the British and executed—Henriksen attempts to trace the dynamic
interplay between those who do soldiering activities and those who
do spying activities. The CIA has done both, as has SOF, according
to Henriksen.
I have some serious concerns about the scholarly value of this book.
First, the book is a selected summary from secondary sources that are not
scholarly. The secondary sources include: books or articles authored by
individuals who were formerly employed by the various national security
organizations who revealed unauthorized disclosures, information from
leaked documents, and information supplied by anonymous sources;
and newspaper articles by syndicated authors. If primary research was
done, it was not clearly demonstrated.
Second, structured as a historical account from World War II
through 2015, the narrative within each historical era goes back and
forth in time, moving between different contexts, making it difficult
to follow Henriksen’s argumentation. From a scholarly perspective, the
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negative effect of this style of writing is the difficulty in identifying and
validating arguments of causality within this complex topic.
Third, the book has many factual errors, which leads one to wonder
how many additional errors exist beyond what I could glean. For example,
the claim is made the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was created
in 1961 to support tactical military operations, when any reading of its
creation directive, Department of Defense Directive 5105.21, 01 August
1961, defines its responsibilities primarily at the theater and strategic
levels of war. In another example, Henriksen mentions that Michael
Flynn, a recent director of DIA, was a four-star general; he was a threestar general. Other errors were noticed as well.
Fourth, the book is highly editorialized emphasizing one view
without acknowledging other views, and without evidence. For example,
Henriksen mentions Clausewitz and refers to his famous dictum, “war is
a continuation of policy,” when we know that this particular dictum was
merely his antithesis, necessary to reach his synthesis, and that his real
contribution was what Clausewitz called, the remarkable trinity; that was
his famous dictum. Henriksen mentions recent personalities in the press
and only represents them in the most positive light, yet fails to let readers
know the vast extent of differing views also mentioned in the press. For
example, Flynn is mentioned as being an outstanding colonel when in
Afghanistan, yet Henriksen fails to mention the plethora of reporting
that, at that time, he was known for his arrogance and toxic leadership
style. In another example, terrorists were almost always referred to as
“Islamic terrorists” or “violent Islamists,” without acknowledging or
explaining the intentionality and logic of those in Washington, DC
to not invoke the name of Islam to name them. One time, however,
Henriksen did refer to such as “insurgent-based terrorism” (162).
Fifth, there were two areas Henriksen briefly raised but should
have spent more effort to help the general public understand aspects of
the relationship between the CIA and SOF. The first was the sense of
identity; what does it mean to the individual who serves as a CIA or SOF
officer, and then assume opposite roles? Henriksen briefly mentions the
2003 US Army War College Strategic Research Project (SRP) by an Army
legal officer, Colonel Kathryn Stone. He used Stone’s SRP to reinforce
the idea that CIA and SOF individuals can serve in both functions of
intelligence collection and analysis and military operations. But, Stone’s
SRP was fundamentally about the legal and identity issues that separate
these two actors, focusing on what would happen, for example, if either
were a prisoner, different expectations surrounding compliance with US
law, and concerns with command and control. Henriksen could have
pivoted the discussion to address these concrete issues. Second, the
recent use of drones in nonwar zones, such as Yemen and Pakistan, was
raised briefly to discuss the conflicts in authorities over drone use, but
the logic behind who should be using drones, CIA or SOF, and why,
were not sufficiently discussed.
Finally, the recommendations proposed lacked substantive discourse
about how they might be implemented, and most have already been
proposed by others.
For many reasons, which I have attempted to identify the most
important, Eyes, Ears & Daggers is not a scholarly manuscript, nor does
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it provide new information or analysis from what has already been
published, and, consequently, it does not provide value to senior members
within and scholars of the defense or intelligence communities.

Chasing Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism
By John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

J

New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016
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$31.95

ohn Mueller and Mark G. Stewart have created a first-class work in
Chasing Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism with a hard-to-beat pedigree
of highly regarded authors, teams of research assistants supporting the
authors, numerous talks and conferences used to sharpen the arguments
contained within the book, various elements of the book appearing in
leading publications, over 600 references cited within, and the Oxford
University Press seal of approval stamped upon it. The book—per
the publisher’s synopsis—thematically “approaches terrorist-fighting
national security measures and spending with a critical questioning
from which they have largely been immune . . . analyzes the enormous
cost of finding domestic terrorists relative to the threat posed . . .
and . . . questions whether the current amount of resources allocated to
find terrorists is necessary and appropriate.” Hence, the authors argue
that Islamist extremist terrorists threatening the United States are like
ghosts that, while existing, are far more uncommon (N=62, post-9/11
through 2015) than conventionally thought (refer to Appendix A, pages
267–74). As a result, their premise is that the post-9/11 national security
apparatus established to catch terrorists is overkill and not worth the costs
associated with maintaining the present size of the massive programs
enacted to implement it.
The book begins with introductory insights into earlier ghosthunting episodes in Western history—those focused on witch hunting
(and burning) from 1480 through 1680 in Europe and communist
hunting (and career destroying) during the 1950s through the 1970s
in the United States—and how we have entered a radical Islamist
terrorist-hunting era post-9/11. Two sections make up the next portion
of the book. “The Ghosts” is composed of four chapters on official
perceptions, public perceptions, terrorism and the United States, and the
foreign adversary and mastermind myth, and “The Chase” is composed
of five chapters on counterterrorism enterprise evaluation, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Security Agency (NSA), the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and local and airport police.
The book ends with a conclusion detailing the consequences of the
present ghost chase and three appendices, the latter two which cover the
costs inflicted by terrorism (Appendix B) and marginal costs and benefits
of FBI counterterrorism expenditures (Appendix C). Derived from the
material laid out in the book and the robust cost-benefit analysis related
to it, including tables related to risk-reduction calculations, the authors
make a very convincing argument that some counterterrorism programs
are more efficient than others and that, overall, the domestic security
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apparatus put together post-9/11 is very much a “throwing money at
the problem” debacle.
Still, the major theoretical and analytical strength of the book
derived from its rationalistic methodology that utilizes a cost-benefit
approach to public policy decision-making also, counterintuitively,
represents its weakness. The methodology utilized is unable to account
for noneconomic costs and benefits hence it is, in a sense, haunted by
its own ghostly bête noire of the ethereal and unquantifiable quality
of national security itself. This point is made abundantly clear related
to the passages addressing 9/11 and Pearl Harbor in that “there was a
clear lapse in rational decision making—that is, a failure to consider
alternative policies—and that lapse was not necessarily predictable
beforehand” (75). Such alternative policies, like “shor[ing] up the
protection of US territory and to engage in a patient, far less costly Cold
War-like harassment of the much under-resourced and over-extended
Japanese empire” (75) in response to the Pearl Harbor attack, may make
theoretical sense but contextually from a national security perspective,
which follows a very different logic than simple cost-benefit analysis—
one that includes concepts of grand strategy, deterrence, and the need
for an immediate response to a crisis of governmental confidence in
the national psyche—ignore the political and military realities of
great power politics.
Sometimes a state, even a classical one such as Rome, will need to “go
Masada” on an opponent and make a political statement no matter the
high economic costs incurred by such a large-scale endeavor. While this
may fail the logic metric of simple economic costs and benefits, it affords
the state many international and domestic policy benefits. This is not to
say Chasing Ghosts is categorically wrong about the overreaction to 9/11—
it is not; it provides a valuable analytical assessment of US bureaucratic
and policy failures in this regard. Indeed, US counterterrorism policy
needs to find the reasonable middle ground between the present
inflamed passions and bureaucratic momentums which have us “chasing
ghosts” while at the same time recognizing that states and their citizens
cannot, and should not, operate like soulless automatons that simply
engage in probabilistic risk-based decision-making devoid of any
emotive or ideological considerations. While Mueller and Stewart—to
their credit—are cognizant of this dichotomy, they tend to downplay
some of the real-world policymaking considerations states engage in
for the sake of strengthening the rationalistic cost-benefit arguments
presented in the book.
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Regional Studies
Taiwan’s China Dilemma: Contested Identities and Multiple
Interests in Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Economic Policy
By Syaru Shirley Lin
Reviewed by Dr. Andrew Scobell, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation
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he US national security community is accustomed to seeing the
word “Taiwan” paired with the term “crisis.” Yet, in recent years,
the Taiwan Strait has been remarkably calm and largely absent from the
headlines. It has been replaced by media attention on other Asia-Pacific
flash points, notably the Korean peninsula, the East China Sea, and the
South China Sea. Syaru Shirley Lin’s book contains significant insights
enabling readers to understand why the Taiwan Strait has remained
largely crisis free for almost a decade.
Continued calm is not assured. Taiwan remains the most likely
location for a full-blown military conflict between the United States
and the People’s Republic of China, even if the degree of tension and
probability of a conflagration have both declined significantly. The main
reason for this decline is not that China has given up on its pursuit of
national unification with the island; on the contrary, Beijing remains
staunchly committed to political union with Taipei. As Taiwan’s China
Dilemma makes clear, political leaders in China have to date exercised
considerable patience and exhibited a good measure of pragmatism and
flexibility in pursuing this goal. This pragmatism and flexibility have
been matched by political leaders in Taiwan. The result—a remarkable
expansion of cross-strait economic relations, transportation links, and
people-to-people interactions. The island’s China dilemma refers to the
reality of Taiwan “relying economically on a partner it does not trust and
that poses an existential threat” (206).
Understanding cross-strait dynamics and focusing on Taiwan
requires an examination of multiple factors, and Lin’s book brings
these together effectively, showing how economic realities and political
aspirations interact. Merely focusing on the burgeoning economic ties
increasingly binding Taiwan to China leads to a simplistic conclusion:
eventual political union is inevitable. Meanwhile, simply focusing on
political trends in Taiwan, such as evolving identities, suggests a more
troubled and even turbulent future for the island’s relations with the
mainland. Lin examines four case studies of Taiwan’s trade policy toward
China and shows how “identity forms the basis for defining interests,”
leading the island to alternate between restriction and liberalization (12).
Taiwan’s China Dilemma underscores that while people on the island
increasingly identify as Taiwanese and less as Chinese, they also recognize their economic present and future are intertwined inescapably with
China. Psychologically, the islanders are very proud of the democratic
system they have created and the economic prosperity they have built
through ingenuity and hard work. For Washington, Taipei’s persistent
Beijing dilemma demands continued US vigilance.
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Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics,
and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards
By Afshon Ostovar
Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, Professor Emeritus, US Army War College

A

fshon Ostovar’s Vanguard of the Imam is a study of the political and
military role of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
since it was established in early 1979 as a pillar of the country’s new
revolutionary regime. Ostovar describes the development of the IRGC
from its beginnings as a loose grouping of proregime militias until its
emergence as a major force in Iranian politics and security over time.
Ostovar notes IRGC units began as a collection of Islamic militias within
a postrevolutionary patchwork of anti-monarchist groups that also
included powerful armed leftist organizations. Aware of the leftist threat
to its authority, the Islamic government quickly appointed an IRGC
command headquarters that provided the militia units with official status
and began the effort to centralize the force. The IRGC’s official standing
also gave it the political cover it needed to engage in actions such as
disarming rival militias and detaining suspected counterrevolutionaries
before turning them over to the doubtful justice of revolutionary
courts. Throughout this period of upheaval, Ayatollah Khomeini, the
leader of the new government, stressed the danger of foreign powers
attempting to undo the revolution through a campaign of subversion and
other hostile acts. With Khomeini’s encouragement, the IRGC leaders
correspondingly justified the campaign against potential rivals as a fight
against US and Israeli “plots.”
A central turning point for the development of the IRGC was the
Iran-Iraq War, which began with Saddam Hussein’s September 1980
invasion of Iran. At the beginning of this struggle, IRGC fighters were
poorly armed, undisciplined, badly trained, poorly led, and had only a
few units with combat experience (against Kurdish guerrillas). The organization, nevertheless, did everything it could to rise to the occasion.
Early in the war, the IRGC leadership attempted to substitute the
revolutionary enthusiasm of its members for military expertise. In this
environment, IRGC military efforts yielded high Iranian casualties, but
over time members’ combat skills improved, and sometimes the force
inflicted serious setbacks on the usually less-motivated Iraqi ground
troops, especially in urban fighting. As the war continued, the IRGC
and its subordinate Basij militia (mostly made up of boys in their early
and mid teens) became the chief proponents of mass infantry assaults as
well as the primary participants in such operations (often described as
“human waves”). These tactics produced horrendous Iranian casualties,
but they also helped to break the Iraqi army’s defensive formations in
Iran and push the Iraqis back into their home territory. This approach
further leveraged Iran’s larger population as a way of countering Iraqi
technological superiority and greater access to weapons suppliers.
Flushed with these grisly victories, the IRGC gradually replaced
the regular army as Iran’s leading operational force in the conflict.
Moreover, so long as the Iranians continued to rely on human-wave
tactics, the IRGC/Basij forces could plausibly claim that they should
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be the dominant forces for achieving an Iranian victory. Unfortunately
for these organizations, they championed this tactic long after the
Iraqis had learned to cope with it through dramatic improvements in
their system of defenses. Iranian mass infantry attacks increasingly led
to horrendous losses for negligible gains. By 1988, Iran had suffered a
number of battlefield defeats and no longer had a viable path to winning
the war. Consequently, the regime had no other option except to agree
to a United Nations sponsored plan to end the war. The Iran-Iraq War
correspondingly ended in August 1988 without any clear Iranian gains.
The failure to defeat Iraq served as a significant blow to the prestige of
the IRGC with its previous unrelenting calls for more sacrifice as the
road to total victory.
Despite these setbacks, the IRGC sought new roles for itself in the
post-war era and in an especially significant move established the Qods
Force. This elite IRGC force took over the responsibility for exporting
Islamic revolution and thereby creating a regional order more open to
Iranian power and priorities. The IRGC correspondingly became the
main instrument of Iranian meddling throughout the region, replacing
the Office of Liberation Movements, and building on previous IRGC
involvement in countries such as Lebanon. Ties to Shia overseas clients
and militias were a priority, and these groups have often been especially
receptive to Iranian influence, although the IRGC has also supported
some Sunni groups that share its goals. In contemporary times, the
Qods Force has played an important role in supporting the Assad regime
in Syria and is a major supporter of the most prominent Shia militias
fighting ISIS in Iraq. Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani has
claimed the uprising against the Assad regime in Syria is part of a much
larger Western plan to weaken “Iran’s place in the region” (207).
Also in contemporary times, the IRGC continues its intense
devotion to Iran’s supreme leader. The IRGC’s role and functions are
safeguarded through the dominance of the leader within Iran’s theocratic
system and his special relationship with the IRGC. The 2009 elections,
which are widely assumed to have been rigged by the government, serve
as an example of this relationship. As unrest expanded, angry mass
demonstrations against the vote rigging became a serious problem for
the regime, especially when demonstrators singled out Supreme Leader
Ali Khamenei, in chants of “death to the dictator” (185). The IRGC
correspondingly unleashed Basij militia forces (which may number over
four million) to crush the demonstrators and brutally restore order
for the regime.
Despite this and other chilling episodes, Ostovar concludes on what
seems like a bit of forced optimism suggesting that the IRGC may yet
find itself weakened by the longing of the Iranian population for reform
as evidenced by a number of elections where moderate candidates for
office did well despite systematic governmental efforts obstruct their
success. He also notes that a future supreme leader will almost certainly
enter the office weaker than Ayatollah Khamenei, and may need to
make concessions on reform to maintain some level of legitimacy for the
system. Such developments are certainly possible, but it is also possible
that the current system, which has become remarkably resilient, will
maintain itself in the same basic form for some time to come.
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Military History
High Command: British Military Leadership
in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars
By Christopher L. Elliott
Reviewed by Anthony C. King, Chair in War Studies, Department of Politics
and International Studies, University of Warwick

T

he period 2003–9 remains a traumatic one for the British defense
establishment. The United Kingdom had committed to a deeply
unpopular and possibly illegal war in Iraq in 2003 and, then, already
embroiled in a failing and underresourced struggle in Basra, the country
launched itself into another major campaign in Helmand. Operating far
in excess of defense planning assumptions, the results were predictable.
The British forces, led by the army, suffered a humiliating defeat
in Basra, while they proved, despite their best efforts, incapable of
pacifying Helmand. The implications for the transatlantic relationship
were profound.
In High Command: British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan
Wars, Christopher Elliott, a former two-star general in the British
Army, seeks to explain how the British armed forces and the defense
community could have failed so badly. There has been much criticism
of the senior commanders and politicians over the Iraq and Afghan
campaigns culminating in the Chilcot Inquiry into the Iraq War. Elliott,
however, notes an oversight: “what the witnesses at the Chilcot Inquiry
have not revealed is why good, principled, capable public servants took
the actions that they did” (1). He, therefore, determines to explain
this conundrum.
Understandably, Elliott wants to avoid the polemical and ad hominem
criticisms that have been levelled at senior commanders. Explaining the
Iraq-Afghan debacle would be easy if senior officers were just stupid,
weak, or malign. For him, the debacle over Basra and Helmand is
interesting precisely because senior officers were overwhelmingly so
honest, hard-working, and professional. In the last section of the book,
he discusses each Chief of the Defence of Staff who served from 1998 to
2010, concluding “it is self-evident that officers of high ability achieved
the top military post of UK Chief of the Defence Staff in his period.”
Similarly, “all the military chiefs who worked with the Secretaries of
State [for Defence] of the decade had nothing but admiration for them”
(44). Overseen by competent professionals, the British crisis was an
anomaly, then, which Elliott wants to unravel.
Elliott proposes two central explanations for the crisis. Firstly, while
individual officers at every level were highly capable, the armed forces
institutionalized a system of command that was unhelpful in this era. As
an imperial power, British forces have long been accustomed to devolving
authority to local commanders. The introduction of mission command
into British military doctrine from the 1980s has only accentuated this
tendency. Consequently, despite the existence of significant command
nodes in the United Kingdom, such as the Permanent Joint Headquarters
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(PJHQ) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) Director of Operations,
senior commanders in London consistently referred to commanders on
the ground in Iraq and Helmand as “there emerged a culture where there
was just too much deference to the commander on the ground” (177).
Consequently, focused on the tactical issues of the local commander,
normally on a six-month tour, no coherent national strategy was ever
developed and “it was inevitable that each successive vision changed
substantially on handover, not least because of deference from PJHQ
and the MOD to the man on the ground.”
Excessive decentralization was partly a product of the second
central reason for the crisis—the politics of the Ministry of Defence and
Whitehall, more broadly. Elliott outlines how the different interests and
priorities of politicians, civil servants, and military officers sometimes
conflicted with each other to prevent coherent strategic decision-making.
In addition, the administrative procedures of Whitehall, a monstrous
bureaucracy, impeded coherent decision-making and responsibility.
In an opening vignette, Elliott describes the niceties of its
“Byzantine processes” with sharp irony. On his first day as director of
military operations in the MOD, Elliott was given a series of files on
which to make a decision. Finding the staff-work flawless, he confidently
signed off on each file without reference to his colleagues. The decisions
seemed so obvious no consultation was required. Elliott, however,
was soon confronted by his subordinate: “Brigadier, you signed off
the files . . . without socializing them?” (4). No matter how obvious a
decision, it was the norm in the Ministry of Defence to confer with the
Head of Secretariat, Finance, and probably the Foreign Office, too.
Against this viscosity, strategic commanders in London found it
easier to short-circuit decisions by simply passing them down to the local
commanders and then presenting the Ministry of Defence, Whitehall,
and, indeed, the government with a fait accompli. Yet, the consequences
of this ad hockery became obvious in Iraq “when the British found
themselves up to their necks in a problem very much greater than they
had first anticipated, they lacked the political and institutional will to
resolve it, either by reinforcing with sufficient combat forces to master
the insurgency or by deploying sufficient cross-government capabilities
to exploit military success where it appeared” (125). The episode was
truly tragic.
Written by an insider, High Command provides a very useful and
perceptive insight into the problems which vitiated British strategy in the
crucial decade after the September 11 attacks. There is but one irony in
the book. Elliott rightly highlights the problems of interservice rivalry in
the Ministry of Defence. As an army officer, however, he cannot always
resist a subtle dig at the Royal Marines. He notes the apparent anomaly of
sending the marines to landlocked Afghanistan in 2002. While the fact
that the Chief of the Defence Staff was an admiral was not irrelevant, the
United States requested the Royal Marines for their expertise in mountainous terrain—not for their amphibious capabilities. More archly,
Elliott records “several have commented in interview that the hugely
talented and influential [Royal Marines] Lieutenant General Sir Rob Fry
would have approached things differently as Director of Operations in
the MOD if he had experienced high field command himself, which
through no fault of his own, was denied to him” (179). While the British
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Army has two divisions and a corps, the largest formation of the Royal
Marines is, of course, a brigade. Tribalism lives on.

MacArthur’s Korean War Generals
By Stephen R. Taaffe
Reviewed by Donald W. Boose Jr., Contract Faculty Instructor, US Army War
College; author of US Army Forces in the Korean War 1950–53 (Osprey
Publishing, 2005); and coeditor of The Ashgate Research Companion to the
Korean War (Routledge, 2014)

I

n this fascinating book, Stephen R. Taaffe examines the performance of
and relationships among senior US ground force commanders during
the first year of the Korean War when General Douglas MacArthur
served as the unified, multinational commander-in-chief, Far East
Command, and commander-in-chief, United Nations Command (UNC).
During MacArthur’s tenure, his forces first conducted a delay against
attacking North Korean forces, then began a counteroffensive with the
amphibious landing at Inchon and subsequent push deep into North
Korea. A massive Chinese intervention in the winter of 1950–51 forced
the UNC back into South Korea. A renewed UNC counteroffensive
and subsequent war of movement in 1951 culminated in a final drive
back to a line generally north of the 38th Parallel. At that point, the two
sides began negotiations that would, after another 18 months of bloody
but static conflict, bring an armistice that remains in effect to this day.
For each phase, Taaffe provides clear, tightly written descriptions of the
strategic situation, the military operations, and the actions of the senior
ground force leaders. He concludes each section with an analysis of the
performance of the senior leaders.
Taaffe, an experienced and respected military historian who has
published several excellent books on senior American military leaders
during the Revolution, the Civil War, and World War II, is well placed to
make these assessments. His evaluations are thoughtful, well informed,
and persuasive. He deals with the two most controversial Korean War
generals, MacArthur and X Corps Commander Edward M. Almond,
objectively and unemotionally. He argues some of the qualities that
had made MacArthur successful in the Pacific in World War II (giving
his subordinates free play, remaining aloof from tactical decisions, and
playing senior leaders against each other) were counterproductive in
Korea. He also faults MacArthur for his decision to separate Almond’s
X Corps from Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker’s Eighth Army, for
withdrawing X Corps to conduct an amphibious turning movement into
northeastern Korea, and for his hasty, ill-organized push north that left
UNC forces vulnerable to the Chinese attack. Almond, he concludes
“was certainly an overbearing, arbitrary, and insensitive man who made
mistakes, but his innate aggressiveness and single-minded determination
to win paid big dividends for the Eighth Army” (172).
Walker, MacArthur’s ground component commander, tried with
his understrength and poorly equipped Eighth Army to stop stronger,
better-prepared North Korean forces during the chaotic and desperate
first two months of the war. While noting examples of inadequate
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leadership by some of Walker’s subordinates, Taaffe praises Walker
for his conduct of the delay and subsequent tenacious defense of the
Pusan Perimeter. He also notes Walker did not have MacArthur’s full
confidence, refused to challenge some of MacArthur’s questionable
decisions, and failed to relieve weak subordinates from fear of being
relieved himself. Taaffe blames the substandard performance of some of
Walker’s subordinates in part on their selection, based not on previous
performance, but rather to give them experience at a regimental or
divisional command or as a reward prior to retirement.
Walker was killed in a traffic accident in December 1950. His
replacement, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, had the full
confidence of both MacArthur and Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton
Collins, which greatly strengthened Ridgway’s position, allowing him
to replace most of the early-war division commanders and to take
other actions that improved capabilities. Ridgway’s Eighth Army, now
experienced in combat and under solid leadership at all levels, stopped
the Chinese winter offensive.
Taaffe continues his analysis beyond April 1951, when President
Truman relieved MacArthur of command and replaced him with
Ridgway. Ridgway in turn was replaced as Eighth Army commander
by Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, whom Taaffe rates highly.
Under Van Fleet, Eighth Army stopped another Chinese offensive and
drove north, well past the 38th Parallel. Taaffe argues, despite an uneven
performance earlier in the war, Eighth Army fought well enough to win
the war militarily. He insists Van Fleet most likely could have continued
the offensive further north, and he notes it was a political decision, not
the military situation, that stopped Eighth Army.
Readers may argue with some of Taaffe’s judgments, but he
has exhaustively examined the documentary evidence and makes a
compelling case. MacArthur’s Korean War Generals is particularly relevant
to readers of Parameters. What could be more valuable to senior military
professionals than a well-informed study of leadership and operational
art during a major and challenging war? This is the heart and soul of the
military profession, and Taaffe makes a substantial contribution to the
grand conversation on the art of war.

The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational
Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger
By Gerhard P. Gross
Reviewed by Richard L. DiNardo, Professor of National Security Affairs, US
Marine Corps Command and Staff College
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C

ertainly no foreign military establishment has garnered more
attention in the United States than the German army. Historically,
the German army of World War II has taken the lion’s share of interest,
but consideration of the army of the Kaiserreich has grown with the
arrival of the centennial of the Great War. Some scholars, most notably
Robert M. Citino, have posited the idea of a “German way of war.”
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This volume by Gerhard Gross is a welcome addition to the corpus of
literature on this subject.
Gross, is both a colonel and a career officer in the German Bundeswehr
and a well-published author and researcher. Until recently, he had been
the head of the Department of German Military History before 1945
at the Center for Military History and Social Sciences of the Bundeswehr
(ZMSB) located in Potsdam, Germany. The center is the successor to
the former Military History Research Office (MGFA), the organization
that had produced the German “semiofficial” history of World War II,
translated into English under the title Germany and the Second World War.
Gross’s work is very similar to Citino’s German Way of War, but with
some important and interesting differences. Where they agree is on the
basic parameters of the Prusso-German approach to war. Given the
geographic circumstances of the Prussian kingdom, the Prussian army
and its German successor sought to fight short wars, quickly decided by
sharp offensively oriented campaigns culminating in decisive battles.
Thus, while Napoleon is often credited with creating this style of warfare,
for the great Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz, Napoleon was merely
the continuator of a process really begun by Frederick William, Elector
of Brandenburg.
While Citino began his work with Frederick, the Great Elector
of the seventeenth century, Gross begins his book with Helmuth von
Moltke, Moltke the Elder, and thus wades into a controversy that still
resonates today, especially in the American military. Moltke is credited
with creating the operational level of warfare—or at least identifying
it. Defining it, however, was another matter. As Gross notes, Moltke
contributed to the confusion with the looseness of his language in his
writing on the subject.
The greatest danger to the German army’s preferred method of
warfare was something over which the army had no control, namely
increasing size. The span of Moltke’s career saw the rise of mass armies,
first in the American Civil War and later in Europe after the creation of
the German Empire in 1871. The growth in the size of armies made the
prospect of waging a short, sharp conflict problematic. Although all the
European war plans that were developed called for decisive campaigns,
other factors almost ensured the plans would miscarry. Primary among
these factors was logistics. Gross notes the failure to take logistics
into account was one of the constant weaknesses of German military
planning throughout the period of both world wars.
Another critical factor for the German way of war was the
environment in which war was conducted. The German high command,
both during and after the war, pointed to the Battle of Tannenberg as
the ideal operation. Gross, however, identifies two important things that
run counter to this fixation. First, Tannenberg was a defensive battle, as
opposed to the German army’s preferred posture, which was offensive.
In addition, the battle was fought on German territory, allowing German
commanders Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff to make use
of the excellent road and rail system.
The German method of waging war was thus best suited to areas of
central and western Europe, where road and rail systems could facilitate
the conduct of rapid operations. Where these systems were not present,
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most notably in the expanses of Russia, the German way of warfare
either yielded indecisive (if occasionally spectacular) results or broke
down completely.
Where German military thinking really failed was in its focus,
which was generally downward. Thus, the focus of thinking, education,
and doctrine produced an army that was operationally nimble and
tactically adept, but strategically as bereft of ideas as the country’s
political leadership.
Gross goes beyond the scope of most works on German military
history, including Citino’s, by extending his discussion into the early
Cold War period. The thinking of both German armies owed much
to its predecessor, although the Soviet army had also developed its
operational theory during the war. For the newly created Bundeswehr,
the key figure was Adolf Heusinger, a high-level staff officer who was
arrested by the Gestapo in 1944 as a suspect in the attempt to kill Adolf
Hitler. Ironically, the German approach to conventional warfare worked
best when incorporated into a broader alliance system, where a bigger
ally really determined the strategy.
In conclusion, Gross has made a major contribution to the literature
in this field. The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking
from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger is indispensable reading for any student
of the topic.
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